§. 210. (VI.) Of relations of possession.

Another class of relations may be called relations of PosSESSION.Every one knows, that not unfrequently, in his examination of objects, there arises a new feeling, which is distinct from, and independent of the mere conceptions of the objects themselves; and which, as it differs from other feelings of relation, may be termed the relation of possession or belonging to. This is one of the earliest feelings, which human beings exercise. When we see the small child grasping its top and rattle with joy, and disputing the claims of another to a share in them, we may know that he has formed the notion of possession. It is not only formed in early life, but experience fully shows, that it loses neither activity nor strength by the lapse of years.

The application of the Judgment, or that power, by which we perceive the relations of things, is frequently in this particular form; and we find here a fruitful source of words. The whole class of possessive pronouns, which are to be found in all languages, have their origin here; such as MINE, THINE, YOUR, HIS, HER, &c. The relation of possession is embodied also in the Genitive case of the Greeks, Latins, Germans, and whatever other languages express relations in the same way; in the construct state of nouns in the Hebrew and the other cognate dialects; and in the preposition or, which is the substitute for the genitive termination in English, and the articles DE, DU, DE'L, and DE LA in French.

The verbs TO BE in English, ESSE in Latin, ETRE in French, (and the same may undoubtedly be said of the corresponding verb of existence in all languages,) are often employed to express the relation of possession or belonging to. To say that the rose is red or the orange yellow is as much as to say, that the qualities of yellowness and redness are the possession of, or belong to the rose and orange. But it will be observed that the relation is not indicated by the name of the subject, nor by the epithet expressive of its quality, but by the verb which connects the subject and predicate. And similar remarks will apply to some other verbs.

This class of relations is involved in many complex terms, which imply definite qualities and affections of mind, as friend, enemy, lover, hater, adorer, worshipper. These terms

not only indicate certain individuals, to whom they are applied, but assert the existence of certain mental affections as their characteristics, and as belonging to them.

CAUSE.

§. 211. (VII.) Of relations of cause and effect.

There are relations also of Cause and Effect. We will not delay here to explain the origin of the notions of cause and effect any further than to say, that the notion of cause, as it first exists in the mind, includes nothing more than invariable antecedence. When the antecedence to the event, or the sequence of whatever kind, is our own volition, (and probably in a single other case, see §. 189,) we have the new idea of POWER. The idea of invariable antecedence, therefore, which of course supposes some sequence, when it is combined with that of Power, constitutes the full notion of When the sequence is found invariably to follow, and its existence cannot be ascribed to any thing else, it is called the EFFECT. Accordingly men usually give the name of events, of occurrences, or facts, to those things, which from time to time fall under their notice, when they are considered in themselves. They are the mere facts, the mere events, and nothing more. But when, in the course of their further experience, such events are found to have certain invariable forerunners, they cease to apply these terms, and call them, in reference to their antecedents, EFFECTS. And in like manner the antecedents are called CAUSES, not in themselves considered, but in reference to what invariably comes after.

Cause and effect, therefore, have certainly a relation to each other; it is thus that they exist in the view of the mind and in the nature of things, however true it may be, that men are unable to trace any physical connection between them. We cannot conceive of a cause, if we exclude from the list of our ideas the correlative notion of effect, nor, on the other hand, do we call any thing an effect without a reference to some antecedent. These two notions, therefore, involve or imply the existence of each other; that is, are relative.

§. 212. Of complex terms involving the relation of cause and effect. The suggestion of the relation of Cause and Effect exists on occasions almost innumerable; and in all languages gives

a character to a multitude of words. This relation is embodied, for instance, in a multitude of names which are expressive of complex objects, such as printer, farmer, sculptor, warrior, writer, poet, manufacturer, painter.

This may be thus illustrated. When we look at any interesting piece of statuary, the sight of it naturally suggests its author. But when our mind is thus directed from the statue to the sculptor, it is evident we do not think of him as we do of a thousand others, but we combine with the conception of the individual a reference to what he has done. We unite with the mere complex notion of man that of a cause, and this combination evidently alters its character, making it relative instead of absolute.In like manner when we look at a fine portrait or historical painting we are naturally reminded of the artist, whose ingenuity has been displayed in its proportions and coloring. But the word painter, which we apply to him, expresses not merely the man, but comprises the additional notion of the relation of cause, which he holds to the interesting picture before us.

§. 213. Remarks on instituted or conventional relations.

Perhaps we may be thought not to have completed this subject, without remarking, that there are certain complex terms, expressive of what Mr. Locke calls INSTITUTED OF CONVENTIONAL relations. As the epithets indicate, which are applied to them, they are not permanent, but are dependent on the will, agreement, or appointment of men; such as citizen or burgher, governor, judge, senator, general, legislator, &c. Accordingly a CITIZEN is one, who has a right to the privileges of civil society in a certain place; that is to say, is the subject of some government, to the principles of whose organization and authority he is supposed to have consented, in the expectation of receiving its protection. A GENERAL is one, who has the power to command an army with the various powers incidental to it; the right being delegated to him by the choice and consent of the government of the country.

But it is obviously unnecessary to stop for the purpose of considering the innumerable and constantly changing relations of this kind. They assume the most multiplied shapes;

not taking their character from any one fixed and definite principle of the mind, but embracing a complication of qualities both absolute and relative. There are other complex names, involving various relations which chiefly differ from the conventional relations, in being natural and more permanent, such as father, son, brother, sister, nephew, &c.

§. 214. Connection of relative suggestion or judgment with reasoning.

It may be profitable to notice here the connection, which relative suggestion has with reasoning in general. The suggestions of relation, (or elementary judgments, as they may perhaps properly be called,) are, in some respects, to a train of reasoning, what parts are to the whole. But they evidently do not of themselves include all the parts in a train of reasoning, and are distinguished by this peculiarity, that their office, in a great measure, is to connect together other subordinate parts in the train. In the combination of numbers, and in the various applications of demonstrative reasoning, the relations of PROPORTION and the relations of IDENTITY and DIVERSITY, (otherwise called of AGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT,) find a conspicuous place. Moral reasoning embraces all kinds of relations, those of degree, time, place, possession, and cause and effect, as well as of agreement and disagreement, and of proportion. Relative feelings, sometimes of one kind and sometimes of another, continually unfold themselves, as the mind advances in argument. So that, although there are elements in reasoning besides perceptions of relation, it is evident that it cannot advance independently of their aid. Facts may be accumulated, having close and decisive relations to the points to be proved, but those facts can never be so bound together as to result in any decisive conclusion, without a perception and knowledge of the relations.

CHAPTER FIFTH.

1

ASSOCIATION. (1) PRIMARY LAWS.

§. 215. Reasons for considering this subject here.

In giving an account of the internal origin of knowledge, we might be expected to proceed directly from Relative Suggestion to a consideration of the Reasoning power, which is one of the most effective and fruitful sources of intellectual perception. By means of this power, we are enabled to combine and compare the ample materials, furnished by ORIGINAL SUGGESTION, CONSCIOUSNESS, and RELATIVE SUGGESTION, and thus to develope in the mind new elements of thought, and to cast light on the darkened places in the field of truth. But there are powers of the mind, subordinate to the reasoning power and essential to its action, which may with propriety be first considered; particularly Association and Memory. Other persons perhaps, in examining the various parts of the mind, would propose, for the consideration of these powers, some other place; but we see no valid objection to considering them here. On the contrary, they have comparatively so little to do with what has gone before, and so much to do with what comes after, and in particular are so essential to every process of ratiocination, that this seems to be their appropriate position. As Association is presupposed and involved in memory, as well as in reasoning, we naturally begin with that principle first.

§. 216. Meaning of association and illustrations.

Our thoughts and feelings follow each other in a regular train. Of this statement no one needs any other proof, than