stal not for T-bi er fallet they in “Lë and but end and eng vatand scrambling desperate

Tough for his own hand lae • EL 1 Wynd and Grenadiers Detrans and Fusiliers got mixed together the

Die met. Our officers could de Ile more

Tell I than join in with their swords and reviv FLES WIMILT TASA es; and our men, often surrounded by the Russians, fought their way out as best they e n the could. Generalship there could be none We used a this whatever. British steadiness and bull-dog Mir of Betish sol- courage did it. The result was to be seen 21 Asa while at next day in the fearful mass of Russians in of the eighteen-dead, which plainly told that it required ng the artillerymen something more than numbers to beat ders that they should about 350 men engaged. They fired 20,000 ers, dreading the loss British soldiers. Our battalion had only

34

To

arsenals and the dockyards were laid under | whether the allied ships would be able to requisition. Waggons and carts, and even carriages belonging to private citizens, were employed in drawing up loads to the batteries. From dawn to sunset between five and six thousand men were toiling eagerly along the lines of defence, and by the help of torches the work was carried on through the night. The mainspring of tnese efforts, and the soul of the defence, was Colonel Todleben, the young officer of engineers whose skill and energy long delayed the fall of the fortress, and gained for himself a European reputation. The round tower at the extreme left, known as the celebrated Malakoff, was speedily surrounded by substantial earthworks. the right of it was constructed a formidable redoubt, termed the Redan. Between the Redan and the arsenal at the head of Dockyard Creek were the Barrack Batteries. To the west of the creek, facing the French lines, was the Garden Battery, and beyond it was the Flagstaff Battery, united by a line of strong defences and by a wall to the Quarantine Fort and the sea. Every day fresh earthworks were thrown up, and additional guns of heavy calibre placed in position. The defenders had at their command the immense stores of ammunition and guns which had been accumulated in Sebastopol, and they now turned them to the best account. When the extensive and solid nature of the new works was pointed out to the chief British engineer, he is said to have replied that they were only built to be knocked down again;' but it was found ere long that works of earth proved more formidable than those of stone.

It was at length arranged that the attack was to be made on the 17th of October, and that the French and British batteries should open their fire together on the morning of that day. At a council of war it was agreed that the allied fleets should make a simultaneous attack with the land forces. But as the Russians on the 23rd of September had sunk fourmen-of-war and two frigates across the entrance of the roadstead, it was doubtful

approach near enough to the forts to inflict any material injury on the defences. The bombardment began at half-past six, and for some time it seemed to be attended with great success. The Flagstaff Battery suffered severely both from the French and the British guns. The stone work of the Malakoff tower was rent, and its heavy guns were either dismounted or silent, though the earthworks which covered it still poured forth a deadly fire. The fronting walls of the Redan and the other bastions were in some places destroyed, in others grievously injured, and great numbers of the gunners were killed or wounded. The contest had thus continued with apparent advantage to the assailants, especially on the British side, until about nine o'clock, when a report like that of distant thunder rose above the roar of the artillery. A volume of flame sprung up from the French batteries, and was followed by a thick murky column, spreading far and wide as it rose into the air. A powder magazine had been blown up by a shell from one of the Russian batteries, and had killed about fifty men and disabled a number of guns. This catastrophe produced discouragement and even consternation among the French troops, and the fire of their artillery slackened, and was shortly after suspended. The Russians were thus enabled to concentrate their fire upon the English works, on which they inflicted considerable injury, dismounting and destroying several guns, though the loss in men was much less than might have been expected.

Meanwhile the allied fleets had not been idle, but on either side of the mouth of the harbour there was a long shoal, while the entrance was blocked up by the sunken ships of the enemy. The assailing vessels, therefore, found it impossible to get near enough to the sea forts of Sebastopol to make their broadsides of any real effect. They continued their fire until it was dark, and withdrew about half-past six with a

less on the part of the British of forty-four | of Inkerman. It was anticipated that during the killed and 260 wounded, while the French winter the force would have its headquarters in the had thirty killed and 164 wounded. The neighbourhood of the Bosphorus ; and I have reason to believe that in the first week of September, Russians admitted a loss of 500 men in and after we had embarked in the expedition, killed and wounded. Among the former Lord Raglan was corresponding on the subject was Admiral Nachemoff, who was killed by with the British Ambassador at the Porte. And the fragment of a shell; and Admiral Kor- here too I may be permitted to state my opinion, niloff, who commanded in the town, was that the responsibility of the general and officers engaged in the invasion of the Crimea was not a mortally wounded by a shot from one of responsibility of the same description which atthe batteries. It was these two officers taches to the conduct of ordinary warfare. Marwho planned and executed the attack on shal St. Arnaud and General Lord Raglan-under the Turkish squadron at Sinope. Two of very decisive instructions from one at least of the the British and six of the French ships were governments at home-determined to make a so seriously damaged, that they had to be descent upon the enemy's coast, and to attempt a rapid military enterprise against the stronghold of sent home for repairs. The broadsides of Sebastopol; but they never proposed nor intended, the French vessels, though delivered at and certainly were not prepared, to invade Russia 1500 yards' distance, silenced the fire of by regular operations in the field, i.e. by the Fort Quarantine, and inflicted considerable advance of an armed body connecting itself by injury upon the embrasures; and the walls sufficient means of transport with the "base of operations." In that sense the allied forces were of Fort Constantine were so much shaken "army;" they would be more properly by the fire of the Agamemnon at 800 yards' called a "movable column." distance that they had subsequently to be supported by wooden shores and props, and earthworks were constructed to protect this enormous stone-work. There is every probability that if the depth of the water had permitted her to approach within 300 or 400 yards the fort would have been destroyed. But as matters stood the tremendous cannonade of the allied fleets had not materially impaired the strength of the sea defences of Sebastopol. On the land side the only part of the Russian fortifications completely disabled were the two stone towers. The efficiency of the earthworks that had been raised around them was not materially impaired.

It had thus become evident that the Russian stronghold could not, as had been expected when the expedition was planned, be taken by a coup de main. The change which now of necessity took place in the character of the allied operations is thus distinctly stated by Sir Richard Airey:

'At the time of the embarkation, and from that

time until the 17th of October (the day of the first bombardment), there was no expectation whatever of having to winter in the Crimea-no final determination to do so was formed until after the battle

not an

'A movable column has certain advantages, and especially that of being rapid in its operations; but the well-known drawbacks to the employment of such a force are these: that it is adapted only for temporary use, and that it is exposed to great risk-not to the ordinary risk of mere defects and consequent loss, but to the risk of total destruction. Certainly the expeditionary force which landed on the beach at Old Fort could not have been expected or intended to enjoy that degree of security which belongs to regular operations.'

This authoritative exposition of the designs of the allies shows that they had planned a coup de main by 'a movable column,' not a regular siege with 'a base of operations' and all regular supports and resources. This state of things may help to account for most of the privation and suffering that ensued.

On the failure of the cannonade by sea and land to silence the enemy's batteries, the position of the allied forces became exceedingly critical. The works of defence which the Russians had thrown up with indefatigable activity had rendered their position so strong that a siege, and probably a protracted one, was inevitable. allies had scarcely enough of men to carry on siege operations, and were entirely with

But the

in confusion without an attempt to maintain their position. The enemy took possession of the redoubts and deserted guns, which had been spiked, though inefficiently, by the British artillerymen who had been stationed in each. They did not venture to attack the fourth, in which some British troops were placed, and they soon afterwards abandoned the third redoubt.

out a covering army to protect the troops Those in the second and third redoubts fled engaged on the works, or to occupy the roads leading from the entrance to Sebastopol, so as to prevent Russian reinforcements being poured into the Crimea On the other hand the enemy had not only a garrison in Sebastopol sufficient for the defence of the town, but they had a far larger army outside ready to avail themselves of every favourable opportunity to attack the positions of the allied troops. The besiegers were thus compelled to stand on the defensive, and were in imminent considerable force of artillery. They divided danger of being assailed by an overwhelming force, and compelled to make an ignominious and disastrous retreat

The redoubts having been carried, the Russian cavalry advanced, supported by a

into two bodies. The smaller of the two, ecnsisting of about 400 men, charged down the slope on the 93ri Highlanders, under The Russian generals who could not Colonel Ainslie, who were drawn up in fail to know that the allies were placed front of the road leading to Balaklava. in a most disadvantageous and indeed They were ordered by Sir Colin Campbell dangerous condition, were now preparing to receive the enemy in a line the thin to make an attack upon the British red line-and on the first volley the Rusposition at Balaklava, with the hope that sian cavalry fell back in confusion. The by forcing it they would place our army stronger body of the enemy, estimated at between two fres in front and rear. On about 1000 men, turned to the right and the 24th of October a large body of Russian advanced towards the camp of the Scots infantry, supported by cavalry and artillery. Greys and the Inniskillen Dragoons, whose which proved to be a fresh as Jame united strength did not exceed 400. These under General Liprandi, just arrived from two gillant regiments were just returning the Danubian Principalities, was discovered from the position they had at first taken up bivouacking at the mouth of a valley beyond the ridge to the left of the line of through which runs the highwad from redoubtas and had only time to form and to Simplerepel and Odessa to Balaklava At daybreak next morning a body of 80.000 mèn advanced to assail the British position, They opened fire from a battery of heavy guns upon the redoubts which formed the outer line of defence, and were held by a body of Turkish troops chiefy Tunes and militia who had never been under fire. before. They maintained a well-directed fire for about twenty minutes, but on the approach of a strong column of infantry, supported by cavalry, the Turks in the first redoubt were no longer alle te persist in their defence, but retired in good ender, suffering considerable loss in their retrval

*The Turks were much Named at the time for their failure so bold these rizales They were so -constructed, however, that the Cossacks had no

meet the Russian charge. The memorable scene that ensued has been vividly desended by Colonel G. R. Hamley, who was an eye-witness of the fight

All who had the good fremme be says, "to look

the bats a that belazi spectacle any mestarini remenice of it. The pain and semending bills all clad in sober green, femed an excelent background for the stars of the opposing masses-ibe dark may Rasan adını sweţing down in multitalous spenny d rindes a the red-clad squadrons shaa, hindered by the obstacles of the ground on

a thier www mening advanced siowly to meet them. There was a clash and fasion is of ware meting vare, when the bead of the echama ea

Benly a keying their breses ever them. The French gemers, declared them tematie and comse neztempt was made to recapture them.

countered the leading squadrons of our brigade, all | way they had come. those engaged being resolved into a crowd of individual horsemen, whose swords rose and fell and glanced. So for a minute or two they fought, the impetus of the enemy's dense column carrying it on, and pressing our combatants back for a short space, till the 4th Dragoon Guards, coming clear of a wall which was between them and the enemy, charged the Russian flank, while the remaining regiment of the brigade went in in support of those which had first attacked. Then-almost

it seemed in a moment and simultaneously-the whole Russian mass gave way and fled, at speed and in disorder, beyond the hill, vanishing behind the slope some four or five minutes after they had