on the canvass. Many, especially manufacturers, merchants, and bankers, were prevented from voting the Republican ticket, though they could not but approve the doctrines of its platform, while constrained to vote for candidates whose principles they must condemn. The canvass resulted in the election of Mr. Buchanan, though he lacked more than three hundred and seventy thousand votes of a majority, Mr. Fremont receiving more than one million three hundred and forty-one thousand votes. This Democratic victory was a severe blow to Republican hopes and to all liberty-loving men. Its lessons could neither be gainsaid nor ignored, for they were burned into the hearts of all who had participated in this heated canvass. They saw that, notwithstanding the constant antislavery agitations of twenty-five years, which had enlisted the ablest tongues and pens, and spread before the people by voice and press, by pulpit and platform, not only the primal truths of human rights, but the grim and abhorrent facts and features of the slave system; notwithstanding the high-handed aggressions of the Slave Power, all fully and even ostentatiously indorsed by the victorious party, in whose platform they had been made the prominent and commanding articles ;-notwithstanding all this, done with purpose and without concealment, the people, with seeming deliberation, had adopted it and made it their own. Though the Slave Power seemed more firmly seated than ever, and more securely enthroned; though the cries of "bleeding Kansas" lingered in the air, its soil was still moistened with the blood of the victims of slaveholding hate, and its skies were yet murky with the smoke of burning and desolated homes, the people seemed willing to make public record of their subserviency, stronger the chains of the slave, and more hideous their own ignoble vassalage. CHAPTER XXXIX. THE DRED SCOTT CASE. Domination of the Slave Power. Over the Judiciary. Dred Scott "Case."One of a series of slaveholding aggressions. — His history. - Famous opinion. - Points of the case. - Conflicting opinions. - Question of citizenship. Historical survey. Adverse to the negro's claim. - Declaration of Independence and Constitution. - Not a question of law. - Ulterior purposes. Line of argument. Daniel. · Slavery national. — Dissenting opinions of Justices McLean and Curtis. Strong and significant language of Judge McLean. Argument of Judge Curtis for negro citizenship. - General indignation and alarm. — Opinion severely condemned. - Mr. Benton's review. - Characterization. - JOHN QUINCY ADAMS's characterization of the workings of the Federal Constitution with its proslavery provisions, that it made "the preservation, propagation, and perpetuation of slavery the vital and animating spirit of the national government," was no more terse than true. No language less strong and severe would fully and fitly describe its terrible history. Nor was that influence anywhere more marked than on the judiciary. There, instead of even-handed justice, was its most shameless prostitution, and judges, instead of being "just, ruling in the fear of God," gave unmistakable evidence that their rulings were rather given in "fear" of the almost omnipotent Slave Power. And nowhere was this ever more apparent and distressing than in what was familiarly termed "The Dred Scott Case." In that "case," with its antecedent and attendant facts, there was much to alarm. Its interpretations and rulings were untrue in fact, barbarous in spirit, absolutely revolutionary in their scope and intent, inhuman towards the black, and despotic and defiant towards the white population of the land. It came, too, after and apparently as the sequel and culmination of new slaveholding aggressions, beginning with the compromises of 1850, followed up by the more disas trous legislation of 1854, the border-ruffian policy in Kansas, and its full indorsement by the President, by Congress, and by the Democratic party. In it the Supreme Court not only gave a similar indorsement, but exhibited a forwardness to give it, a willingness, indeed, to go out of the way to do it. It was felt to be both an index and a presage, a milestone far in advance of any yet reached in that disastrous journey the nation was travelling so rapidly towards one of the alternatives of which Mr. Lincoln had spoken when he predicted that the nation must ultimately become "all slave or all free." The "case" was that of Dred Scott of Missouri, formerly, with his wife, a slave of a gentleman of that State, though subsequently sold to John F. A. Sandford of New York. During the ownership of his former master he had been taken into Illinois, and also into a portion of the northwest territory, now Minnesota. Being taken back to Missouri, he had unsuccessfully sued for his freedom on the ground that he had been taken into a free State. After being purchased by Mr. Sandford, he sued again in the circuit court of St. Louis County, and obtained a favorable decision. His new owner, however, appealed to the supreme circuit court and obtained a reversal. The case now under consideration was on an appeal to the Supreme Court on a writ of error. It was on this appeal that Chief Justice Taney gave utterance to the sentiment, which has been the subject of so much remark and animadversion, that "the black man has no rights which white men are bound to respect." It may be said, however, that he did not so much proclaim this as his personal opinion-though it evidently was -as that this was his interpretation of history, both European and American. Whether his interpretation was true or not, and whatever might have been his individual opinion, this was his method of placing the sentiment before the court, the nation, and the world. By a singular coincidence and confluence of circumstances, the necessities of an individual, and the exigencies of a section and faction, this claim of a single unknown slave was made the occasion of a decision more radical in its character, more sweeping in its reach and range, and of greater notoriety, than any single case in court or congress, since the formation of the government. The points raised were mainly three. To show that the court had no jurisdiction in the case, it was necessary to make it appear that Dred Scott was not a citizen of the United States, and therefore that he could not bring a suit. To show that taking him into a free State did not vitiate his owner's claim, it was necessary to disallow the principle that such transit did thus inure to his detriment, as had been generally recognized by the courts. To "make assurance doubly sure," it was deemed necessary to prove, too, that the Missouri inhibition was unconstitutional. There were other points, legal and technical, which became the occasion of much discussion in the court, and on which there was much difference of opinion. Indeed, this conflict of sentiment on the side issues and incidental questions that came up did much to break the moral force of the obiter dicta, the extra-judicial opinions which the Chief Justice and other members of the court pronounced on the occasion. A contemporanous critic thus puts it: "Four judges are of one opinion; two of the opposite; two will give no opinion, and one is divided. . . . . There is no majority in favor of anything, but a majority against everything suggested; unless it should be claimed that Judge Grier is in favor of something." On another point he writes: "The result is that three judges are for reversing the decision of the court below on the plea of abatement; and six are against the reversal, — two because that decision is right, one because this court has no authority to examine it, and three without giving any reason. There is no majority for anything, to reverse, affirm, or waive." On the question whether the plaintiff had a right to sue in the courts arose the inquiry whether he was a "citizen." On this the Chief Justice said: "This is certainly a very serious question, and one that now for the first time has been brought for decision before this court. . . . . Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported and sold as slaves, . . . . become entitled to all the rights and privileges and immunities guaranteed by that instrument to a citizen?" In reply he entered upon an elaborate examination of the status of the negro, both in ... 66 "every European nation" and in this country. At the time of the formation of our government, he said, "they had, for more than a century before, been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relation; and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit." This "opinion," he said, was "fixed and universal,"; "an axiom in morals as well as in politics"; "uniformly acted upon by the English government and English peoples"; imposed upon the colonies," and fully exemplified in their "legislation," samples of which he gave. These were, he said, "a faithful index" of the state of feeling towards the negro, and of "the degraded condition of this unhappy race." In opposition to the argument that the strong language of the Declaration of Independence concerning the equality of "all men" militated against this view, he said it was plain that its authors did not in their averment "embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized governments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery." Culling from the acts of the legislatures and courts, especially of the Northern and Eastern States, those provisions which discriminated against the colored race, especially in the matter of intermarriage, serving in the militia, and attending schools, he pointed to them as a triumphant refutation of the idea that the two races were regarded as equal. Though these States had abolished slavery, he gave them no credit for moral principle in the matter; but he contended that it was for prudential reasons, and not from religious convictions. With such a state of feeling and opinion at the time. of framing the Constitution, he contended that the idea could not have been entertained that negroes were citizens; indeed, "the only two provisions which point to them and include them treat them as property." He also quoted from the opinions of William Wirt and Caleb Cushing, when filling the office of Attorney-General, in which they denied that negroes were citizens of the United States. Similar sentiments were expressed by several of the judges, Judge Daniel affirming that "a knowl |