66 Commons. Unable to deny he endeavoured to defend his conduct. "It was," he said, a matter of true policy "and of justice to deceive so great a villain as Omi"chund." * The villany of Omichund, however, appears mainly this, that for the treachery which the English encouraged and abetted he claimed a larger reward than the English were willing to pay. But even admitting to the fullest extent the guilt of the Hindoo intriguer, this does not suffice to vindicate the British chief; this does not prove that it was justifiable, as he alleges, to deceive the deceiver, and to foil an Asiatic by his own Asiatic Such expedients as fictitious treaties and counterfeited signatures are not, as I conceive, to be cleared by any refinements of ingenuity, or any considerations of state advantage†, and they must for ever remain a blot on the brilliant laurels of Clive. arts. Omichund having thus been successfully imposed upon, and the conspiracy being now sufficiently matured, Mr. Watts made his escape from Moorshedabad, and Clive set his army in motion from Calcutta. He had under his command 3,000 men, all excellent troops, and one third Europeans. The terror of Surajah Dowlah was increased by a haughty letter from Clive, alleging the Nabob's infraction of the recent alliance, and his new designs against the English. Much perturbed, the Nabob, however, proceeded to assemble near the village of Plassey * Speech, May 19. 1773. Parl. Hist., vol. xvii. p. 876. † See the elaborate defence of Sir John Malcolm in the sixth chapter of his Life of Clive. He argues, that Admiral Watson knew and permitted the signature of his name by another hand. But in the first place, and primâ facie, it appears utterly incredible that any man refusing on conscientious grounds his signature to a delusive treaty would give his consent to the counterfeiting of that signature. Secondly, I observe, that no such apology is ventured upon by the contemporary historian, Mr. Orme, notwithstanding his personal friendship for Clive (Hist. vol. ii. p. 155.). Thirdly, I find that the expressions ascribed to Watson by Mr. Cooke, the Secretary to Government, are merely as follows : "The Admiral said he had not signed it, but left them to do as they pleased," - expressions which, I think, can imply no more than that the other parties might proceed or not, as they could or would, in their own course of policy, without him. Watson died of jungle-fever only a few weeks after these events. 66 INDIA.] ADVANCE OF CLIVE. 329 his whole force amounting to 15,000 cavalry, and 35,000 foot. Nor was it merely in numbers of men that he surpassed the English; while Clive brought only eight field. pieces and two howitzers, Surajah Dowlah had above forty pieces of cannon of the largest size, each drawn by forty or fifty yoke of white oxen, and each with an elephant behind, trained to assist in pushing it over difficult ground. Forty Frenchmen in the Nabob's pay directed some smaller guns. The greater part of the foot were armed with matchlocks, the rest with various weapons, -pikes, swords, arrows, and even rockets. The cavalry, both men and horses, were drawn from the northern districts of India, and, to the eye at least, appeared more formidable than those encountered by Clive in the wars of the Carnatic. But in truth these numbers were an army only in name and outward show; not cheered by military spirit, nor jealous of military reputation; with no confidence in themselves, and no attachment to their leader. The Nabob, distrustful of Meer Jaffier, had before he left the capital exacted from him an oath of fidelity upon the Koran. Either a respect for this oath, or, what is far more probable, a doubt as to the issue of the war, seemed to weigh with Meer Jaffier; he did not perform his engagement to the English, of joining them with his division at the appointed place of meeting, but kept aloof, sending them only evasive answers or general assurances. When, therefore, the English army came within one march of the Nabob's at Plassey,—with the wide stream of the Hooghly flowing between them, - can we wonder if doubts assailed even the resolute spirit of Clive, how far relying on the slippery faith of the Hindoo conspirator, or on his own brave but scanty force, he might venture to pass the river, and bring the enemy to battle? He well knew, as he said himself, that "if a defeat en"sued not one man would have returned to tell it." Under these circumstances he assembled a Council of War. Sixteen years afterwards he observed that this was the only Council of War which he had ever held, and that if he had abided by its decision it would have been the ruin of the East India Company. But these words, if taken alone, would not convey an accurate im pression of what passed. Having called together his officers, to the number of twenty, he proposed to them the question, whether it would be prudent, without assistance, to attack the Nabob, or whether they should wait until joined by some native force. Contrary to the usual form in Councils of War, beginning with the youngest Member, Clive gave his own opinion first, and that opinion was, not to venture. Twelve officers concurred with their chief; seven others, among whom was Major Eyre Coote, voted for immediate action. Thus a large majority approved the judgment of Clive; but his own doubts returned more forcibly than ever, and he began to feel that not only honour but safety pointed forwards. It was said at the time that his purpose had been changed by one hour of tranquil meditation under the shade of some trees; but Clive himself declared in his Evidence in England, that after the Council he had taken "about 66 twenty-four hours' mature consideration." Be this as it may, he came forth fully resolved to put every thing to the hazard. The troops were led across the river; they accomplished in eight hours a toilsome march of fifteen miles, and at one o'clock in the morning of the memorable 23d of June, 1757, they reached the mangoe-grove of Plassey. The mingling sounds of drums, clarions, and cymbals, the usual tokens of a night-watch in an Indian army, convinced them that they were now within a mile of the Nabob's camp. For the remainder of that night Clive took up his quarters in a small hunting-house belonging to the Nabob, but could not sleep; while his soldiers, less concerned than their General, stretched themselves to rest beneath the adjoining trees.* At sunrise Clive ascended the roof of the huntinghouse, and surveyed with a steadfast eye the rich array and the spreading numbers of his enemy. He saw them advance from several sides, as if to enclose him, but they halted at some distance, and began a cannonade, which * The proceedings of the Council of War, and the march of Clive, are in some points of less importance, differently told by different writers. These points are clearly drawn out and well discussed by Mr. Thornton in two notes. (Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 235. and 237.) Sir John Malcolm adopts two conflicting statements without explanation or remark. (Life of Clive, vol. i. p. 161. and 164.) INDIA.] BATTLE OF PLASSEY. 331 was returned by the English, and which continued during several hours. It was found that the cumbrous ordnance of the Indians did far less execution than the light fieldpieces of Clive. So careless, besides, were the former troops in carrying or handling ammunition, that several explosions were observed in their own ranks, and that about noon a passing shower damaged a great part of their powder, and compelled them to slacken their fire. At nearly the same time one of their most trusted leaders fell, and one of their divisions consequently showed some symptoms of disorder. This news came to the Nabob, who had remained in his tent beyond the reach of danger, surrounded by officers, one half of whom were parties to the conspiracy against him. He now received the perfidious or timid counsel, to which his own fears readily responded, of commanding a retreat towards his capital; the order was issued, and the army began to fall back. At such favourable indications, a charge upon the enemy was begun, without orders, by two companies under Major Kilpatrick *, and soon afterwards was renewed by Clive, at the head of his whole line. They met with faint resistance, except from the gallant little band of Frenchmen; drove the enemy from the advanced position; and became possessed of some rising ground near an angle of the Indian camp. Meer Jaffier, on his part, seeing to which side the fortune of the day was tending, drew off his body of troops. Before five o'clock the victory of Clive was not only certain but complete. It had cost him no more than twenty-two soldiers slain and fifty wounded, while the loss of the vanquished also did not exceed 500 men; but they were pursued for six miles, scattering in every direction, and leaving behind all their artillery and baggage. The field of Plassey, on which with such slender loss the fate, not only of Bengal, but of India, was in truth decided, continued for many years an object of interest 66 66 - * "Colonel Clive chanced at this time to be lying down in the hunting-house. Some say he was asleep, which is not improbable, considering how little rest he had had for so many hours before ; "but this is no imputation either against his courage or conduct." (Orme's Hist. vol. ii. p. 176.) and curiosity to the passing stranger. It was visited, amongst several other British officers, by the Duke of Wellington, whom I have heard describe it; but more recently it has become difficult, nay, almost impossible, to trace the scene of this great achievement. The river has here entirely changed its course, and encroached upon the plain; the Nabob's hunting-house, once the abode of Clive, has crumbled away, and even the celebrated mangoe-grove is no longer to be found.* Of this battle it may be said, that it was gained against a disparity of force nearly such as the Spaniards encountered in Mexico and Peru. But there is a difference highly honourable to the English. The natives of Mexico and Peru were wholly ignorant of gunpowder, and viewed the Spaniards with their fire-arms as demi-gods, wielding the lightning and thunder of the Heavens. The natives of India, on the contrary, were well acquainted with the natives of Europe; they looked on them with no superstitious awe; and, however unskilful in the use of artillery, they were at least not surprised at its effects. From the day of Plassey dates our supremacy above them. From that day they began to feel that none of the things on which they had heretofore relied, not their tenfold or twentyfold numbers, their blaze of rockets, the long array of their elephants, the massy weight of their ordnance, their subterfuges and their wiles, would enable them to stand firm against the energy and discipline of the island-strangers. They began to feel that even their own strength would become an instrument to their subjugation; that even their own countrymen, when, under the name of Sepoys, trained in European discipline, and animated by European spirit, had been at Plassey, and would be again, the mainstay and right arm of the British power. From that day the British flag in Hindostan has never (and the Hindoos know it) been unfurled in vain; its very sight has more than once awed, without a blow, aggressors to submission, and ever inspired with undoubting confidence those who are ranged beneath it, and can claim it for their own. That feeling, now prevalent through the East, has in our day been forcibly * Hamilton's East India Gazetteer, article PLASSEY, ed. 1828. |