expression, of the supreme Being. All have sinned and come short of the glory of God. All like sheep have gone astray. If thou, Lord, shouldest mark iniquity, O Lord, who should stand? Every mouth shall be stopped, and the whole world shall appear guilty before God. The Father is represented as so loving, i. e. so pitying the world, as to send his Son. Those who are saved, are said to be vessels of mercy; and their recovery is ascribed to that God, who is rich in mercy. Not by works of righteousness, which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us. Now, if all wicked men are criminal for being such, and the appointment of a Saviour were matter of benignity, and not of obligation, our race would have had no right to demand a dispensation similar to that of the Gospel, and of course no right to complain, had no such purpose been concerted. Further, if it were not a matter of obligation in Deity to provide a Saviour for any, he could not be under obligation to make such provision for all. Therefore, if Jesus Christ had died for a part of mankind only, the remainder would have sought in vain for cause of complaint. I am far however from considering, as fact, the thing which is here supposed. I am far from doubting, that Jesus Christ tasted death for every man, and that his atonement would be as sufficient for all, would all repent, as it is for those who are reduced to penitence. But even if it were otherwise, the justice of God would not be liable to impeachment. Scarce any thing can be more clear than that creatures lying under just condemnation can have no claim to redemption.

The question directly before us, however, you will observe, does not relate to the extent of our Saviour's atonement, but the extent to which God designs to render this atonement effectual. This atonement is effectual in regard to every one, who repents and obeys the Christian religion. There is no impediment to the salvation of a wicked man, but the want of a right inclination towards his duty. We are however so perversely inclined, that independently of divine operation, we shall never choose the path of virtue and glory. While such is the propensity of the heart,

while disobedience is an affair of our own choosing, can blame be transferred from us to our Maker, because he does not destroy this pernicious taste, and direct the current of our desires into a different channel? The dishonest or profane man, as was observed in the last lecture, may as well complain of God for not inducing him to relinquish his immoral habits, as the sinner can complain of not being induced to repent. Nor could the latter with more truth or decency, charge with injustice the unequal distributions of divine grace, than could the wretch, who had been injuring you through his whole life, complain, that though you had very frequently endeavoured to reconcile him to yourself and his duty, there was some other person of similar character to his own, with whom you had been more urgent.

Should it be asked, why all men are not treated with equal lenity, or equal severity, I answer, that while each creature in the universe has a right to claim justice, no one can demand a favor; and the answer which the householder is represented as returning to the querulous labourers, is precisely applicable to the case in question: Friend, I do thee no wrong: Have I not a right to do what I will with mine own? Is thine eye evil because I am good?

If persons, who believe either the Scriptures, or the moral government of God, propose this objection, they ought not to forget, that themselves are as truly concerned in its removal, as are those who believe the doctrine now under discussion. For it was shown, in the last lecture, that Deity bestows his favors with unlimited variety. Why has God given to one being the nature of an angel, and to another the nature of a man? Why has he given to some animals existence but for a few months, and to others for a hundred years? Why are talents bestowed on some men, raising them far above the standard of our species, while others are depressed as far below it? Why have the lines fallen to part of mankind in the land of darkness and shadow of death; while others enjoy the clear light of science and religion? Why have some of the wisest and most upright men been constrained to waste their lives in the damps, the

darkness, and solitude of a prison, while profligate tyrants have been at liberty to corrupt, or to enslave men, and to set at open defiance the justice of heaven? Or, to use the words of the poet :

"Why unassuming worth in secret lived,

And died neglected: why the good man's share

In life was gall and bitterness of soul:
Why the lone widow, and her orphans pin'd
In starving solitude; while luxury,

In palaces, lay straining her low thought,

To form unreal wants; why heaven-born truth,
And moderation fair, wore the red marks
Of superstition's scourge: why licens'd pain,
That cruel spoiler, that embosom'd foe,
Imbittered all our bliss."-Thomson.

When any person shall give a satisfactory answer to all these inquiries, he may, with less impropriety, demand the reason why communications of celestial grace are not made to all in the same measure?

It is by no means to be imagined, that in distributing variously the blessings either of providence or grace, the Almighty acts arbitrarily, or with caprice. As has been heretofore remarked, when it is said that God is a sovereign,-that he does all things according to the counsel of his own will,-and that he has mercy on whom he will have mercy, we are not to imagine, that he acts merely because he has the power of acting, or that his choice is not regulated by perfect wisdom. No being in the universe is more invariably confined, so to speak, by the rules of fitness and propriety. Herein consists the perfection and dignity of his character. By the sovereignty of God is meant nothing more, than that his reasons for acting are concealed from human observation. Reasons always exist in the divine mind, why the gifts of providence and grace are bestowed with greater liberality on one, than on another. Perhaps some of these reasons are made known to the spirits of just men made perfect. Perhaps the subject is still further understood by the angels :—

and as the capacities of both are enlarged, and as they advance in their acquaintance with the great plan of divine government, the number and cogency of apparent reasons will perpetually in

crease.

2. It may be natural to inquire, whether God gives to some small portions of divine influence, with design, that they should not repent. To this inquiry an affirmative answer could not, I think, with safety be rendered. I know of no reason to doubt, that the repentance and conversion of the non-elect under those circumstances, in which they are placed, would be agreeable to the mind of God: nor do I perceive, on any other supposition, how those numerous declarations of Scripture, which express the divine reluctance to abandon and punish sinners, can be reconciled with perfect integrity: Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die, saith the Lord? Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die, O house of Israel. As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth. At a time when the crimes of Israel were such as to require severe chastisements, the language of God was full of benignity and forbearance. How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set thee as Zeboim? My heart is turned within me. My repentings are kindled together? Christ asserts, that he would often have gathered the inhabitants of Jerusalem; but they would not: and exclaims: O that thou hadst known, at least in this thy day, the things of thy peace: but now they are hid from thine eyes. Now, all this is perfectly intelligible, if the repentance of these persons, under existing circumstances, would have been agreeable to the mind of God. On this supposition, there is unquestionable sincerity in the declarations cited.

It is not pretended, however, that all difficulties are yet removed. It has been asserted, you say, that there are persons to whom God never determined to give those advantages and influences of grace, which would in fact issue in their reformation. If this be true, the Jews, to whom the preceding quotations re

fer, were doubtless of that number. Now, if God never determined to give them such divine influence, and place them in such circumstances, as would in fact produce reformation, how can it be said, that such an event would have been agreeable to the divine will?

I answer, that whatever may be the consequence of the first position, its truth will not be denied by any one, who considers for a moment, the absurdity, which such denial embraces. Would you assert; or would any person in the free use of his rational powers assert, that God did give to the inhabitants of Jerusalem such powerful influences of his Spirit, or placed them in such circumstances, as actually produced a change of character, and saved them from ruin? And if he did not this, it will hardly be said that he ever determined to do it.

We will now endeavor to show that his not resorting to greater efforts, than were employed for reforming the Jews, was perfectly consistent with divine admonitions, and with an inclination that they should repent. A parent, let it be supposed, gives to his son those advantanges, which if rightly improved, would secure to him a competent knowledge of the arts and sciences. He at the same time being perfectly acquainted with the disposition of the latter, knows, that unless these advantages are doubled, or altogether changed in kind, the effect will not be produced,-the desired acquisition will not be made. Now there may be a thousand reasons, to prevent him from increasing the number of these advantages, or altering their kind. Perhaps this could not be done consistently with justice to his other children. Still it would be perfectly agreeable to his wishes that the son to whom we refer, should be skilled in the arts and sciences. Nor would any one call in question, that such was the father's desire, although for good reasons he did not see fit to afford those greater advantages, without which he foresaw, that the end would not be obtained.

Here you will see the necessity of recurring to a distinction, made in the last lecture, between what a person might do, and what he actually will do. The son, mentioned in our sup