an original one; as there was a foreign gentleman present, who could recite every word of it. Voltaire listened with amazement to the stranger, as he repeated word for word, the poem, which he had been at so much pains in composing; and giving way to a momentary freak of passion, he tore the manuscript in pieces. A statement was then made to him of the circumstances, under which the Englishman became acquainted with his poem, which had the effect to mitigate his anger, and he was very willing to do penance for the suddenness of his passion, by copying down the work from a second repetition of it by the stranger, who was able to go through with it, as before.* A considerable number of instances of this description are found in the recorded accounts of various individuals, but they may be considered as exceptions to the general features of the human mind, the existence of which it is difficult to explain on any known principles. They are probably original and constitutional traits; and if such be the case, they necessarily preclude any explanation, further than what is involved in the mere statement of that fact. There are, however, some diversities and peculiarities of memory, less striking perhaps, than those just referred to, which admit a more detailed notice. * The following recent statement, and from a most unquestioned source, (Mr. Rhenius, Missionary in Southern India, year 1827,) discloses a tenacity of memory not unlike the very striking instances above mentioned, and which have been already so often quoted in other works."I have lately witnessed, (says he,) a remarkable instance of a wonderfully retentive memory in a young Brahmin from Ramnad. Three days ago, a gentleman wrote a sentence in English, (of which language the Brahmin knew nothing,) containing 30 syllables: each syllable was numbered in order; all the syllables with their numbers were told him; not in their proper order, but skipping from three to twenty, then to six, and so on ; when the whole sentence was finished, the Brahmin arranging the numbers in his head in regular order, told the sentence word for word. Today he wrote him an English sentence of sixty-nine syllables; and proceeded in telling him the numbers as before; while this was going on, I wrote a sentence in Hebrew, containing fourteen syllables, telling him the numbers in the same skipping manner: while this was proceeding, he repeated to us the sentence which he had heard three days ago: and when the numbers of the new English and Hebrew sentences were finished, he told us both of them in a regular order, as if he had read them from a book. This was certainly a prodigious memory, and astonished us all." §. 246. Of circumstantial memory, or that species of memory, which is based on the relations of contiguity in time and place. There is a species of memory, more than usually obvious and outward in its character, which is based essentially upon the relations of Contiguity in time and place. In the explanation of this form or species of memory, it may be proper to recur a moment to the explanations on the general nature of memory, which have already been given. It will be kept in mind, that our remembrances are merely conceptions, modified by a perception of the relation of past time. Removing, then, the modification of past time, and the remaining element of our remembrances will be conceptions merely. Our conceptions, it will be recollected, cannot be called up by a mere voluntary effort, because to will the existence of a conception necessarily implies the actual existence of the conception already in the mind. They arise in the mind, therefore, in obedience to the influence of some of those principles of ASSOCIATION, which have already been considered. And Memory, accordingly, will assume a peculiarity of aspect, corresponding to the associating principle which predominates. If it be based, for instance, on the law of Contiguity, as it will deal chiefly with mere facts, and their outward incidents and circumstances without entering deeply into their interior nature, it will be what may be described, not merely as an obvious and practical, but, in particular, as a circumstantial memory. If it be based chiefly on the other principles, it may be expected to exhibit a less easy and flexible, a less minute and specific, but a more philosophical char acter. That species of memory, which is founded chiefly on the law of contiguity, and which is distinguished by its specificalness or circumstantiality, will be found to prevail especially among uneducated people, not merely artisans and other laboring classes; but among all those, in, whatever situation of life, who have either not possessed, or possessing have not employed the means of intellectual culture. Every one must have recollected instances of the great readiness, exhibited by these persons, in their recollection of facts, places, times, names, specific arrangements in dress and in buildings, traditions, and local incidents. In their narrations, for in stance, of what has come within their knowledge, they will in general be found to specify the time of events; not merely an indefinite or approximated time; but the identical year, and month, and day, and hour. In their description of persons and places, and in their account of the dress and equipage of persons, and of the localities and incidents of places, they are found to be no less particular. When we assert, however, that this species of memory, which from the peculiar aspect it exhibits may conveniently be designated as CIRCUMSTANTIAL memory, is based upon the principle of Contiguity, we do not mean to intimate that its possessors are naturally destitute of the other associating principles, or that they necessarily possess them in a much lower degree than others. As compared with the principle of Contiguity, the principles of Resemblance or Analogy, of Contrast, and of Cause and Effect appear to be more remote and inward, and less accessible by familiar and outward influences. Accordingly as a general statement, they imply, in their exercise, a greater degree of mental developement. And hence it naturally happens, that those persons, who have not possessed or have not employed the means of this developement, even if they are possessed of the principles themselves, avail themselves of those more obvious and easy helps to memory, which nature has placed within their reach. In other words, it is almost invariably the case, that they aim to strengthen their recollections of facts and events, by associating them with those things, which happened at the same time, or were proximate in position. And having by almost constant exercise greatly strengthened the tendency to those associations, which exist in consequence of mere contiguity, they can readily tell you not only the precise place, where any thing has happened, but almost every thing, which has happened in the immediate neighborhood; not only the time, when the event occurred, but many other things, which occurred about the same period; not only the person, but numberless particularities of dress, form, and position. §. 247. Illustrations of specific or circumstantial memory. The great masters of human nature, (Shakspeare among others,) have occasionally indicated their knowledge of this species of memory. Mrs. Quickly, in reminding Falstaff of his promise of marriage, discovers her readiness of recollection in the specification of a great variety of circumstances, under which the promise was made. Her recollection in the case was not a mere general remembrance of the solitary fact, but was in the manner of a witness in a court of justice, · circumstantial.-"Thou didst swear to me on a parcel-gilt goblet, sitting in my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a sea-coal fire, on Wednesday in Whitsun week, when the prince broke thy head for likening him to a singing man of Windsor."The coachman in Cornelius Scriblerus gives an account of what he had seen in Bear-garden ;-"Two men fought for a prize; one was a fair man, a sergeant in the guards; the other black, a butcher; the sergeant had red trousers, the butcher blue; they fought upon a stage about four o'clock, and the sergeant wounded the butcher in the leg." "In a certain village of Estramadura, (says the humble squire of the knight of La Mancha,) there lived a certain goat shepherd. I mean one that keeps goats; and this shepherd or goatherd, as the story goes, was called Lope Ruyz; and it came to pass, that this Lope Ruyz fell in love with a shepherdess, whose name was Torralva; which shepherdess, whose name was Torralva, was the daughter of a rich herdsman; and this rich herdsman," &c. Don Quixote took exception to Sancho's telling the story with so much particularity; but he frankly and honestly replied, that all the people in his country told stories in that manner, and he must tell it so, or not tell it at all. §. 248. Of philosophic memory, or that species of memory which is based on other relations than those of contiguity. There is another species of memory, clearly distinguishable from the CIRCUMSTANTIAL memory, which may be describ ed as the philosophic. This form of memory, relying but seldom on the aids of mere Contiguity, is sustained chiefly by the relations of Resemblance, Contrast, and Cause, and Effect. The circumstantial memory, which deals almost exclusively with minute particulars, and especially with those which are accessible by the outward senses, admirably an swers the purpose of those persons, in whom it is commonly found. But mere contiguity in time and place, which is almost the sole principle, that binds together facts and events in the recollection of those, whose powers are but imperfectly developed, possesses comparatively little value in the estimation of the philosopher. He looks more deeply into the nature of things. Bestowing but slight attention on what is purely outward and incidental, he detects with a discriminating eye the analogies and oppositions, the causes and consequences of events. It would seem, that the celebrated Montaigne was destitute, perhaps in a more than common degree, of that form of reminiscence, which we have proposed to designate as the circumstantial memory. He says on a certain occasion of himself, "I am forced to call my servants by the names of their employments, or of the countries, where they were born, for I can hardly remember their proper names; and if I should live long, I question whether I should remember my own name." But it does not appear, notwithstanding his inability to remember names and insulated facts, especially if they related to the occurrences of common life, that he had much reason to complain of an absolute want of memory. His writings indicate his cast of mind, that he was. reflective and speculative; and he expressly gives us to understand, that he was much more interested in the study of the principles of human nature, than of outward objects. Accordingly the result was such, as might be expected, that his memory was rather philosophical, than circumstantial; and more tenacious of general principles than of specific facts. A man, whose perceptions are naturally philosophic, and whose remembrances consequently take the same turn, may not be able to make so rapid and striking advances in alt branches of knowledge, as a person of different intellectual bias. Almost every department of science presents itself to the student's notice under two forms, the practical and theoretical; its facts and its rules of proceeding on the one hand, and its principles on the other. The circumstantial memory rapidly embraces the practical part, seizing its facts and enunciating its rules, with a promptness of movement and a show of power, which throws the philosophic memory quite |