fairness be allowed, that many of his reasonings upon it are justly liable to the exceptions Prof. T. has taken. It seems frequently to be very directly maintained, in the Inquiry, that this preliminary acting is a change, is even a volition, and demands some cause external to the mind to account for its existence; a mode of argument which calls for a reply, and to which our author has replied, in our apprehension, conclusively. The principle itself, however, (against which the objections of the reviewer above mentioned more particularly bear,) we are constrained to regard as a just one; and as his discussion of it has attracted no small attention among the readers of the Repository, and possesses considerable interest, it will not, perhaps, be deemed superfluous if we proceed to adduce some considerations, tending directly to sustain our views.

Edwards has assumed the obnoxious canon without any attempt at proof, as a universal and necessary conception. Is there any thing to be alleged in support of this assumption? Here we remark:

I. That there is nothing to be alleged against it. The very ingenious efforts, which we have noticed, to impugn this principle of causation, bear upon it only as it is supposed to imply that the preliminary acting of a cause involves some change in the state of the cause. We have endeavored to show that it does not involve this implication; if our effort is at all successful, the principle must be acknowledged to stand beyond the reach of the only objections which have ever been made to it.

II. We re-affirm it, on the ground that the universal conceptions of mankind imply its truth. It would be a mere waste of words for us to assert our consciousness in opposition to that of the writer we are controverting; we carry our appeal, therefore, at once to the consciousness of mankind at large, as it is developed in the structure and use of human language. The form in which men universally express their conception of causation, implies the separate existence of the things in question. The form of statement universally em

ployed to describe this process, is, that "causes PRODUCE effects." Now, in the absence of all proof to the contrary, must be held, that the copula, the word which connects the subject with the predicate of this proposition, denotes something distinct from either of them. The producing is a distinct thing, both from the cause which produces and from the effect produced; else why do mankind at large give it distinct expression? The fact that the acting, and the effect, of a cause, are denoted in all languages, and in every man's usage, by entirely different words, is all the proof we can have in such cases that all men consider the things distinct; which is the highest evidence that they are distinct.

III. It is unphilosophical to suppose another mode of giving existence to effects. That effects are sometimes produced in the mode for which we contend, is beyond question. It will scarcely be denied that the world's beginning to exist, was strictly an effect-an effect, too, caused by a previous exercise of Divine power. We have thus an admission that effects are sometimes produced by an acting which is "prior to, and separate from the effect." Of course it becomes unphilosophical to suppose another mode, unless some necessity of doing so can be made out. Some effects must be adduced, for the existence of which the acknowledged mode of producing is insufficient to account. It is contended by these writers that volition is such an effect; on the ground that, if in this effect we admit a prior acting of the cause, it is absolutely impossible to account for that acting. This objection we have shown to be groundless-the previous acting, even in this instance, does not require, does not admit of, any account. The acknowledged mode of causation is entirely sufficient to account for all which demands to be accounted for; of course, the formation of a second hypothesis is inadmissible.

IV. The principle of our opponents is inconsistent with the simplicity of our idea of causation.

The conception denoted by the words produce, cause, etc., is absolutely simple-it contains but a single element of

thought. What this element is, an illustration will show. When the first human soul began to exist, that beginning of existence was, in the strictest sense, an effect, of which God was, in the strictest sense, the cause. But it is inconceivable that God should have been the cause of this effect, unless it took place in consequence of his previous action. A previous action of the cause is, therefore, in this instance, absolutely essential to its producing. If then, there is any instance of causation in which a previous acting of the cause is not essential, the idea of causation is no longer a simple idea. Its essential element is different in different instances. Those who acknowledge a causation of this kind, may, therefore, be justly called upon to define the words cause, produce, etc.; nor can they, while maintaining that something else than previous action of the cause constitutes causation, excuse themselves from the obligation of telling what that extraordinary something is.

Furthermore; this previous acting is all that is essential to causation, in the illustration we have adduced. It is inconceivable that the effect should not follow this previous acting of the Divine mind. If, then, there is any instance of causation from which this idea is excluded, some other must be substituted, else the word cause will denote, in that instance, absolutely no idea. All that constitutes causation in one instance, is stricken from the conception in another; some other idea must be substituted, or we have literally nothing left. If, when the word produce does not denote a previous acting of the cause, nothing can be named which it does denote, we confess ourselves utterly unable to perceive that it denotes any thing.

We forego with some reluctance other topics of remark, which would add materially to the force of our argument; but the discussion has been protracted already perhaps too long. If the canon of Edwards has been vindicated successfully from the objection of involving an infinite series of causative acts, our argument for its support will, we trust, be deemed sufficient; if it has not, additional reasoning would scarcely make it so.

The remainder of Prof. Tappan's work is occupied, for the most part, and the last volume exclusively, with an application of his psychological principles to important subjects of morals and theology. His remarks extend to a wide range of topics, and many of them are of a new and pleasing character. The great fact of the mind's freedom is illustrated in a variety of its applications; and frequently with an elevation of thought, a power of language, and a beauty of sentiment rarely surpassed. The reader will find at Vol. III. pp. 89-90, 97, 140-144, and 179-80, passages of uncommon merit in these respects, with which (if the length to which this article has grown, did not positively forbid extracts) we should be glad to enrich our pages. The author's characteristic defects of style and analysis, are unfortunately evident; still, to most readers, this will be a very interesting portion of his work. In its theological relations, the work will furnish to a certain class of divines but scanty satisfaction. Men whose whole system is circumscribed within the limits of a triangle, or even a hexagon; who recognize only the few combinations of thought which depravity and sovereignty and inability can be made to produce, will find food enough in it, or rather troublesome reflection, nor do we profess any unqualified approbation of it. Some of our author's remarks, in respect to decrees, election, and some other topics, we regard as unhappy and erroneous; and to others of them we should take exception as being couched in a phraseology which is needlessly obnoxious, and which gives them, even when true, an aspect of error. But throughout this portion, and indeed the whole of the work, there is a sense of the importance of the truth that man is free, and a lofty and fearless assertion of it, which it is refreshing to witness. Prof. T.'s earnestness in defence of this great fact, carries him not unfrequently beyond just limits; and of this none can be more sensible than ourselves. Still we say, without hesitation, that the great principles he maintains will come with conviction to many a mind dissatisfied with the barren and meagre philosophy to which it is now forced to stoop.

The ardor and enthusiasm with which he has sought to vindicate to the utmost, the weightier matters of human liberty and accountability, ought to secure from every generous mind a lenient treatment for any errors into which they may have betrayed him, and a kind reception for a work, which is des tined, we doubt not, to exert a powerful, and on the whole, a healthful influence in the promotion of moral and metaphysi cal science in our country.

ARTICLE VII.

DOMINICI DIODATI I. C. NEAPOLITANI, DE CHRISTO GRÆCE LOQUENTE EXERCITATIO.

Translated by Rev. O. T. DOBBIN, LL. D., of Western Independent College, Exeter, Eng

Continued from page 564, Vol. I.

3. The preface of Josephus and the close of his Antiquities explained.

We are now to examine certain ambiguous passages of the great Jewish historian that seem to oppose our opinion. And first of all, in the prooemium of his Antiquities he says that he had undertaken to translate out of Hebrew books into Greek, the history of the Jewish people for the benefit of the Grecians, and then goes on thus: Χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τοῖς μεγάλων ἅπτεσθαι διανοουμένοις, ὄκνος μοὶ καὶ μέλλη. σις ἐγίνετο τηλικαύτην μετενεγκεῖν ὑπόθεσιν εἰς ἀλλοδαπὴν ἡμῖν καὶ Ferns dialéxzov ovrývav. That is, "in process of time, as usually happens to those who undertake difficult tasks, serious delays were occasioned by attempting to transfer so great a body of matter into a foreign and unfamiliar tongue." Then again to the same effect in the end of the Antiquities he writes: Καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δὲ γραμμάτων ἐσπουδασα μετασχείν,

1 Josephus, in proœm. Antiq. p. 2, § 2.