mishers were all thrown forward on this and the succeeding day, and energetically felt our whole line, but were everywhere repulsed by the steadiness of our troops. Thus with five thousand men, exclusive of the garrisons, we stopped and held in check over one hundred thousand of the enemy. Every preparation was made in anticipation of another attack by the enemy. The men slept in the trenches and under arms; but, to my utter surprise, he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault. few days, the object of this delay was apparent. In every direction, in front of our lines, through the intervening woods and along the open fields, earthworks began to appear. Through the energetic action of the Government, re-enforcements began to pour in; and each hour the Army of the Peninsula grew stronger and stronger, until anxiety passed from my mind as to the result of an attack upon

us."

In a

President Lincoln was sorely troubled by this unnecessary siege; and he wrote to Gen. M'Clellan during its progress, and in the letter he says, "The country will not fail to note ・is noting now. that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched position is but the story of Manassas repeated."-Conduct of the War, Part I. pp. 17, 18.

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This letter must have stung Gen. M'Clellan to the quick; but he deserved every word of the rebuke; and the nation cannot fail to recognize the superiority of the President's views on the subject over those of M'Clellan. And this is all the more important, if the remark of a prominent officer was true, "We lost Richmond at Yorktown."

We will not multiply examples of this kind, though we might add many more from the Committee's Report. These

will serve our purpose as well as more, and show the truth of our position, that, if Gen. M'Clellan were sincere in his views and measures, then President Lincoln possesses the greater military gerius of the two.

We will, however, quote a letter which the President wrote to Gen. M'Clellan, Oct. 13, 1862. It exhibits so much greater military knowledge than M'Clellan's proposed views and measures about which the letter discourses, that it is worthy of careful perusal.

It was after the battle of Antietam. The President desired that M'Clellan should cross the Potomac, and pursue and destroy the fleeing rebel army. Many of his generals were in favor of this summary measure. But M'Clellan hesitated, and made excuses for not moving, until the President directed Gen. Halleck to telegraph to him, "Your army must move now while the roads are good." One week thereafter, the following letter in question was penned. (See Conduct of War, Part I. pp. 44

46.)

MY DEAR SIR,—You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?

As I understand, you telegraphed Gen. Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpepper Court House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Win

chester; but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and, in fact, ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored.

Again: one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is "to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applied against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not that he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But, if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him: if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.

Exclusive of the water-line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his.

You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below, instead of above, the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was, that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would sieze, if he would permit. If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move towards Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say, "try :" if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea, that, if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side-way from the enemy is remarkable, as it were, by the different spokes of a wheel, extending from the hub towards the rim; and this whether you move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket, and Fredericksburg; and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Aquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry: to wit, Vestal's, five miles; Gregory's, thirteen; Snicher's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty-eight; Manassas, thirty-eight; Chester, forty-five; and Thornton's, fiftythree. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack, if you should wish. For a great part of the way, you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When, at length, running for Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn, and attack him in the rear; but I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy, if our troops march as well as the enemy; and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order. Yours truly, A. LINCOLN. Major-Gen. M'CLELLAN.

No plan or document emanating from Gen. M'Clellan, since the outbreak of the Rebellion, bears, so unmistakably .as this letter of the President, a correct knowledge of the military position, a clear and comprehensive idea of the manner of conducting the campaign, and a bird's-eye view of the advantages and disadvantages of this way of destroying the rebel army, and capturing Richmond. And we would suggest to those persons who have complained

of the President, at times, because he did not prosecute the war more vigorously, that they cast the blame where it does not belong. With two or three such generals as M'Clellan in the field to manage, a President would have his hands full of business, without any other official duties.

A class of true antislavery men have doubted Mr. Lincoln's fidelity to freedom. Utterly ignoring his antecedents, which have always exhibited the most decided hostility to slavery, they have sometimes talked as if he desired to save slavery. While they cannot put their finger upon a single act or speech of his, since he entered public life, that favors the institution, they nevertheless fear that he is not true to liberty. How strange! Let them ponder the following facts:

1. The rebels have denounced Mr. Lincoln more for his hostility to slavery than for any thing else. As soon as he was nominated for the Presidency, they began to point to his antislavery antecedents to show that he would not favor the "peculiar institution" of the South.

2. In Congress he distinguished himself as an antislavery man by introducing an amendment to a bill relating to the slave-trade in the District of Columbia. His amendment provided for the abolition of slavery there; and it is a somewhat remarkable coincidence, that the man who labored to carry this measure through Congress in 1848 should become the President of the United States twelve years thereafter, and, by his administration, slavery be abolished in that District. He was defeated then; but he is triumphant now.

3. Read the speeches of Judge Douglas in the memorable canvass of Illinois with Mr. Lincoln. One of his chief