§. 128. Illustrations of analysis as applied to the mind.

The subject of the preceding section will be the better understood by the consideration of Analysis as applicable to the mind. As we do not combine literally, so we do not untie or separate literally; as there is no literal complexness, so there is no literal resolution or analysis of it. Nevertheless we have a meaning, when we speak of analyzing our thoughts and feelings. And what is it? What are we to understand by the term analysis?

Although this subject is not without difficulty, both in the conception, and in the expression of it, it is susceptible of some degree of illustration.-It will be remembered, that there may be analysis of material bodies. The chemist analyzes, when he takes a piece of glass, which appears to be one substance, and finds, that it is not one, but is separable into silicious and alkaline matter. He takes other bodies, and separates them in like manner; and whenever he does this, the process is rightly called analysis.

Now we apply the same term to the mind; but the thing expressed by it, the process gone through, is not the same. All we can say is, there is something like this. We do not resolve and separate a complex thought, as we do a piece of glass, or other material body into its parts; we are utterly unable to do it, if we should seriously make the attempt; every mental state is in itself and in fact simple and indivisible, and is complex only virtually. Complex notions are the results, rather than the compounds of former feelings; and though not literally made up of parts, have the relation to them, which any material whole has to the elements composing it; and in that particular sense may be said to comprehend or embrace the subordinate notions. Mental analysis accordingly concerns merely this relation. We perform such an analysis, when, by the aid of our reflection and consciousness, we are able to indicate those separate and subordinate feelings, to which, in our conception of it, the complex mental state is virtually equal.

The term GOVERNMENT, for instance, when used in reference to the mental perception of the thing thus named, expresses a complex state of the mind; we may make this mental state, which is in fact only one, although it is virtually

more than one, a subject of contemplation; and we are said to analyze it, when we are able to indicate those separate and more elementary notions, without the existence and antecedence of which, it could not have been formed by the mind. We do not literally take the complex state in pieces, but we designate other states of mind, which, every one's knowledge of the origin of thought convinces him, must have preceded it, such as the ideas of power, right, obligation, command, and the relative notions of superior and inferior.

§. 129. Complex notions of external origin.

The doctrine of simplicity and complexness of mental states is applicable, in both its forms, to the Intellective and Sensitive parts of our nature; in other words, there may be a complex affection or passion, as well as a complex perception. The acts of the Will, the other great Division of the mental nature, are always simple. When we consider the subject in reference to the intellect alone, we may add further, that there is complexity of the Intellect, both in its internal and external action; and it seems proper, in this connection, to say something, in particular, of COMPLEX NOTIONS of EXTERNAL

ORIGIN.

What we term our simple ideas are representative of the parts of objects only. The sensations of color, such as red, white, yellow; the original intimations from the touch, such as resistance, extension, hardness, and softness, do not, in themselves considered, give us a knowledge of substances, but only of the parts, attributes, or elements of substances. Accordingly the ideas which we have of the various objects of the external world, are, for the most part, complex. We speak of a house, a tree, a flower, a plant, a mineral, an animal; and in none of these cases are the ideas which we have simple; but on the contrary, embrace a considerable number of elements.

§. 130. Of objects contemplated as wholes.

In point of fact, the various external objects, which come under our notice, are presented to us as wholes; and as such, (whatever may have been the original process leading to that result,) we very early contemplate them.-Take for instance

a LOADSTONE.

In their ordinary and common thoughts upon

it, (the result probably of some antecedent and very early training,) men undoubtedly contemplate it as a whole; the state of mind, which has reference to it, embraces it as such. This complex notion, like all others which are complex, is virtually equal to a number of others of a more elementary character.- -Hence, when we are called upon to give an account of the loadstone, we can return no other answer than by-an enumeration of its elements. It is something, which has weight, color, hardness, power to draw iron, and whatever else we discover in it.

We use the term GOLD. This is a complex term, and implies a complexity in the corresponding mental states. But if we use the word gold, or any other synonymous word, in the hearing of a man who has neither seen that substance, nor had it explained to him, he will not understand what is meant to be conveyed. We must enter into an analysis; and show, that it is a combination of the qualities of yellowness, great weight, fusibility, ductility, &c. We look upward to the sun in the heavens. But what should we know of that great aggregate, if we could not contemplate it in the elements of form and extension, of brightness and heat, of roundness and regularity of motion ?-All the ideas, therefore, which we form of external objects considered as wholes, are complex ; and all such complex notions are composed of those which are simple.

§. 131. Something more in external objects than mere attributes or

qualities.

But it is to be anticipated, that we shall expose ourselves here to be pressed by certain inquiries. It will be said perhaps, that this makes the whole visible creation a mere congregation, (susceptible undoubtedly of being arranged into classes, but after all, a mere congregation,) of attributes, qualities, or properties. What we behold yonder, it will perhaps be alledged as an illustration of the objection, is mere greenness, resistance, hardness, form, &c. but nothing more; it is not a TREE. In the firmament there is brightness and heat and roundness, and uniformity of motion, but that is all; we mistake when we suppose there is a reality, an actual SUN. In a word, this view of external objects brings us back to one of the fundamental doctrines of Pyrrho, that there is nothing

external to us but certain uniform appearances, which are mistaken for existences and realities without being so.

It is perhaps enough to say in regard to this objection, that we reject the idea of its being rightfully applied to ourselves, because we do not hesitate to admit and assert the truth of an existence, (however difficult it may be to the mind fully to conceive of it,) independently of these qualities; in other words, that there is something more, in point of fact, than what is outwardly exhibited. On a careful examination of our feelings we shall probably find it impossible even to conceive of a quality without a subject, or an attribute without some object to which it belongs. We believe, (and we cannot help believing,) that there must necessarily be some foundation, some basis, which is the support of such attributes and qualities. We may not be able to tell precisely what it is; we may not have it in our power to describe or define it; but still it exists. The quality, therefore, and the existence, to which it belongs, the outward accessible presentation and the subjective nature or essence are not, in the view of the mind, identical. (See §. §. 93-96.)

It will then perhaps be asked, Why do we not direct our attention at once to the true subjective existence, to matter itself, and not delay upon its appendages? The answer is, we cannot; the mind has its limits. It might be asked with the same reason, why we do not look directly into the existence and essence of the Deity, instead of studying Him in his works and intermediate manifestations? It might be asked, why we do not directly contemplate the existence and essence of the mind instead of studying it in its attributes and operations? The answer in all these cases is the same, viz, that we are unable to do it. And yet we believe in the existence and reality of a God, although we know him only through his manifestations and attributes. We believe in the

existence and reality of the human mind, although the direct subject of our knowledge is not the mind itself, but merely its attributes and operations. It is the same in regard to the material world. The qualities and properties of bodies are the signs or marks, which are immediately presented to our notice. They form the occasion, on which the mind, by its power of ORIGINAL SUGGESTION, assures us of something more

than the signs, which immediately fall under our notice. This something, which we cannot help regarding as an actual and independent reality, we call variously a material subject, material existence, matter, &c. Nor is the idea, which we form of matter, to be regarded as an indistinct one, although, being simple, each one must depend for the clearness of his perception of it on himself.

§. 132. Imperfections of our complex notions of external objects.

Although the mind of man is to be regarded, in the great ordering and constitution of things; as in some important sense the representative of the material universe, it must still be acknowledged to be a very imperfect one. It is as true in nature as in religion, that we know only in part. Men have no doubt been always advancing in knowledge, but when we compare our present acquisitions with our former ignorance, we may well anticipate, that the progress of the future will lay the foundation of another comparison, not so flattering to the present generation. This view will not only apply to knowledge in the mass; but will hold good, on a smaller scale, of every complex notion which we form.-Take for instance the complex idea of Gold. The thought is understood to be the representative of the thing. But is it in this case a true one? If we should admit it to be so, as far as it goes, still it is evidently not a full or perfect one; nor can we regard it as such without suffering ourselves to be led into error. the complicated notion, to which men agree in giving that name, we combine the simple ideas of yellowness, weight, hardness, malleability, and perhaps others; but it is only reasonable to suppose, that no person combines, in his conception of it, all its properties.

In

Philosophy may justly boast of her achievements, without pretending that nature has made a revelation of all her secrets. Can any man explain the mode of the connection between mind and matter? This connection is obviously a secret not yet cleared up. Can any man assert positively what that cohesion or attraction is, which holds together the parts of gold, iron, and other material bodies? That is a subject also, on which nature has reserved to herself something further to say. One body impinging upon another puts it in mo