§. 26. Memory and Testimony considered as sources of belief.

IV,-Another original ground or law of belief is the Memory. So far as we are confident, or rather have no particular reason to doubt, that the original sensations and perceptions in any given case are correctly reported in the remembrance, the latter controls our belief and actions not less than those antecedent states of mind, on which it is founded. "The evidence of memory, says Dr. Beattie, commands our belief as effectually as the evidence of sense. I cannot possibly doubt, with regard to any of my transactions of yesterday which I now remember, whether I performed them or not. That I dined to day, and was in bed last night, is as certain to me, as that I at present see the color of this paper. had no memory, knowledge and experience would be impossible; and if we had any tendency to distrust our memory, knowledge and experience would be of as little use in directing our conduct and sentiments, as our dreams now are. Sometimes we doubt, whether in a particular case we exert memory or imagination; and our belief is suspended accordingly but no sooner do we become conscious, that we remember, than conviction instantly takes place; we say, I am certain it was so, for I now remember I was an eye-witness."*

If we

There remains, however, another inquiry, What is the origin of this confident reliance? And the reply here is, as in many other cases; it is our nature, our mental constitution, the will and ordinance of the Being, who created us. Whatever may be said on the subject, there must be, and there are certain original grounds, certain fundamental laws of belief, which, in every analysis of our knowledge, are fixed and permanent boundaries, beyond which we cannot proceed. And reliance on memory is one of them.

V,—HUMAN TESTIMONY. By this is commonly meant the report of men concerning what has fallen under their personal observation. And this forms another ground of belief. As to the fact, that men readily receive the testimony of their fellow beings, and that such testimony influences their belief and conduct, it cannot be denied. They thus universally yield credence to the statements of each other, unless some*Beattie's Essay on Truth, Pt. I, CH. II. §. 4.

thing comes to their knowledge unfavorable to the credibility of the narrator, because it is natural or constitutional to do so. In other words, the very nature of our mental constitution, independently of the suggestions of reason and experience, leads us to believe what men assert. We are so constituted, that the very first sound of the human voice, which reaches us, calls into action a disposition on our part to admit the truth of whatever intelligence it conveys. In support of this view, (which, it may be remarked, has in its favor the weighty names of Reid and Campbell among others,) reference may properly be made to what we observe in children. In the earliest period of life, as soon as the first gleams of intelligence are visible, they look with hope and fondness to those, who support them; there seems to be no doubt, no suspicion, no want of confidence. This strong reliance discovers itself from time to time, as they advance towards youth; and in the whole of the early part of our existence, is so distinct, strong, and operative, that men have given to it a specific name, in order to distinguish it from the more chastened credence of riper years. We speak of the caution and the convictions of manhood, and of the simplicity and CREDULITY of children.

§. 27. Objections to reliance on testimony.

It may be objected to the doctrine of reliance on human testimony, that we are liable to be led into mistakes by the statements of our fellow men. This objection merits some attention; and the answer to it may be summed up in two particulars.-FIRST. The proportion of cases of deception, compared with those where we are not deceived, is very small. We admit that we may be disappointed and deceived sometimes, but not often, in comparison with the whole number of cases where we place reliance. Men are naturally disposed to speak the truth; it is much easier than to speak what is not true, for truth is at hand, but the practice of prevarication and mis-statement requires labor and invention, besides conflicting with the general estimate of human character, and jarring violently upon every honorable sentiment within us. So capable is this view of being sustained, that even those men, who have brought upon themselves the in

famy of being considered liars, probably utter the truth an hundred times, where they utter a falsehood once.-SECOND.-Admitting, that we are liable to be led astray by means of testimony, still it is in our power, and is our duty to take suitable precautions against this liability. We are by no means required to place implicit confidence in it, without a regard to the circumstances under which it is given, and the character and opportunities of the person who gives it. Every one knows, that there are in himself tendencies and principles, which, in certain circumstances, may be brought in conflict with the more ennobling principle of truth; and that he is liable to error, even when he supposes himself to be seeking the truth, from the mere want of labor and care. And we may make use of this experience in judging of the testimony of others, since we may reasonably suspect in them the existence of similar tendencies, and similar want of circumspection. It is, therefore, consistent with any suitable degree of reliance on testimony to satisfy ourselves, whether the person, who testifies, possessed ample means of information; whether he made use of those means; and whether, in giving testimony, he may not be under the influence of interest or passion.

§. 28. Of relative suggestion as a ground of belief.

VI, Another ground or law of belief of such a nature, as to be entitled to a distinct consideration, is RELATIVE SUGGESTION. By this phrase is expressed the power or susceptibility, by means of which we perceive the relations of objects. What RELATIONS themselves are, it is unnecessary to attempt to define; no mere form of words can render the conception of them clearer to any person's comprehension, than it is already supposed to be. All, that needs be asserted, is the mere fact, that, when the mind contemplates two or more objects, we naturally put forth other perceptions or feelings; we cannot avoid doing it. For instance, we feel or perceive such objects to be the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, cause or effect, whole or part, attribute or subject,&c.

These new feelings, as well as the direct perceptions of the objects, to which they relate, are occasions of belief. We not only believe the existence of the feelings themselves,

but find ourselves unable to resist and exclude the belief of the actual existence and truth of that, to which they correspond, viz, relations. The relations of things, it is true, are not objects, directly addressed to the external senses; and as we cannot directly see them, nor hear them, nor feel them, they seem comparatively obscure. And yet we are so constituted, that the cognizance of them is utterly inseparable from a knowledge of those objects, in respect to which they exist. If they are not perceivable by the outward senses, they are nevertheless perceivable by the mind, and are undoubtedly, in some important sense, real subjects of contemplation and knowledge. Accordingly, RELATIVE SUGGESTION, the name of the susceptibility, by means of which we become acquainted with relations, is properly regarded a

LAW OF BELIEF.

§. 29. Of reasoning as a ground or law of belief.

VII,—All REASONING, both Moral and Demonstrative, and in whatever form it exists, is also an original foundation of belief. Relative suggestion and reasoning are closely connected together; since every train of reasoning implies, and involves a series of felt or perceived relations. Perceptions of relation may be regarded as the links, which bind together such separate perceptions, facts, or truths, as come within the range of the subject reasoned upon; and without which they would inevitably remain in their original state of insulated and unavailable propositions. Truth is added to truth, feeling arises successive to feeling, until we arrive at the conclusion, which invariably fixes our belief.

When, however, we assert, that the conclusions, deduced from a process of reasoning, invariably influence our belief, we should particularly keep in mind here, that belief may exist in very various degrees. When the successive feelings, which we have in a train of reasoning, are all intuitive, and the propositions, with which we commenced, were certain, or were assumed as such, belief is of course of the highest kind. And this is always the case in demonstrations; for there we always begin either with known or assumed truths, and as the propositions compared together are entirely abstract, there seems to be no room for doubt or mistake. But

in moral reasoning, although the mental process is the same, the conclusion is not necessarily true; the propositions contemplated are in general of a different character from what we find in demonstrative reasoning; and the conclusion will vary from mere presumption to absolute certainty according to the nature of the facts laid before the mind.

But is it a fact, that Reasoning necessarily controls our convictions in any case? What evidence is there, that our belief, in a greater or less degree, is naturally dependent on its conclusions ?-If we can suppose such a question to be seriously put, a prompt and satisfactory answer is to be found in the general and in individual experience. No man has it in his power to refuse obedience to the decisions of reasoning; nor does he ever do it, except from an inability to embrace at once, and to balance the successive steps of the process. So far as he fully understands the elementary parts, which enter into a just train of reasoning, and can estimate the relative bearing of one part on another, just so far his belief is naturally and necessarily affected.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

GENERAL CLASSIFICATION.

§. 30. The mind may be regarded in a threefold point of view.

It is undoubtedly true, that the human soul is to be regarded as constituting a nature, which is one and indivisible; but still there is abundant reason for asserting, that its nature can never be fully understood by contemplating it solely and exclusively under one aspect. There are accordingly three prominent and well defined points of view, in which the mind may be contemplated, viz, the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will; otherwise expressed by the phrases INTELLECTUAL, SENSITIVE or SENTIENT, and vOLUNTARY states of the mind. Whatever truly and appropriately belongs to the