delightful forms in nature, and how many ideal temples, contemplated for a long time in the mind's eye, must the genius, that planned the Parthenon, have abstracted each form of beauty and excellence of proportion! From how many forests, both seen and imagined, and fields of bloom, and rivers and waterfalls, must the mind, that conceived the Garden of Paradise Lost, have drawn the sounds that delight the ear, and the colors that are pleasant to the sight!

CHAPTER THIRTEENTH.

GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS.

§. 138. General abstract notions the same with genera and species.

WE proceed, in connection with the remarks of the last chapter, to the consideration of GENERAL ABSTRACT ideas ; a subject of no little interest, and which has frequently been thought to be attended with no small difficulty.

General Abstract notions are not only different in consequence of embracing a greater number of elementary parts, from those which are particular, but are also susceptible of being distinguished from the great body of our other complex notions. The idea for example, which we form of any individual, of John, Peter, or James, is evidently a complex one, but it is not necessarily a general one. The notion, which we frame of a particular horse, or of a particular tree is likewise a complex idea, but not a general one. There will be found to be a clear distinction between them, although it may not be perfectly obvious at first. GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS are our notions of the classes of objects, that is, of Genera and Species. They are expressed by general names, without, in most cases, any defining or limitation, as when we use the words ANIMAL, MAN, HORSE, BIRD, SHEEP, FISH,

TREE, not to express any one in particular of these various classes, but animals, men, horses, &c. in general.

§. 139. Process in classification or the forming of genera and species.

Now if our general abstract ideas, so far as they relate to external objects, are truly notions of SPECIES and GENERA, it will aid us in the better understanding of them, if we briefly consider, how species and genera are formed. Men certainly find no great practical difficulty in forming these classifications, since we find that they do in fact make them in numberless instances, and at a very early period of life. They seem to be governed in the process by definite and uniform mental tendencies.What then, in point of fact, is the process in classification? It is obvious, in the first place, that no classification can be made without considering two or more objects together. A number of objects, therefore, are first presented to us for our observation and inquiry, which are to be examined first in themselves, and then in comparison with each other. place.

We will take a familiar scene to illustrate what takes

We suppose ourselves to stand on the bank of a navigable river; we behold the flowing of its waters, the cliffs that overhang it, the trees that line its shore, the boats and boatmen on its bosom, the flocks and herds, that press down to drink from its waves. With such a scene before us, it is to be expected, that the mind will rapidly make each, and all of these the subjects of its contemplation; nor does it pursue this contemplation and inquiry far, without perceiving certain relations of agreement or difference. Certain objects before it are felt to be essentially alike, and others to be essentially different; and hence they are not all arranged in one class, but a discrimination is made, and different classes are formed. The flocks and herds are formed into their respective classes. The tall and leafy bodies on the river's bank, although they differ from each other in some respects, are yet found to agree in so many others, that they are arranged together in another class, and called by the general name of TREE. The living, moving, and reasoning beings, that propel the waters, form another class, and are called MAN.

boats on its

-And there

is the same process, and the same result in respect to all other bodies coming within the range of our observation.

§. 140. Early classifications sometimes incorrect.

It has been intimated, that, in making these classifications, men are governed by definite and uniform mental tendencies; still it must be acknowledged, that mistakes are sometimes committed, especially in the early periods of society, and in all cases where the opportunities of examination and comparison are imperfect. When man first opens his eyes on nature, (and in the infancy of our race, he finds himself a novice, wherever he goes,) objects so numerous, so various in kind, so novel and interesting, crowd upon his attention; that, attempting to direct himself to all at the same time, he loses sight of their specifical differences, and blends them together, more than a calm and accurate examination would justify. And hence it is not to be wondered at, that our earliest classifications, the primitive genera and species, are sometimes incorrectly made.

Subsequently, when knowledge has been in some measure amassed, and reasoning and observation have been brought to a greater maturity, these errors are attended to; individuals are rejected from species, where they do not properly belong, and species from genera. The most savage and ignorant tribes will in due season correct their mistakes, and be led into the truth.

§. 141. Illustrations of our earliest classifications.

We are naturally led to introduce some circumstances here, which throw light on this part of our subject. What we wish to illustrate is the simple fact, that men readily perceive the resemblances of objects, and exhibit a disposition to classify them in reference to such resemblance. The first case, which we shall mention in illustration of this, is that of Caspar Hauser. The principal objects, which Caspar had to amuse himself with in his prison, were two little wooden horses, which in his entire ignorance he believed to be possessed of life and sensibility. After the termination of his imprisonment, his biographer informs us, that to "every animal he met with, whether quadruped or biped, dog, cat, goose, or fowl, he gave the name of horse."

In the year 1814, Pitcairn's Island, a solitary spot in the Pacific ocean, was visited by two English cruisers. Two of the young men, that belonged on the island, and whose knowledge was of course exceedingly limited, came on board one of the vessels. The youths, (says the Narrative,) were greatly surprised at the sight of so many novel objects; the size of the ship; the guns, and every thing around them. Observing a cow, they were at first somewhat alarmed, and expres sed a doubt, whether it was a huge goat, or a horned hog, these being the only two species of quadrupeds they had ever seen."

The English navigator Cook, in going from New Zealand to the Friendly Islands, lighted on an Island, called Wateeoo.

"The inhabitants, (he says), were afraid to come near our cows and horses, nor did they form the least conception of their nature. But the sheep and goats did not surpass the limits of their ideas, for they gave us to understand, they knew them to be birds."

Captain Cook informs us, that these people were acquainted with only three sorts of animals, viz. dogs, hogs, and birds. Of hogs and dogs they had probably never known more than one variety or class, and had never been led to suspect, that there was, or could be any other. But having noticed a great variety of birds in their forests and waters, they had undoubtedly found it necessary before this period, not only to give a general name expressive of all birds, but also to classify some of the subordinate varieties. This people, therefore, not unnaturally, although we do not pretend to say with much discrimination, applied the term BIRDS to the sheep and goats of the English. They knew not but there might be some new class of birds, which they had not hitherto noticed; and they saw no insuperable objection, in the size of the sheep and goats, to this disposition of them, whatever other objection they might, on a further examination, have subsequently found.

§. 142. Of the nature of general abstract ideas.

The notions, which are thus formed in all cases of classification, are commonly known, in the Treatises having relation to these subjects, as General Abstract ideas. And they

are no less numerous than the multiplied varieties of objects, which are found to exist every where around us. It is thus, that we form the general notions of animal and of all the subordinate species of animals; of tree and its numerous varieties; of earths, and minerals, and whatever else is capable of being arranged into classes.

We may apply these views not only to natural objects, but to forms and relations of a very different character. The word Triangle is the name of a general abstract idea. Great exceptions, however, have been taken to certain incautious expressions of Mr. Locke on this point. He asserts, that it requires some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle, and gives the following reason; "for it must neither be oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once," &c. This language is undoubtedly open to criticism, and in truth has not failed to receive a full share. The correct view seems to be this. The word TRIANGLE is not only the name of a class, but of a very general class; it is the name of a Genus, embracing all those figures, which agree in the circumstance of being bounded by three strait lines meeting one another so as to form three angles. A figure having any other form, (in other words not exhibiting a resemblance or similarity in this respect,) is excluded from the Genus; but it is still so extensive, taken in the sense just now mentioned, as to include all figures whatever of that name. Now there are embraced within the genus, as in numerous other cases, subordinate classes, which are distinguished by their appropriate names, viz. the class of acute-angled triangles, that of right-angled triangles, of obtuse-angled triangles, &c.

But it is to be noticed, that the general idea, whatever objects it may be founded upon, does not embrace every particular, which makes a part of such objects. When we look at a number of men, we find them all differing in some respects, in height, size, color, tone of the voice, and in other particulars. The mind fixes only upon those traits or properties, with which it can combine the notion of resemblance; that is to say, those traits, qualities, or properties, in which the individuals are perceived to be like, or to resemble each other.The complex mental state, which em