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precisely opposite, the idea or conception of one is immediately followed by that of the other. When the discourse is of the palace of the king, how often are we reminded, in the same breath, of the cottage of the peasant! And thus it is, that wealth and poverty, the cradle and the grave, and hope and despair, are found, in public speeches and in writings, so frequently going together, and keeping each other company. The truth is, they are connected together in our thoughts by a distinct and operative principle; they accompany each other, certainly not because there is any resemblance, in the things thus associated, but in consequence of their very marked contrariety. Darkness reminds of light, heat of cold, friendship of enmity; the sight of the conqueror is associated with the memory of the conquered, and when beholding men of deformed and dwarfish appearance, we are at once led to think of those of erect figure or of Patagonian size. Contrast, then, is no less a principle or law of association, than resemblance itself.

Count Lemaistre's touching story, entitled from the scene of its incidents, THE LEPER OF AOST, illustrates the effects of the principle of association now under consideration. Like all persons, infected with the leprosy, the subject of the disease is represented as an object of dread no less than of pity to others, and while he is an outcast from the society of men, he is a loathsome spectacle even to himself. But what is the condition of his mind? What are the subjects of his thoughts? The tendencies of his intellectual nature prevent his thinking of wretchedness alone. His extreme misery aggravates itself by suggesting scenes of ideal happiness, and his mind revels in a paradise of delights, merely to give greater intensity to his actual woes by contrasting them with imaginary bliss. "I represent to myself continually, (says the Leper,) societies of sincere and virtuous friends; families, blessed with health, fortune, and harmony. I imagine, I see them walk in groves, greener and fresher, than these, the shade of which makes my poor happiness; brightened by a sun more brilliant than that which sheds its beams on me ;-And their destiny seems to me as much more worthy of envy in proportion as my own is the more miserable."

Association by CONTRAST is the foundation of the rhetorical

figure of Antithesis. In one of the tragedies of Southern we find the following antithetic expressions.

-"Could I forget

"What I have been, I might the better bear
"What I am destined to. I am not the first,

"That have been wretched ;-But to think how much

"I have been happier.

Here the present is placed in opposition with the past, and happiness is contrasted with misery; not by a cold and strained artifice, as one might be led to suppose, but by the natural impulses of the mind, which is led to associate together things that are the reverse of each other.

§. 222. Contiguity the third general or primary law.

Those thoughts and feelings, which have been connected together by nearness of time and place, are readily suggested by each other; and, consequently, contiguity in those respects is rightly reckoned, as another and third primary law of our mental associations. When we think of Palestine, for instance, we very readily and naturally think of the Jewish nation, of the patriarchs, of the prophets, of the Savior, and of the apostles, because Palestine was their place of residence, and the theatre of their actions. So that this is evidently an instance, where the suggestions are chiefly regulated by proximity of place. When a variety of acts and events have happened nearly at the same period, whether in the same place or not, one is not thought of without the other being closely associated with it, owing to proximity of time. If, therefore, the particular event of the crucifixion of the Savior be mentioned, we are necessarily led to think of various other events, which occurred about the same period, such as the treacherous conspiracy of Judas, the denial of Peter, the conduct of the Roman soldiery, the rending of the veil of the temple, and the temporary obscuration of the sun.

The mention of Egypt suggests the Nile, the Pyramids, the monuments of the Thebais, the follies and misfortunes of Cleopatra, the battle of Aboukir. The mention of Greece is associated with Thermopyla and Salamis, the Hill of Mars and the Vale of Tempe, Illissus, the steeps of Delphi, Lyceum, and the "olive shades of Academus." These, it will be

noticed, are associations on the principle of contiguity in PLACE. But if a particular event, of great interest, is mentioned, other events and renowned names, which attracted notice at the same period, will eagerly cluster around it. The naming of the AMERICAN REVOLUTION, for instance, immediately fills the mind with recollections of Washington, Franklin, Morris, Greene, Jay, and many of their associates, whose fortune it was to enlist their exertions in the support of constitutional rights, not merely in the same country, (for that circumstance alone might not have been sufficient to have recalled them,) but at the same period of time.

It is generally supposed, and not without reason for it, that the third primary law of mental association, is more extensive in its influence than any others. It has been remarked with truth, that proximity in time and place forms the basis of the whole calender of the great mass of mankind. They pay but little attention to the arbitrary eras of chronology; but date events by each other, and speak of what happened at the time of some dark day, of some destructive overflow of waters, of some great eclipse, of some period of drought and famine, of some war or revolution.

§. 223. Cause and effect the fourth primary law.

There are certain facts or events, which hold to each other the relation of invariable antecedence and sequence. That fact or event, to which some other one sustains the relation of constant antecedence, is in general called an effect;And that fact or event, to which some other one holds the relation of invariable sequence, has in general the name of a cause. Now there may be no resemblance in the things, which reciprocally bear this relation, there may be no contrariety, and it is by no means necessary, that there should be contiguity in time or place, as the meaning of the term contiguity, is commonly understood. There may be CAUSE and EFFECT without any one or all of these circumstances. But it is a fact, which is known to every one's experience, that, when we think of the cause in any particular instance, we naturally think of the effect, and, on the contrary, the knowledge or recollection of the effect brings to mind the cause. And in view of this well known and general experi

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ence, there is good reason for reckoning CAUSE and EFFECT among the primary principles of our mental associations. What we here understand by principles or laws will be recollected, viz. The general designation of those circumstances, under which the regular consecution of mental states occurs.

It is on the principle of Cause and Effect, that, when we see a surgical instrument or any engine of torture, we have a conception of the pain, which they are fitted to occasion. And, on the contrary, the sight of a wound, inflicted however long before, suggests to us the idea of the instrument, by which it was made. Mr. Locke relates an incident, which illustrates the statements made here, of a man, who was restored from a state of insanity, by means of a harsh and exceedingly painful operation. "The gentleman, who was thus recovered, with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgement, owned the cure all his life after, as the greatest obligation he could have received; but whatever gratitude and reason suggested to him he could never bear the sight of the operator that image brought back with it the idea of that agony which he suffered from his hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure."The operation of the law of Cause and Effect, in the production of new associations, seems to be involved in the following characteristic passage of Shakspeare, Henry IV, 2d PT. ACT. I.

"Yet the first bringer of unwelcome news
"Hath but a losing office; and his tongue
"Sounds ever after as a sullen bell,
"Remember'd knolling a departed friend.

CHAPTER SIXTH.

ASSOCIATION. (II) SECONDARY LAWS.

§. 224. Secondary laws and their connection with the primary.

THE subject of Association is not exhausted in the enumeration and explanation of its Laws, which has thus far been given. Besides the PRIMARY LAWS, which have fallen under our consideration, there are certain marked and prominent circumstances, which are found to exert, in a greater or less degree, a modifying and controlling influence over the more general principles. As this influence is of a permanent character, and not merely accidental and temporary, the grounds or sources of it are called, by way of distinction, SEC

ONDARY LAWS.

These, which we are now to consider, will probably appear at first sight to be more numerous than they are in fact. It is undoubtedly somewhat difficult to make out a just and unalterable designation of them. Nevertheless it is believed, that, on a careful examination, their multiplicity will be lessened, and that they will be found to be but four in number; viz, lapse of Time, degree of coexistent Feeling, repetition or Habit, and original or constitutional Difference in charac

ter.

It must at once be obvious, that these principles, although holding a subordinate rank, give an increased range and power to the PRIMARY laws. It is not to be inferred from the epithet, by which they are distinguished, that they are, therefore, of a very minor, and inconsiderable importance. On the contrary, human nature without them, as far as we are capable of judging, would have assumed a sort of fixed

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