1761.

CLAIMS OF FRANCE.

233

with all the honours of war, and be transported without delay to the nearest ports of France.

The conquest of Belleisle had of course a favourable influence on the negotiations with France. Nor was other good news of the same kind wanting. In the West Indies an English officer, Lord Rollo, had, with slight effort, reduced the little island of Dominica. In the East, the French commander, M. de Lally, had surrendered, with Pondicherry, the last and chief of their strong-holds. It is remarkable that the intelligence of the taking of Pondicherry reached Paris on the same day as that of the victory at Kirch-Denkern; and, both combined, says Mr. Stanley, produced a far greater impression than would have resulted from their coming singly.*

Nevertheless, the Ministers of Louis the Fifteenth (for of Louis the Fifteenth himself we need take little account) continued to urge several inadmissible conditions. They denied that Belleisle was a just equivalent for Minorca, and asked for Guadaloupe, claiming Belleisle also, in return for their conquests in Germany.

They

claimed the restoration of Cape Breton, or, at least, the privilege of fishery along its coasts. They wished England to give them back, at its option, either Senegal or Goree. They demurred to the demolition of some new works at Dunkirk, in compliance with the Treaty of Utrecht. They demanded the restitution of all captures at sea made by England previous to the declaration of war. Still more important was the question that arose respecting the interests of Germany. The Duke de Choiseul was willing to withdraw the troops of France, but urged, in return, that, whatever succours might be sent in money, no man from Prince Ferdinand's army should be permitted to reinforce the Prussian ranks. Yet Pitt, in his very first reply to Choiseul's overtures, had explicitly declared, that if, unhappily, the General Congress should fail in producing a general pacification, King George would not be restrained by any separate peace with France from extending the most effectual aid to his good brother and ally of Prussia. - On all these points except as to the restoring of Guadaloupe) Pitt continued

Mr. Stanley to Mr. Pitt, Paris, July 30. 1761.

66

as

to maintain his ground. It was his fixed resolve, he had declared it on a former occasion, that, so long as he held the reins of power, "no Peace of Utrecht shall again stain the annals of England." * Yet the expressions which he used in his denials were sometimes so haughty and imperious that they might I fear, deservedly be reckoned among the obstacles in this negotiation.†

It seems probable, however, nay, nearly certain, that the Court of Versailles, considering its long train of reverses in the war, would have finally yielded every one of the points at issue, but for its new connexion, which arose about this time, with the Court of Madrid. - Ever since the accession of Charles the Third, the Spanish counsels had been verging more and more towards the French. The times had passed, it was said, when the Kings of Spain and of France could be rivals; they were now near kinsmen, and their interest, rightly understood, was the same. A Monarch of the House of Bourbon should regard the Head of that House as his natural ally. Let but the members of that great Family combine, and they might defy all other enmity, and present a firm front to the rest of the world. Such maxims, undoubtedly specious, however far from sound, had already more than once, though but at intervals, prevailed at Madrid since the reign of the Bourbon dynasty. It was the very danger which had all along been foreseen from that reign; it was the danger against which Somers and Godolphin had contended in council and debate; against which Marlborough had fought in Flanders, and Stanhope in Spain. The commencement of the War of the Succession was never yet so fully vindicated as by the conclusion of the Family Compact.

But besides the motives which inclined the King of Spain to an alliance with his Royal kinsman, he also conceived himself to have numerous and just causes of complaint against England. During the war with France the Spanish flag had not always been respected by the British cruisers. In such cases there was sometimes slow

* Letter to A. Mitchell, Esq. June 12. 1759.

†This is cautiously but clearly hinted even to himself by Mr. Stanley. See in the Appendix his letter dated August 26. 1761.

1761.

COMPLAINTS OF SPAIN.

235

redress in London, and always great exaggeration at Madrid. In the midst of the rankling resentments which these private interests called forth, and which maritime jealousy envenomed, both the Americas, North and South, added largely to the stock of grievances. From the South there came the ever recurring complaints of illicit traffic with the Spanish Colonists. From the North there was an intricate controversy on the construction of an article in the Treaty of Utrecht, and the claims of the Basque provinces to a share in the Newfoundland fishery. All these points were discussed at great length, but with little result, between General Wall, the Spanish Premier, and the Earl of Bristol, the British Ambassador. Nor was the Conde de Fuentes, who represented the Court of Madrid at St. James's, more successful in his interviews with Pitt. Of these differences, growing wider and wider as time proceeded, the French were skilful to avail themselves. A close intimacy sprung up between the Duke de Choiseul and the Marquis Grimaldi, who was at that time the Spanish Ambassador at Paris. Through this channel the French statesman insinuated every topic of aggravation. He represented the English as the tyrants of the seas, as the natural enemies of every maritime and commercial power. Nor did the former lures, the restoration of Minorca or the recovery of Gibraltar, - remain idle in his hands. He referred pri.vately to the Catholic King_every step of the negotiations between France and England, and by pretending to consult, in reality guided his judgment, obtaining at length an entire concert and union in all their public

measures.

Elated with this success, the Duke de Choiseul visibly slackened in his readiness of concessions to England. More than once he had hinted to Mr. Stanley, that, if the negotiations should fail, France would be enabled to continue the war with new allies. Now, however, he resolved to overawe, if possible, his adversary; to convince Pitt beyond all question, and by some overt act, of the cordial feeling between the two branches of the House of Bourbon. Accordingly while a French Memorial of Propositions was transmitted to Pitt through M. de Bussy, another French Memorial on Spanish affairs, dated July 15. was

adjoined. This Memorial expresses the wish that the reconciliation resulting from the proposed Treaty might not be liable to be interrupted by the interests of any Third Power; it states the demands of Spain as three; first, the restitution of the captures made during the present war upon the Spanish flag; secondly, the privilege of fishery upon the banks of Newfoundland; thirdly, the demolition of the English settlements made upon the Spanish territories in the bay of Honduras; and it urges an adjustment of these questions at the same time that the peace shall be concluded between the Courts of London and Versailles, which peace the King of Spain shall. then be invited to guarantee.

66

" It

So unusual a demand filled Pitt with the highest indignation. He replied as follows to M. de Bussy: "is my duty to declare to you, in the name of His Ma'jesty, that he will not suffer the disputes with Spain "to be blended in any manner whatever in the negotia"tion of peace between the two Crowns; to which I must "add, that it will be considered as an affront to His Majesty's dignity to make further mention of such a "circumstance. Moreover it is expected that France will "not at any time presume a right of intermeddling in "such disputes between Great Britain and Spain.” In like manner Pitt wrote to Lord Bristol, declaring that His Majesty would by no means add facilities for the satisfaction of the Court of Spain in consequence of any announcement of union of councils, or of present or future conjunctions with the French; that, of the three demands in the French Memorial, there were Courts of Law to give redress upon the first, the second was inadmissible, and the third was open to negotiations, but not through the channel of France. Lord Bristol was likewise instructed to demand a clear and categorical explanation of the armaments making in the Spanish ports.

When these representations were accordingly laid before the Court of Madrid, General Wall acknowledged that the French Memorial had been presented with the full consent of His Catholic Majesty, but he added a great

Mr. Pitt to M. de Bussy, July 24. 1761.

number of pacific professions by which the British ambassador appears to have been completely blinded.*

The real object of Wall and his colleagues was, however, by no means peace, but only leisure to complete their preparations, and to receive in safety their galleons and treasure-ships from South America. — On the 15th of August, at the very time when Lord Bristol was lending so ready an ear to their expressions of good-will and amity towards England, Grimaldi and Choiseul signed the celebrated FAMILY COMPACT. By this treaty the Kings of France and Spain agreed for the future to consider every Power as their enemy which might become the enemy of either, and to guarantee the respective dominions in all parts of the world which they might possess at the next conclusion of peace. Mutual succours by sea and land were stipulated, and no proposal of peace to their common enemies was to be made, nor negotiation entered upon, unless by common consent. The subjects of each residing in the European dominions of the other were to enjoy the same commercial privileges as the natives. Moreover, the King of Spain stipulated the accession of his son, the King of Naples, to this alliance; but it was agreed that no prince or potentate, except of the House of Bourbon, should ever be admitted to its participation.†

Besides this treaty, which in its words at least applied only to future and contingent wars, and which was intended to be ultimately published, there was also signed on the same day a special and secret convention. This imported, that in case England and France should still be engaged in hostilities on the 1st of May 1762 Spain should on that day declare war against England, and that France should at the same period restore Minorca to Spain.‡

The impolicy of this Compact, so far as Spain is concerned, scarcely stands in need of illustration. - A State which connects itself in an exclusive alliance for offence and defence with another State far more powerful than

* See the diplomatic documents laid before Parliament, and printed in the Parl. Hist. vol. xv. p. 1129-1210.

† Martens, Recueil de Traités, vol. i. p. 16-28.

Sismondi, Hist. des Français, vol. xxix. p. 242.