the state; for such municipal regulation does not bind the officers of the United States. Palmer v. Allen, 7 Cranch, 550; 2 Cond. Rep.

607.

2. Bail in Civil Cases.

9. The bail is fixed by the death of the principal, after the return of a capias ad satisfaciendum, and before the return of the scire facias; and the bail is not entitled to an exoneretur in such a case. Davidson v. Taylor, 12 Wheat. 604; 6 Cond. Rep. 660.

10. On a question of holding to bail, the court will not inquire into the merits of the controversy, where there is an apparent cause of action. Parapet v. Ganteer, C. C. U. S. of Pennsylvania, 2 Dall. 330.

11. An exoneretur will not be entered on a bail-piece, on the ground that the defendant is a lunatic, and is confined in a hospital as such, although the derangement is shown to be permanent. Bowerbank v. Payne, 2 Wash. C. C. R.

464.

12. Where a plaintiff, on a rule to show cause of action, produces a positive affidavit of the debt, the defendant cannot relieve himself from the necessity of giving bail, by proving that the plaintiff had sued him in another court for the same cause of action. Post v. Sarmiento, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 198.

13. The court ought not to discharge on common bail, where the evidence is doubtful in its nature. Craig v. Brown, Peters' C. C. R. 352.

14. A circuit court of the United States will not enter an exoneretur on a bail-piece, in an action pending in that court against one who had obtained a discharge under a state insolvent law. The certificate of discharge should be brought before the court by plea. The certificate is not conclusive evidence of the regularity of the discharge. Hayton v. Wilkinson, 1 Hall's American Law Journal, 260.

15. The laws of Maryland, or the rules of the courts of Maryland, do not authorize the surrender of the principal by his bail, at the judge's chambers. Baxter v. Biays, 4 American Law Journal, 276.

19. On a rule to show cause why the defendant should not be discharged on common bail, he having been discharged under the insolvent laws of Pennsylvania, evidence to show that the discharge had been fraudulently obtained, cannot be given. Campbell et al. v. Claudius, Peters' C. C. R. 484.

20. Pennsylvania.-Where the debt has been contracted and made payable out of the state, the circuit court will not discharge, on common bail, a defendant arrested for such debt, notwithstanding his discharge by the insolvent laws of the state in which the action was brought. Ibid.

21. In a suit on a contract made by foreigners in their own country, by the laws of which the contract is suspended until a period, not arrived when the suit was brought, special bail cannot be demanded. Camfrangue v. Burnell, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 340.

22. After bail given, and plea pleaded, the defendant cannot arrest the judgment on the ground of a misnomer. Scull v. Briddle, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 200.

23. The proceedings were amended by the recognisance of bail, and the name of the defendant in the recognisance was inserted in the declaration. Ibid.

24. The court are not precluded from obtaining further satisfaction as to the debt sworn to in an affidavit to hold to bail, because the affidavit is positive; but the necessity to examine the party who makes the affidavit, must be presented on the face of the same. Oliver v. Parish, Peters' C. C. R. 462.

25. New York.-Under the act of congress of 6th January, 1800, the sheriff of a county is bound to take a bond for the limits, as provided by the state laws, from a prisoner confined on process from the courts of the United States; and false imprisonment would lie on his refusal. U. S. v. Noah, Paine's C. C. R. 368.

26. New York.-Such a bond has, in all respects, the same incidents, and the like legal effects with a bond taken under the state laws. Ibid.

27. New York. It is assignable; and an assignment discharges the sheriff from a liability for a subsequent escape. Ibid.

17. Pennsylvania.-The circuit court will discharge, on common bail, a defendant who has been arrested for a debt contracted in the state in which he has, subsequent to the commencement of the suit, been discharged by the insolvent laws of the state. Read v. Chapman, Peters' C. C. R. 404.

18. Pennsylvania.-Where a capias has been issued against a person who has been discharged from the debt for which it was issued, by the insolvent laws of the state in which it was contracted, the court will not quash the writ, but will discharge the defendant on common bail. Ibid. 18*

29. New York.-The secretary of the treasury having accepted such an assignment, the court presumed that he was authorized, and held the plaintiffs bound by his acceptance. Ibid.

30. New York.-The term "process," in the act, includes executions, as well as mesne process. Ibid.

31. New York. After a prisoner has been enlarged upon a limit bond, the sheriff can confine him again only on the bail's becoming insufficient. He cannot accept a surrender of him; certainly not after an assignment of the bond. Ibid.

32. Pennsylvania.-The bail to the sheriff entered special bail; on being excepted to, he

2 B

51. When the party is, by the practice of the court, entitled to an exoneretur without a positive surrender of the principal, according to the terms of the recognisance; he is, a fortiori, entitled to insist on it by way of defence, when he is entitled, ex debito justitiæ, to surrender the principal. Ibid.

52. The doctrine is fully established, that where the principal would be clearly entitled to an immediate and unconditional discharge, if he had been surrendered, there the bail are entitled to relief by entering an exoneretur without any surrender. And, a fortiori, this doctrine will apply, when the law prohibits the party from being imprisoned at all, and where by the positive operation of law the surrender is prevented. Ibid.

53. Where bail has been fixed before the discharge of the principal under the insolvent laws, such a discharge will have no effect on the liability of the bail. If the discharge had been before the bail was fixed, it might have been a question whether the bail had been discharged under the rule laid down by the supreme court in the case of Beers v. Haughton, 9 Peters, 329. Lyon v. Auchincloss & Co., 12 Peters, 239.

54. When the defendants in a judgment are liable to be imprisoned, having been released under the insolvent laws of a state, the special bail is not bound to surrender them in his discharge. Beers et al. v. Haughton, 1 M'Lean, C. C. R. 231.

55. To an action on the recognisance of bail, he may plead the discharge of his principal. Ibid.

56. To hold to bail, an affidavit, under the statute of Illinois, must state more than the belief of affiant, or the legal import of the obliga tion on which the action is founded. Wright et al. v. Cogswell, 1 M'Lean, C. C. R. 471.

57. The act of the 20th February, 1839, which adopted the state laws in regard to imprisonment of debtors, took immediate effect, as well in suits pending, as in other cases. Gray, Sherwood & Co. v. Munroe et al., 1 M'Lean, C. C. R. 528. 58. This law relates to the remedy; and under it, where appearance bail had been given, the defendant on motion may be discharged on common bail. Ibid.

59. Where a cause is removed from a state court to the circuit court of the United States, under the judiciary act of 1789, section 12, Statutes at Large, vol. I. p. 79, and special bail is given; if the bail afterwards seek to surrender the principal, it should be done in open court, and not by a commitment to jail, according to the local laws of the state. But if the principal is so committed, the circuit court will, upon the petition of the bail, grant a writ of habeas corpus to bring the party into court, to be surrendered

3. Bail in Admiralty, and in Prize Causes. 60. Where the court of admiralty has parted with the possession of the property upon bail or stipulation, and it is necessary for the purposes of justice to retake the property into the custody of the court, the proper process against any person not a party to the stipulation, but who is alleged to have the actual or constructive possession, is a monition, and not an execution in the first instance. The Gran Para, 10 Wheat. 497; 6 Cond. Rep. 199.

61. Wherever a stipulation is taken in an admiralty suit for property subjected to legal process and condemnation, the stipulation is deemed a mere substitute for the thing itself; and the stipulators are liable to the exercise of all those authorities on the part of the court, which it could properly exercise if the thing was in custody. The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1; 6 Cond. Rep. 397.

62. Regularly there should be no delivery of prize property on bail, until after a hearing of the cause, and in most cases a sale is preferable to an appraisement. Gammell v. Skinner, 2 Gallis, C. C. R. 45; The George, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 249.

63. Proceedings by libel were instituted upon a seizure of goods, and a bond given for their appraised value on the delivery of the goods to the claimant. Afterwards the libel was by amendment changed to an information, and the goods were condemned. On an application for an attachment against the obligors in the bond, it was held that although the case was not regularly within the 89th section of the collection law, yet a compliance with the stipulations in the bond might be enforced by attachment against the obligors. U. S. v. Four Part Pieces of Woollen Cloth, 1 Paine, 435.

64. And the court held that it made no difference that the obligors were only sureties, and had not themselves received the goods. Ibid.

65. If the claimant is not a party on the bond, all the obligors are to be deemed principals. Ibid.

66. The bond was taken in the district court of New York, and under the statute dividing the district, the proceedings were transferred to the district court of the northern district, and by a subsequent statute to this court, where the condemnation took place. The condition of the bond was to pay the appraised value of the goods into the district court, if they should be condemned in that court. Held, that a condemnation in this court had the same effect to forfeit the bond. Ibid.

67. In prize causes, before a hearing, the property is never delivered on bail, unless by consent. If it is perishable, the proper remedy is by an appraisement and sale; and in like manner the court will decree a sale, pending the proceedings, for any other justifiable cause. After a hearing, the property may, in the discretion of the court, be delivered on bail. In cases ordered for further proof, a delivery on

ment, or for a sale, as the case may require. Ibid.

68. Where, on the hearing, the property is acquitted, and an appeal is interposed to a tribunal not sitting within the same jurisdiction, or into which the property does not follow the cause, (as an appeal to the supreme court of the United States,) the claimants are generally allowed a delivery of the property, as in a case of sale of the proceeds on bail. Where there is a decree of condemnation, the same rule is generally adopted, as to the captors. But it is always an application to the sound discretion of the court; and if there be danger of injustice, the court will withhold it from either party, and content itself with retaining the property, or with ordering a sale thereof, and a deposit of the proceeds in the registry. Ibid.

69. If a bond, taken on the delivery of property on bail, be void, as not conforming to law, the court will enforce a redelivery of the property by attachment. The Struggle, 1 Gallis. C.

C. R. 476.

70. A bond voluntarily given upon the delivery of property on bail, on application of the claimant, is good; although the condition does not exactly conform to the act of congress, under which it may have been intended to take it. Ibid.

71. The act of congress of 2d March, 1799, ch. 128, is not understood as compulsory on the court as to the delivery on bail. It still rests in the discretion of the court. lbid.

72. The district courts of the United States have no authority, after an appeal, to bail or sell the property. The Grotius, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 503. 73. Whether the security for property, delivered on bail, be by bond or stipulation, is immaterial. On such security, a summary judgment may be entered for the appraised value, and for the costs. The Alligator, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 145.

74. The district court, by virtue of its general admiralty jurisdiction, may deliver property on bail; and the form in which the security is taken is immaterial: on such security a summary judgment may be rendered to the appraised value. The Lively, 1 Gallis. C. C. R.

315.

75. It is the duty of commissioners to whom it is referred to estimate damages, to make their report as specific as the nature of the thing will admit; so that not only the result, but the detail of their judgment should appear. Ibid.

76. In cases of restitution with damages, in prize proceedings, if, in order to ascertain the damages, an inspection or sale of the cargo be, in the judgment of the commissioners or the parties, necessary, application should be made to the court for an order of unlivery and appraise

BAILMENT.

1. The law regulating the responsibility of common carriers, does not apply to the case of carrying intelligent beings, such as negroes. The carrier has not, and cannot have over them the same absolute control that he has over in animate matter. In the nature of things, and in their character, they resemble passengers, and not packages of goods. It would seem reasonable therefore, that the responsibility of the carrier should be measured by the law which is applicable to passengers, rather than by that which is applicable to the carriage of common goods. Boyce v. Anderson, 2 Peters, 155.

2. The law applicable to common carriers is one of great rigour. Though, to the extent to which it has been carried, and in the cases to which it has been applied, its necessity and its policy are admitted, yet it ought not to be carried further or applied to new cases. It has not been applied to living men, and it ought not to be. Ibid.

3. The ancient rule of the law of carriers, that the carrier is liable only for ordinary neglect, does not apply to the conveyance of slaves. Ibid. 156.

4. The owner of a vessel is answerable for the carelessness or unskilfulness of his master; and by the common law, nothing but the act of God, or of the enemy, or of the party complaining, can excuse. Dusar v. Murgatroyd, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 13.

5. The owner of a ship has no right, without necessity, to change the vehicle of conveyance of goods shipped on freight. Trott et al. v. Wood, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 443.

6. A usage, to control this general principle, should be so uniform and general, that persons engaging in the trade may be considered as contracting with a reference to it; otherwise, it ought not to affect the rights of the parties. Ibid.

7. A bailee, without reward, is guilty of gross negligence, if he omits that reasonable care of property committed to his charge, which persons in the like situation exercise, or which the bailee is accustomed to exercise in like cases. Tracy v. Wood, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 132.

8. It is no valid objection, that the property is agreed to be held as a security for further advances, to be made by the bailee, if it shall also be made to secure an existing debt. D'Wolf v. Harris, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 515.

9. Gross negligence is to be considered, with reference to the nature of the goods delivered to a bailee without reward. If money is delivered, it is to be kept with more care than common property. Ibid.