power that is granted to the United States. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; 5 Cond. Rep. 562. 26. Although congress cannot enable a state to legislate, it may adopt the provisions of a state law on any subject. Ibid.

27. The power granted to congress by the constitution, "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States," does not exclude the right of the states to legislate on the same subject, except when the power is actually exercised by congress, and the state laws conflict with those of congress. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; 6 Cond. Rep. 523.

28. An act of congress, laying an embargo for an indefinite period of time, is constitutional and valid. United States v. The William, District Court of the U. S. of Massachusetts District, 2 Hall's

Am. Law Journ. 255.

29. In an action of trespass for assault and battery, and false imprisonment, the defendant pleaded that a congress was held and sitting during the period of the trespass complained of; that the house of representatives had resolved, that the plaintiff had been guilty of a breach of the privilege of the house, and of a high contempt of the dignity and authority of the same; and had ordered that the speaker should issue his warrant to the sergeant-at-arms, commanding him to take the plaintiff into custody, wherever to be found, and to have him before the house to answer to the said charges; and that the speaker did, accordingly, issue such a warrant, reciting the said resolution and order, and commanding the sergeant-at-arms to take the plaintiff into custody, &c., and delivered the said warrant to the defendant, the sergeant-at-arms. By virtue of which warrant the defendant arrested the plaintiff, and conveyed him to the bar of the house, where he was heard in his defence, touching the matter of the said charge; and the examination being adjourned from day to day, and the house having ordered the plaintiff to be detained in custody, he was accordingly detained by the defendant, until he was finally adjudged to be guilty, and convicted of the charge aforesaid, and ordered to be forthwith brought to the bar, and reprimanded by the speaker, and then discharged from custody; and after being thus reprimanded, was actually discharged from the arrest and custody aforesaid: Held, that the matters set forth in the plea amounted to a legal justification. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; 5 Cond. Rep. 66.

30. The house of representatives of the United States has authority to punish for contempt persons not members of the body. This power is necessarily implied, and extends to the imprisonment of the party. Ibid.

31. The imprisonment, under an order of the house of representatives, must, at all events, terminate with the adjournment or periodical dissolution of the house. The process issued by the house in such a case, may be executed any where within the United States. Ibid.

32. Congress, when legislating for the District of Columbia, under the 8th section of the 1st article of the constitution, is still the legislature

of the Union; and its acts are laws of the United States. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 424; 5 Cond. Rep. 90.

33. A legislative declaration, that a foreign edict is repugnant to the law of nations, and a violation of the neutral rights of the United States, does not annul the sentences of foreign tribunals founded upon such edict. Williams et al. v. Armroyd, 7 Čranch, 423; 2 Cond. Rep. 556.

34. Congress is competent to make such declaration, and competent to limit its operation, or to give it effect by such means as its own wisdom may suggest. And had congress declared, that all sentences pronounced under such edict, shall be considered as void, and incapable of changing the property it professes to condemn, the courts of the United States would give effect to such legislative declaration, by recognising the title of the original owner. But until congress does declare void such sentences of condemnation, they retain the obligatory effect common to all sentences, whether erroneous or otherwise, that of binding the property on which they act. Ibid.

35. Congress have a constitutional right to enlist minors in the navy or army, without the consent of their parents. United States v. Bainbridge, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 71.

36. The act of the assembly of the state of Delaware, by which the construction of a dam erected by the plaintiffs was authorized, shows plainly that this is one of those many creeks passing through a deep level marsh, adjoining the Delaware, up which the tide flows for some distance. The value of the property on its banks, must be enhanced by excluding the water from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably improved. Measures calculated to produce these objects, provided they do not come in collision with the powers of the general government, are, undoubtedly, within those which are reserved to the states. The measure authorized by this act stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those who have been accustomed to use it. But this abridgement, unless it comes in conflict with the constitution, or a law of the United States, is an affair between the government of Delaware and its citizens, of which the supreme court can take no cognizance. If congress had passed any act, in execution of the power to regulate commerce, the object of which was, to control state legislation over these small navigable creeks, into which the tide ebbs and flows, and which abound throughout the lower country of the middle and southern states, the supreme court would feel not much difficulty in saying, that a state law, coming in conflict with such act, would be void. But congress has passed no such act. The repugnancy of the law of Delaware is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the law to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states; a power which has not been so exercised as to affect this question. Wilson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Company, 4 Peters, 251.

as he thinks proper. These powers no man ever disputed; neither has it ever been controverted that the king might change part or the whole of the law or political form of government of a conquered dominion. Ibid. 41.

11. An acquisition by discovery, is, by the usage of all the discovering nations of Europe, put on the same footing as conquest, as to the power of the sovereign of the nation which makes the discovery. He has the propriety and dominion of the territory, in full sovereignty, and it passes from sovereign to sovereign by cession, in the plenitude of original right. (8 Wheat. 574, &c., 2 Peters, 300, 301.) This principle has been adopted in the United States to its full extent: and the whole country was first granted by the king, as by right of conquest, though it might have been more conformable to historical facts, to consider it strictly as the right by discovery. It is, however, needless to examine this question, after the lucid and able review of the subject by the supreme court of the United States, in Johnson v. M'Intosh. (8 Wheat. 574-604.) It must be received as the established law, that the king had the same power over the territory held by him on this continent, as if it had been acquired by conquest. The opinion of the court is full and conclusive to this point: and as this principle is the foundation of all the rights of property and government, existing before the revolution, it is not to be questioned, or the reasons of its adoption examined. It has been a fundamental law, from the first settlement of the British colonies, and must be respected by all courts, as it has been definitely settled by universal consent and judicial authority, that the rights and power accruing by discovery or conquest, are identical with this qualification, subject only to Indian occupancy in the nature of a lease for years. (8 Wheat. 577, 578, 579, 588, 592, 603, S. P. 6 Cranch, 140. 9 Peters, 745.) Ibid. 42, 43.

12. Even in cases of conquest, the conqueror does no more than replace the sovereign, and assume dominion over the country. "A cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the property of the inhabitants. The king cedes only that which belongs to him; lands he had previously granted, were not his to cede. Neither party could so understand the Louisiana treaty. Neither party could consider itself as attempting a wrong to individuals, condemned by the whole civilized world. The cession of a territory' should necessarily be understood to pass the sovereignty only, and not to interfere with private property." No construction of a treaty, which would impair that security to private property, which the laws and usages of nations would without express stipulation have conferred, would seem to be admissible, further than its positive words require. "Without it, the title of individuals would remain as valid under the new government as they were under Je old; and those titles, at least so far as they were consummate, might be asserted in the

CONSIDERATION.

1. To constitute a consideration for the endorsement of a promissory note, it is not necessary that a benefit should accrue to the promissor; it is sufficient that something valuable flows from the promissee, and that the promise is the inducement to the transaction. Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch, 142; 2 Cond. Rep. 214.

2. The endorser of a promissory note, who receives no value for his endorsement from a subsequent endorser, or from the drawer, cannot set up the want of consideration received by himself: he will not be permitted to say that the promise is made without consideration; be cause money paid by the promissee to another is as valid a consideration as if paid to the promissor himself. M'Donald v. Magruder, 3 Peters, 474.

3. A deed made upon a valuable and adequate consideration, which is actually paid, and the change of property is bona fide, or such as it purports to be, cannot be considered as a conveyance to defraud creditors. Wheaton v. Sexton's Lessee, 4 Wheat. 503; 4 Cond. Rep. 519.

4. A release being once regularly executed and delivered, can never afterwards be avoided at law, by a failure of one of the parties to perform an act, in consideration of which the release was given. It can amount only to a breach of contract, for which the person culpable will be personally liable to the party aggrieved. Fitzsimmons et al. v. Ogden et al., 7 Cranch, 2; 2 Cond. Rep. 395.

5. The payment of the money by the endorser after protest, is a good consideration for an assumpsit, on the part of the maker, to pay the amount of the notes with costs of protest. Morgan v. Reintzel, 7 Cranch, 273; 2 Cond. Rep.

486.

6. Where a promissory note is given for the purchase of real property, the failure of consideration, through defect of title, must be total, to constitute a good defence to an action on the note. Greenleaf v. Cook, 2 Wheat. 13; 4 Cond. Rep. 7.

7. It has been long settled that a promise made in consideration of an act which is forbidden by the law, is void. It will not be questioned, that an act forbidden by the constitution of the United States, which is the supreme law, is against law. Craig et al. v. State of Missouri, 4 Peters, 431.

8. A promissory note given for certificates issued at the loan office of Chariton, in Missouri, payable to the state of Missouri, under the act of the legislature "establishing loan offices," is therefore void. Ibid.

9. A contract was made for rebuilding Fort Washington, by M., a public agent, and a deputy quartermaster-general, with B., in the profits of which M. was to participate. False measures of the work were attempted to be imposed

m the government, the success of which was prevented by the vigilance of the accounting officers of the treasury. A bill was filed to compel an alleged partner in the contract to account for and pay to one of the partners in the transaction, one-half of the loss sustained in the execution of the contract. By the supreme court: To state such a case is to decide it. Public morals, public justice, and the well established principles of all judicial tribunals, alike forbid the interposition of courts of justice to lend their aid to purposes like this. To enforce a contract which began with the corruption of a public officer, and progressed in the practice of known wilful deception in its execution, can never be approved or sanctioned by any court. Bartle v. Coleman, 4 Peters, 184.

10. The law leaves the parties to such a contract as it found them. If either has sustained a loss by the bad faith of a particeps criminis, it is but a just infliction for premeditated and deeply practised fraud. He must not expect that a judicial tribunal will degrade itself by an exertion of its powers to shift the loss from one to the other; or to equalize the benefits or burdens, which may have resulted from the violation of every principle of morals and of law. Ibid.

master and part owner of a ship engaged in the slave trade, by his partners in the joint concern; nor against an agent who is a party to the original traffic, and has the proceeds in his hands. Fales v. Mayberry, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 560.

17. If a ship be sold in a foreign port, to evade a forfeiture incurred to the United States, no action can be sustained on the contract of sale for the proceeds. Ibid.

18. The courts of the United States will not enforce an agreement, not in itself immoral, but a stratagem authorized by the laws of war, entered into in fraud of the laws of the United States; though made between persons then enemies of the United States, and the suit instituted on the agreement after the restoration of peace. Hannay v. Eve, 3 Cranch, 242; 1 Cond. Rep. 512.

19. Where a contract grows immediately out of, and is connected with an illegal or immoral act, a court of justice will not enforce it. Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; 6 Cond. Rep. 298.

20. But if the promise be unconnected with the illegal act, and is founded on a new consideration, it is not tainted with the act; although it was known to the party to whom the promise was made, and although he was principal in the illegal act. Ibid.

12. Bills of exchange and negotiable promissory notes, are distinguished from all other parol contracts, by the circumstance that they are prima facie evidence of valuable consideration, both between the original parties, and against hird persons. Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 77; 4 Cond. Rep. 642.

13. A promise to pay on a consideration exetuted, if such a consideration was induced by the request of the defendant, or by some prerious duty, or if the debt be continuing at the time, or is barred by some statute or rule of aw; is a sufficient consideration to sustain an action of assumpsit. Lonsdale v. Brown, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 404.

for an illegal importation, or should advance money to B., to enable him to pay those expenses; these acts, constituting no part of the original scheme, there would be a new contract, unconnected with the original act, although remotely caused by it; and such contract would not be so contaminated by the offensive act, as to preclude A. from recovering. Ibid.

22. It is a salutary rule, founded on morality and good policy, and which recommends itself to the good sense of every one, that no man ought to be heard in a court of justice, who seeks to enforce a contract founded on, or arising out of moral or political turpitude. Toler v. Armstrong, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 297.

15. One who has agreed to pay a sum of money out of funds expected to come into his hands, is not excused from the payment, if, by his own default, the funds were not received. Blight v. Ashley, Peters' C. C. R. 15.

16. No action can be maintained against a

been applied. Does the taint in the original transaction infect and vitiate every contract growing out of it, however remotely connected with it? this would be to extend the rule beyond the policy which produced it, and would lead to the most inconvenient consequences. Ibid.

24. The rule as now clearly settled is, that where the contract grows immediately out of it, or is connected with an illegal or immoral act, a court of justice will not lend its aid to enforce it And if the contract be in part only connecter