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be remarked here, that Franklin had not yet gone beyond Anandale-about seven miles—and bad as yet, neither come upon the enemy or joined the army in front, nor gained any information about either. If, therefore, his movement was not to continue, it must be because it was too hazardous, or because he had no reserve ammunition or trausportation.

So, it seems, it was Gen. McClellan's judgment that Franklin could not be sent, as soon as he landed, to re-enforce Pope-because, 1st, he had his artillery only partially mounted; 2d, he had no cavalry; 3d, he bad but forty rounds of ammunition, and no transportation for more. The subsequent difficulties were, that he had no transportation for his reserve aromunition, and was too weak alone, and Sumner ought not to be sent to support him, as it would leave the Capital unprotected!

It is fortunate some of McClellan's corps preceded him from the Peninsula, and arrived and marched before he came up. For, if not, two of the corps who joined Pope and fought under bim would have been halted for the reasons that stayed Franklin. Kearney joined without artillery, and Pope ordered two batteries to be given him; Porter bad but forty rounds of ammunition-Heintzelman joined without cavalry.

Why, may it be asked, were “neither Sumner's nor Franklin's Corps in a condition to move and fight a battle ?" McClellan bad been told that in embarking his troops he must see they were supplied with ammunition, as they might have to fight as soon as they landed.” The men were not fatigued by hard marches, nor exhausted with fighting and lack of food, as were their companions in front. What was there to prevent their going to re-enforce them, but the orders and pretexts for delay of General McClellan ?

It will have been noticed that lack of transportation was at the bottom of the alleged difficulties. Transportation was not required for supplies, for the men were ordered to carry their food with them. Is it not strange that, in view of the emergency of the case, some extraordinary means were not resorted to to impress horses and wagons—if none existed in the hands of the Government-in the cities of Alexandria, Georgetown, and Washington, where there was an abundance of both? Such things have been done even in this war, on much less important occasions than this one.

But will not this plea seem stranger still when it is found that there was no need of pressing any private property into service--that there was plenty of public transportation on hand? Let the following dispatch show :

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 30th, 1862.

I am by no means satisfied with General Franklin's march of yester-
day, considering the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in
stopping at Alexandria. Moreover, I learned last night that the Quarter-
master's Departmentavould have given him plenty of transportation if he had
applied for it any time since his arrival at Alexandria. Ho knew the
importance of opening communication with General Pope's army, and
should have actod more promptly.

H. W. HALLECE, Gineral-in-Chief. Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria.

But most strange of all is, that General McClellan knew of there being public transportation at hand, and yet did not use it, even when the fate of a campaign depended upon it, and afterwards assigned the want of it as the reason for not obeying his orders to send re-enforcements. He says, in his dispatch of August 30, to Gen. Pope:

The quartermasters here (Alexandria) said there was none disposable. The difficulty seems to consist in the fact (he adds), that the greuter part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons."

The inference is irresistible that General McClellan, who had charge of every thing in and around 'Alexandria and

Washington, thought it was better that the Army of the Potomac, under Pope, should not be re-enforced, and be defeated, than that the garrisons should be subjected to the slightest inconvenience!

The answer of General Halleck to the telegrams of General McClellan, in which the latter made so many propositions about the movements of Sumner's Corps and the disposition of Cox's force and the other troops for the defence of Washington, is as follows:



WASHINGTON, D. C., August 29th, 1862. Your proposed disposition of Sumner's Corps seems to me judicious. Of course I have no time to examine into details. The present danger is a raid upon Washington in the night time. Dispose of all troops as you deem best. I want Franklin's Corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going further. Otherwise, he will push on towards Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas either by telegrams or through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move actively and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Major-General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria.

It is in this dispatch that General McClellan finds his authority to halt Franklin at Anandale. Franklin had been repeatedly ordered to join Pope, but had been delayed by McClellan, who evidently did not intend he should get beyond his control if possible.

In his telegram to Halleck of 1 P. M. of the 29th, he asks if he

may do as seems to him best with all the troops in the vicinity of Alexandria, including Franklin-Franklin being still in the vicinity of Alexandria. Halleck, in giving him authority to dispose of all troops in his vicinity evidently refers to the disposition to be made of those for the forts and defences, for he proceeds to say, I want “ Franklin's Corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy."

Franklin's Corps did not go out far enough to learn any thing about the enemy. What he learned he picked up at Anandale from citizens, and probably from Banks's wagon-train, which passed him as it came from the front, which it seems it was able to do with safety at the time McClellan considered it too hazardous for 40,000 men to move to the front to join

the army.

It is unnecessary to pursue this matter any further, and show, as might easily be done, how similar delays were procured with respect to other troops which might have been sent to re-enforce Pope. It is sufficient to say that forty thousand men, exclusive of Burnside's force, were thusas it seems to us intentionally—withheld from Pope at the time he was engaged in holding the army of Lee in check.

Having thus disposed of the question of re-enforcements, it now remains to say a word about supplies which General McClellan says he left nothing undone to forward to Pope.

When at Fort Monroe he telegraphed (August 21st, 10. 52 P. M.):

I bave ample supplics of ammunition for infantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. I can supply any deficiency that may exist in General Pope's army.

August the 30th (1.45 P. m.), General Halleck telographed him :

Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, must be immediately sent forward to Centreville for General Pope.

To which he replied :

I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artillery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance officer to load up all the wagons sent to him.

General McClellan might have very easily found out those calibres. His ordnance officer knew those of the corps of his own army, and he was in telegraphic communication with the ordnance officer in Washington, where a register is kept of all the batteries in service.

What was his course with respect to supplies of forage and subsistence, of which Pope's army was in such extreme need ? .

He directed Franklin to say to Pope he would send him out supplies if he, Pope, would send back cavalry to escort them out! "Such a request," (says Pope in his dispatch of 5 A. M., August 30), "when Alexandria is full of troops, and I fighting the enemy, needs no comment.”

The Army of the Potomac, under General Pope, was defeated and driven back upon Washington. But it had contested every inch of the ground, and had fought every battle with a gallantry and tenacious courage that would have insured a decisive viciory if it had been properly and promptly supported. It was not broken, either in spirit or in organization; and it fell back upon the Capital prepared to renew the struggle for its salvation.

By this time, however, General McClellan had become the recognized head of a political party in the country, and a military clique in the army; and it suited the purposes of both to represent the defeat of the Army of the Potomac as due to the fact that General McClellan was no longer at its head. The progress of the rebel army, moreover, up the Potomac, with the evident intention of moving upon Baltimore or into Pennsylvania, had created a state of feeling throughout the country and in Washington eminently favorable to the designs of General McClellan's partisans; and upon the urgent but unjust representation of some of his officers that the army would not serve under any other commander, General Pope was relieved, and General McClellan again placed at the head of the Army of the Potomac, and on the 4th of September he commenced the movement into Maryland to repel the invading rebel forces.

On the 11th, he made urgent application for re-enforce



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