General Principles. title, who had failed to prosecute their claims for upwards of thirty years, were confirmed in their titles, and adjudged to pay the purchase-money of the land to the holders of the superior equitable title. Boone v. Chiles, 10 Peters, 177. the decree of the Bourbon court, answered, asserting their possession, and that they were pro tected by the statute of limitation; and submitted to such rules and regulations, according to law and equity, as the case may require. In 1822, Thomas Boone made an agreement with Boone Engles, by which the latter took upon him the institution and conducting of this suit, for a portion of the benefit to be derived from it; and this the persons in possession allege to be champerty. The court decreed a conveyance by Chiles, and by others who held the legal title, to be made to the complainants, of all the lands unsold, and not in the possession of others; and that those who are in possession, who had purchased from Chiles, should pay to the complainants the sums which they agreed to pay, respectively, with interest, according to their respective contracts. Boone v. Chiles, 10 Peters, 177. 117. It is a general principle in courts of equity, that, where both parties claim by an equitable title, the one who is prior in time is deemed the better in right; and that where the equities are equal in point of merit, the law prevails. Ibid. having charged that the land had been occupied by them for ten or twelve years, as the tenants of the holder of the legal title. They were not charged with fraud, nor were they placed in any such relation to the land. By the 116. The complainants filed a bill in the circuit court of Kentucky, claiming a conveyance of the legal title, and an account of rents and profits of a tract of land, the legal title to which was derived in virtue of the law of Virginia, under a settlement and a pre-emption right, held by Reuben Searcy. Searcy gave his bond to Hoy, to make a deed of one-half of the land to which he was thus entitled; the other half having been given by him to one Martin, to obtain the location and patenting. He afterwards gave the plats and surveys to Hoy, who, in 1785, obtained a patent for the land, which he was to have a deed for. Hoy, in 1781, assigned the bond of Searcy to George Boone, and made himself surety for its performance: and George Boone assigned the bond to Thomas Boone, the ancestor of the complainants. Thomas Boone lived in the state of Pennsylvania, and was in Kentucky in 1802, 1810, and 1819, in the neighbourhood of the land; but while there he took no measures, personally, to obtain the title or possession of it. In 118. The tenants in possession of land, of 1787, he gave to George Boone a power of attor- which the complainants claimed a conveyance ney to obtain a conveyance of the land; and in of the legal title, were made parties to the pro1802 he made a conditional sale of it to Heze-ceeding by an amended bill; the original bill kiah Boone; but the condition was not performed by Hezekiah Boone; so that under the agreement he obtained no right to the land. Possession was taken of parts of the land, and improvements made as early as or before 1806, and the persons in possession are among the defend-supreme court-No case exists, as to the tenants, ants. George Boone exceeded his powers, and made agreements to sell the land; and also agreed to give up to one of the heirs of Hoy, Searcy's bond; and some of the heirs sold parts of the land to the persons in possession, asserting a right to the legal title; and another of the heirs sold, by a quit-claim deed, all her rights, as one of the heirs of Hoy, to Green Clay. Afterwards William Chiles, alleging that he had obtained from George Boone, and from Hezekiah Boone, the conditional purchaser, the equitable right of Thomas Boone, under Searcy's bond, filed in the name of Thomas, George and Hezekiah Boone, and in his own name, in the county court of Bourbon county, a bill against the heirs of Hoy, the persons in possession, and against Green Clay, alleging him to be a purchaser, with notice of Thomas Boone's equitable title under Searcy and Hoy; and obtained from that court a decree for a conveyance to him of the legal title; and afterwards a deed for the same, from a commissioner appointed to execute the same. This decree was afterwards, on appeal, reversed for informality; but before the same was reversed, the complainants filed this bill, asking for a conveyance from Chiles of all the title he held in the land, either under the decree, or in any other manner. Chiles, after the bill was filed, purchased from Green Clay the rights he held; and, in his answer, alleges him to have been an innocent purchaser, without notice. The persons in possession, who purchased from Chiles, after for the interference of a court of equity, whether they occupied the lands as the tenants of the holder of the legal title, as declared in the ori ginal bill, or as tenants in possession under another; the complainants are to be supposed to have their remedy at law for the recovery of the land, until they shall charge and show that the tenants obtained and retain possession in contravention of some equity subsisting between them and the complainants. Ringo v. Binns, 10 Peters, 269. 119. No practice of the circuit court, inconsistent with the rules of practice established by the supreme court for the circuit courts, can be admissible to control them. Bank of the United States v. White, 8 Peters, 262. 120. The appellants filed a bill in the circuit court of Pennsylvania, claiming to have a bond and mortgage cancelled and delivered up to them. They alleged, which was denied by the defendant, that the same was given without consideration; was induced by threats of a prosecution, for a criminal offence, against the hus band of the mortgagor, and that the instruments were therefore void; and that they were obtained by the influence the mortgagee exercised over the mortgagor, he being a clergyman, and her religious visitor, and her mind being weak or impaired. The circuit court of Pennsylvania dis missed the bill; and on appeal to the supreme court, the decree of the circuit court was affirmed. A court of chancery will often refuse General Principles. to enforce a contract, when it would also refuse | arduous were contemplated, but the object of to annul it. In such a case, the parties are those services had been attained. Allen v. Hamleft to their remedy at law. Jackson v. Ashton, mond, 11 Peters, 63. 11 Peters, 229. 121. If a life estate in land is sold, and at the time of the sale the estate is terminated by the death of the person in whom the right vested, a court of equity would rescind the purchase. If a horse is sold, which both parties believed to be alive, but was dead at the time of sale, the purchaser would not be compelled to pay the consideration. The law on this subject is clearly stated in the case of Hitchcock v. Giddings, Daniel's Exchequer Reports, 1, where it is said that a vendor is bound to know he actually has that which he professes to sell. And even though the subject of the contract be known to both parties to be liable to a contingency which may destroy it immediately, yet if the contingency has already happened, it will be void. Allen v. Hammond, 11 Peters, 63. 122. The provisions of the local law or civil code of Louisiana, were applied to a case which was instituted in the district court of the United States, under the chancery powers vested in that court, by the constitution of the United States, giving chancery jurisdiction to the courts of the United States. Livingston v. Story, 11 Peters, 351. 123. The brig Ann, of Boston, on a voyage from New Orleans to Madeira, &c., was unlawfully captured by a part of the Portuguese squadron, and was, with her cargo, condemned. Upon the remonstrance of the government of the United States, the claim of the owner for compensation for this capture was, on the 19th of January, 1832, admitted by the government of Portugal, to an amount exceeding thirty-three thousand dollars, one-fourth of which was soon after paid. On the 27th of January, 1832, the owner of the Ann and cargo, neither of the parties knowing of the admission of the claim by Portugal, made an agreement with the appellant to allow him a sum a little below one-third of the whole amount of the sum admitted, as commissions, on his agreeing to use his utmost efforts for the recovery thereof. At the time this agreement was made, which was under seal, H., the appellee, was indebted to the appellant, A., two hundred and sixty-eight dollars for services rendered to him in the course of a commercial agency for him. In the contract it was agreed that this debt should be released. Under the contract, A. received the payment of one-fourth the amount admitted to be due to H. by Portugal; and H. filed a bill to have the contract rescinded, and delivered up to him; the debt of two hundred and sixty-eight dollars to be deducted from the sum received, with interest, &c. The circuit court made a decree in favour of H., and on the payment of two hundred and sixty-eight dollars, with interest, the contract was ordered to be delivered up to be cancelled. The decree of the circuit court was affirmed by the supreme court: the court being of opinion, that the agreement had been entered into by both the parties to it, under a mistake, and under entire ignorance of the allowance of the claim of the owner of the Ann and her cargo. It was without consideration; services long and 124. A court of equity looks to the substantial object of the conveyance, and will consider an absolute deed as a mortgage, wherever it is shown to have been intended merely as a security for the payment of a debt. Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat. 489; 5 Cond. Rep. 648. 125. The general rule, both at law and in equity, is, that parol testimony is not admissible to vary a written instrument. But, in cases of fraud and mistake, courts of equity will relieve. Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174; 5 Cond. Rep. 401. 126. It seems that a court of equity will relieve in a case of mistake of law merely. Ibid. 127. If the breach of the condition of the bond given by the owners of a private armed vessel, under the prize act of June 26, 1812, ch. 430, appear upon demurrer, the defendants are not entitled to a hearing in equity under the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 26. Greeley et al. v. The United States, 8 Wheat. 257; 5 Cond. Rep. 433. 128. A bill in equity, brought to rescind a purchase made under a decree of the supreme court, in Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; 3 Cond. Rep. 254, upon the ground that the title to the property was defective, and could not be made good by the vestry and other persons, who were parties to the former suit, was dismissed. Mason v. Muncaster, 9 Wheat. 445; 5 Cond. Rep. 644. 129. Where a conveyance had been made of her real estate by a daughter to a father, imme diately before her marriage, under a belief that she would be benefited by the same, and that the property conveyed by the deed would become hers after the decease of her parent, and where the operation of the conveyance was to deprive the daughter of the estate, the court decreed a conveyance of the property, and an account of the proceeds of the part which had been sold, so as to effect the justice of the case, and to give to the daughter the property to which she would have been entitled had not the conveyance been made. Slocum and Wife v. Marshall et al., 2 Wash. C. C. R. 397. 130. Where the equity of each party is equal, the court will not deprive one party of the advantage he may have gained, by obtaining a legal estate in property which was promised as a security for a debt due to each. Phillips et al. v. Crammond et al., 2 Wash. C. C. R. 441. 131. It is no reason for referring accounts back to the commissioner who made the report, that one of the party suggests that since it was made he has obtained evidence in support of his exceptions, and that he expects he will be able to discover new debts and credits not now known to him; the new evidence may be read when the exceptions are argued. Camac v. Francis, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 108. 132. If the bill in equity alleges a particular fact, the plaintiff cannot in argument urge that the fact is otherwise; he is bound by his admission, unless, before the hearing, he obtains leave to amend. Prevost v. Gratz, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 434. General Principles. 133. The rules which prevail in England rela- 143. The assignee of a mortgage, or othe tive to new trials of issues out of chancery, are chose in action, takes it subject to the same not applicable to the circuit courts of the United equity that it was subject to in the hands of the States, where the same judges that direct, super-assignor. And the rule that it is only an equity, intend the trial of such issues. Here the only question can be, are the judges satisfied with the verdict? Harrison v. Rowan, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 32. 134. Where a specific relief is asked for, in a bill, even though there be a prayer for general relief, the circuit court cannot grant a relief which is inconsistent with, or entirely different from, that which is prayed. Wilson v. Graham, | 4 Wash. C. C. R. 53. 135. The respondent is, however, bound to put his defence upon the answer, and reserve it for a final hearing; but he may, if it be a subject for a plea, put it into that shape, in order to save the expense of going into a general examination. Ibid. 136. The equity practice of the courts of the United States, and the mode of proceeding, were fixed by the act of congress of 1792, subject only to be changed by rules of those courts, or of the supreme court, and cannot be affected by state laws, either prior or subsequent to the act of 1792. Mayor v. Foulkrod, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 349. 137. The court will not order service of a subpoena in equity, on the defendant's attorney at law, to be a good service, except in cross suits and injunctions to stay proceedings at law, on the ground of the defendant's residing out of the state. Eckert v. Bauert, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 370. 138. In cases of injunctions to stay proceedings at law, and in cross suits in equity, and in no others, will the court direct service of the subpoena to be made on the attorney at law, or upon the adverse solicitor in the cross suit. Ward v. Sebring, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 472. 139. After the cause on the original bill was set for hearing, the defendant was informed that the plaintiff was a nominal one, and that the real plaintiff was a citizen of the same state with the defendant. He immediately filed a cross bill, charging this and asking a discovery. The original suit ought not to be heard until the cross bill is answered. Young v. Pott, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 521. 140. The decree of the orphans' court of Pennsylvania, or a deceased guardian's account, the subsequent guardian of the infant being a party to the controversy, is conclusive, and a complete bar to a bill in equity in any other court. Blount and Wife v. Darrach, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 657. 141. The circuit court of the United States having full power to issue commissions to take testimony abroad, when sitting as a court of common law, will not entertain any such proceedings, for such a purpose, on its equity side. Peters v. Prevost, Paine's C. C. R. 64. 142. It is a rule in equity, that a judgment creditor at law is entitled to redeem an encumbrance upon land, and thereby secure his legal priority. The United States v. Sturges, Paine's C. C. R. 525. residing in the original debtor, and not the equities of third persons against the assignor that have this effect, does not exclude a judgment creditor, claiming to redeem; he stands in the place of the debtor, and has his equity. An assignee who might have obtained notice, and ought to have sought it, stands in no better situation than if he had actually obtained it. Ibid. 144. A mortgage was given, in reality, to indemnify the mortgagee, but purporting to secure a sum of money, payable in one year; and five years afterwards it was signed, the whole sum appearing from the instrument to be unpaid. Held, that the circumstances of the case should have put the assignor upon an inquiry, from which he would have learned the true consideration of the mortgage. Ibid. 145. An objection to the equity of the bill, which might have been taken advantage of on demurrer, is not favourably received at the hearing of the cause after answer. Ibid. 146. Where a mortgage is given by a debtor to his co-debtor, to secure the latter against the debt of the creditor, equity considers the mortgagee as a trustee for the creditor; and, where a judgment has been recovered, will apply the mortgaged property in satisfaction of the judg ment, or remove the encumbrance, so that it may be subjected to execution. United States v. Sturges, Paine's C. C. R. 525. 147. The principle which governs such cases is, that the collateral security is a trust created for the protection of the debt, and that it is the duty of a court of equity to see that it fulfils the purpose for which it was intended. Ibid. 148. A judgment creditor, who applies to a court of equity for its aid to enforce a judgment at law, if he asks its aid to reach a chattel, must show that he has taken out execution at law, and pursued it to every available extent, in order to show a lien upon the chattel; but if the aid is sought as to land, it is enough to show a judg ment creating a lien upon the land. Ibid. 149. Although a mortgage be absolute upon the face of it, a court of equity will inquire into the real purpose for which it was given, and apply it to that use. Ibid. 150. An affidavit in chancery, not sworn to before a judge of the circuit court, or before a commissioner appointed to administer an oath, cannot be read in evidence on the hearing of a bill filed in the court. Haight v. The Proprietors of the Morris Aqueduct, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 601. 151. Where the remedy of a party is complete at law, the decree of the circuit court, dismissing a bill in chancery, was affirmed. Graves et al. v. The Boston Marine Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, 419; 1 Cond. Rep. 443. 152. If a party takes security for money which is merely personal, instead of taking a mortgage on property, under a mistake of law by all par ties, that the former was as safe as the latter, a General Principles. court of equity will not relieve the party who took such security, and substitute for it a lien or mortgage on the property. Ibid. 152. A court of equity has jurisdiction to entertain a suit upon the application of heirs at law, to set aside a deed of land obtained from their ancestor by undue influence, he being so weak in mind and body as to be open to such influence, although he was not absolutely insane. And the like doctrine prevails, where one of the heirs at law has, with the consent of the others, taken such a deed, upon an arrangement that the same shall be considered as a trust for the maintenance of the father, and after his death, for the benefit of all his heirs. Under such circumstances, a conveyance may be allowed to stand security for actual advances and charges, and be set aside as to all other purposes on account of imposition. Harding v. Wheaton, 2 Mason's C. C. R. 378. 154. Where a firm put a debt, after the dissolution of the partnership, at the disposal of one partner, and gave information of it to the debtor, such partner has a right to assign it as a security for his private debt; and in equity, the assignee may maintain a suit for it against the debtor. M'Lanahan v. Ellery, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 269. 155. In general, the doctrine of set-off is the same in equity as at law. Jackson v. Robinson, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 138. 156. Joint debts cannot be set off in equity, any more than at law, against separate debts, unless there be some other equitable circum stances. Ibid. 157. The heirs of a deceased mortgagor are not competent witnesses in a suit in equity by an assignee to redeem, to prove the assignment fraudulent, for that is to establish their own title. Randall v. Phillips, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 378. 158. In equity, where there is a joint tenancy in a mortgage, the surviving mortgagee will be held a trustee for the representatives of the deceased co-mortgagee. Ibid. 159. A purchased ninety-nine hundredths of a tract of land of one hundred acres, belonging to the state, under a settler, and the state granted the one hundred acres to the settler, and the settler had granted one acre to B. Afterwards, A obtained from the state, with full knowledge of B's title, a grant of the whole land, the same being excepted in his own deed from the settler. Held, that B was entitled in equity to have the one acre conveyed to him. Dunlop v. Stetson, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 349. 160. Where a set-off or defence to a debt was available at law, and the party omitted by laches to take advantage of it, it seems a court of equity will not relieve him. Ibid. 161. A bill in equity for a reconveyance of an estate upon an agreement and subsequent award, was dismissed upon the circumstances, the bill being brought against purchasers, after a considerable lapse of time, the original vendee being dead and insolvent. A fortiori, it will not decree it against purchasers, even with notice, if their vendee is dead and insolvent, so that they can have no remedy over. Mason's C. C. R. 244. M'Neill v. Magee, 5 162. A bill in equity was brought against a feme sole, to compel her to make an acknowledgment of a deed made by her and her late husband in his lifetime, of her land, on a sale thereof. In her answer she denied all equity, and asserted that the sale was without her consent, and that she received no part of the consideration-money. It was held, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief. Town of Providence v. Manchester, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 59. 163. The statute of limitations binds courts of equity as well as law, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction; and sometimes, by way of analogy, binds equitable titles. Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 95. 164. The statute of limitations of Rhode Island, of suits brought against executors and adminis trators, is a good bar in equity as well as at law. Ibid. 165. If the agreement admitted by the answer differs from that stated in the bill, the plaintiff cannot have a decree unless he prove the contract, aliunde. Thompson v. Todd, Peters' C. C. R. 380. 166. A court of chancery, on a bill of discovery, will not compel a party to produce evidence which would subject him to a forfeiture. United States v. Twenty-eight Packages, Gilpin's D. C. R. 312. 167. A relinquishment by the husband of his marital right to a legacy bequeathed to his wife, is valid as to the creditors of the husband, and a court of equity will not interpose its authority to compel the husband to reduce the legacy into his possession, for the purpose of subjecting it to their claims. Gallego v. Gallego's Ex'rs., 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 285. 168. W. obtained a loan from the Bank of the United States, with S. as his endorser. The note was subsequently endorsed by H., for whose indemnity for any loss which might accrue to him in consequence thereof, W., the drawer, executed a deed of trust. W. afterwards executed other deeds of trust on the same land, for the security of other creditors, and among others, of V. The deed for the benefit of H. was not recorded, but full notice of its execution was given to V. Before the deed to V. was made, he made a calculation of the amount of the prior liens, and said that the property was sufficient to pay them, and secure him. The land was sold, subject to the prior liens, for the payment of V.'s debt. V. bid the amount of his debt, and the property was struck off to him. V. afterwards died, and his executors proposed to the bank to pay the note on which S. was endorser, on condition that the bank would institute suit against S. for their benefit, to which terms the bank acceded, and obtained a judgment against S. S. filed his bill, stating these circumstances, of which he had no knowledge until the judgment was obtained, as he averred; and prayed an injunction, which was granted. The injunction was made perpetual. Swan v. The Bank of the United States, 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 293. General Principles. 169. The endorser of a promissory note, who has been charged by due notice of the default of the maker, is not entitled to the protection of a court of equity as a surety; the holder may proceed against either party at his pleasure, and does not discharge the endorser by not issuing, or by countermanding an execution against the maker. Lenox v. Prout, 3 Wheat. 520; 4 Cond. Rep. 311. 170. An award will not be set aside in equity on account of an omission of the arbitrators to act upon part of the matters submitted; unless that omission should have injured the party complaining. Davy's Ex'rs. v. Faw, 7 Cranch, 171; 2 Cond. Rep. 461. 171. If a person who has obtained a survey upon a military land-warrant under the commonwealth of Virginia, for two thousand acres, sell and transfer for a valuable consideration his right to the survey, and assign the plat and certificate to the purchaser, whereupon the purchaser obtains a patent for the land in his own name; and if, upon a resurvey, it appear that the grant conveys two thousand seven hundred acres; the vendor cannot, in equity, support a claim for the surplus against the vendee. Vowles et al. v. Craig et al., 8 Cranch, 371; 3 Cond. Rep. 174. 172. Equity allows an account of rents and profits, in all cases, from the time of the title accrued, provided that it does not exceed six years, unless under special circumstances; as, where the defendant had no notice of the plaintiff's title, nor had the deeds and writings in his custody, in which the plaintiff's title appeared; or where there has been laches in the plaintiff in not asserting the title; or where the plaintiff's title appeared by deeds in a stranger's custody; in all which cases, and others similar to them in principle, the account is confined to the time of filing the bill. Green et al. v. 1; 5 Cond. Rep. 369. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 173. If one partner, in a voyage on joint account, be authorized by the others to take up money on the credit of the whole concern, and draw bills therefor on a house at Amsterdam, and the partner take up money and draw a bill for the same, directing it to be charged to the account of all the partners, but it is signed by himself only; it seems such bill is binding on all the partners; at least equity will enforce payment thereof against all the partners, in favour of the payor of the bill, who has trusted the money on the faith of the joint credit. Van Riemsdyk v. Kane et al., 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 630. 174. In equity, such a bill, drawn under such circumstances, would be deemed to have been guarantied as to acceptance and payment, by all the partners. The statute of frauds does not apply to such a case; for the guarantee is not for the payment of the debt of another, but of the debt of the guarantors. Ibid. 175. It is not the province of a court of equity to investigate items of an account, but they will be referred to a master, and the report of the master is to be received as true, when no exception has been taken to it; and the exceptions are to be regarded so far only as they are supported by the special statements of the master, | or by evidence, which ought to be brought before the court by a reference to the particular testimony on which the exception relies. Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 103; 6 Cond. Rep. 236. property to indemnify the drawer of the bills of 176. If three persons mortgage their joint exchange drawn for their accommodation, in case of non-acceptance; and if each of the mortga upon their return protested, and two of them gors agrees to take up a third part of the bills neglect so to do, whereby the third is compelled to take up the whole, in consequence of which he requests the drawer not to discharge the mortgage, but hold it for his benefit; a lien in property to the amount of two-thirds of the bills, equity is thereby created upon the mortgaged whole. Pratt et al. v. Law et al., 9 Cranch, 456; in favour of that mortgagor who took up the 3 Cond. Rep. 460. ascertain the injury resulting from a breach of 177. In a case where it would be difficult to contract, or the sum in damages by which it might be compensated, chancery will not itself ascertain such damages, nor direct an issue of quantum damnificatus. Ibid. 178. It is not the equity practice to direct an which the court can lay hold of a simple, equitaissue of quantum damnificatus in any case in ble, and precise rule to ascertain the amount which it ought to decree. Ibid. sold as for a certain quantity, a court of equity 179. The rule of equity, that where land is will relieve if it amounts to much less than the quantity mentioned, applies to contracts for land in a settled country, where the titles are com plete, the boundaries ascertained, and the real quantity either known or within the reach of the vendor; but it is inapplicable to cases where the country is unsettled, and where the general practice is notorious to sell an entry or a survey, ing a part of the land by other entries. Dunlap taking the chance of surplus, and hazard of los et al. v. Dunlap et al., 12 Wheat. 574; 6 Cond. Rep. 654. the legal estate, if he can, to protect his equity. 180. He who has equal equity, may acquire Between merely equitable claimants, each having equal equity, he who has the precedency in time has the advantage in right. Fitzsimmons et al. v. Ogden, 7 Cranch, 2; 2 Cond. Rep. 395. on the firm, agrees to indemnify the injured party 181. If a partner, who has committed frauds to his satisfaction, by an assignment of all the assignment will be construed liberally in his partnership effects for his indemnity, such an favour; and will be reformed in equity so as to meet the intention of the parties in conformity with their agreement. Askew v. Odenheimer, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 386. 182. But the injured party will not be allowed satisfaction as a court of equity may decree rea been destroyed or suppressed, false entries made |