ARTICLE VI.

EXAMINATION OF PROF. HENRY P. TAPPAN'S WORKS ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.

By Rev. BENJAMIN N. MARTIN, Hadley, Mass.

The Doctrine of the Will, determined by an Appeal to Consciousness. By HENRY P. TAPPAN.

The Doctrine of the Will, applied to Moral Agency and Responsibility. By HENRY P. TAPpan.

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NOTE-The present article was promised in a previous one, published in Bib. Repos. Jan. 1843. It has been, by unavoidable circumso long delayed, that the writer would scarcely feel at liberty now to offer it to the public, but for some indications which intervening numbers of the Repository afford, of an interest in one, at least, of its prominent topics of discussion.

The writer would avail himself of this opportunity, to correct an erroneous quotation of the language of Edwards, which occurred in his former article. (B. R. No. XVII., p. 43.) The sentence as quoted, runs thus: "Whether it has any PRODUCTIVE influence or not." The word productive has no place in the original, and was carelessly supplied from a former sentence in revision. The correction would be scarcely worth making, were it not that the marked emphasis given to the word, renders it, unfortunately, an object of particular attention.

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HAVING already offered our readers some observations on Prof. Tappan's views of the philosophy of Edwards, we propose to extend our examination, in the present article, to his These are presented in the two later volumes of his work, the titles of which, as above recited, sufficiently disclose their general character. We shall indicate them in the progress of our remarks, for the sake of convenience, as Vols. II. and III.

There is necessarily a wide difference in the style and character of the two treatises. The former, aiming to establish a theory of the will, deals with whatever is most recondite and abstruse; and requires an accurate analysis, an acute discrimination of the most elementary ideas of psychology. The latter, which seeks to apply the conclusions thus reached

to systems and creeds, calls for less of critical analysis, and more of logical connection: it has less to do with nice distinctions, and demands different qualities of thought and style. We are of opinion that the latter is to be regarded as altogether the more successful portion of the work. Prof. T.'s conclusions are generally drawn with strict accuracy, consequences are logically inferred, and both are sustained with a vigor of thought, and urged with a power of language, which gives great effect to his reasonings. His analysis, however, of elementary ideas, is scarcely sufficiently nice; and his fundamental principles and truths are assumed with too little caution and tact. In maintaining, as he does, the entire freedom of the will, we fully coincide with him; as well as in many of the principles with which this doctrine is connected; as for instance, that the mind is the cause of its own acts, and that it causes voluntary acts with full power to the contrary. His general classification, too, of the mental faculties into intellect, sensitivity, and will, and the entire separation of the last two faculties, (which is a cardinal point in the system,) meet our entire approbation; and we rejoice in the wide currency which these views are likely to obtain through the medium of his work. But the psychological theories which our author connects with these great truths, and on which some of the most important conclusions are made to rest, we are constrained to regard as unsubstantial, and even fanciful. The elementary discussions of the work, wear, in one respect, an unfavorable aspect. The positions chosen seem to have been assumed rather for their convenience, than for their strength. The author occupies the ground he does, not because there is plainly no standing elsewhere, but because he can contend to better advantage there than elsewhere, for the support of some favorite views. Deeply impressed with the importance of the doctrine of man's liberty of will, he places it on a most ample, but scarcely a very firm foundation. He frames a theory of the largest liberty, and seeks for eleinentary distinctions which will sustain it. The primary conceptions of things from which he reasons, seem to have been

adopted, not on account of their absolute and necessary truth, but because they furnish ground for a broad theory of liberty to rest upon. This, at least, is the aspect which the author's philosophy wears to our view. We shall afford our readers some opportunity to judge of its correctness, in a somewhat detailed examination of the principles of the system.

We took occasion, in a former article, to exhibit Prof. T.'s general use of the fundamental terms of his discussion; and particularly to speak of his frequent identification of the idea of cause, with that of causality or power. The subsequent portions of his work are, we regret to say, chargeable with this defect to a still more unfortunate degree. In the former volume, this use of terms is found principally in the application of them-in those oft-recurring forms of speech which a writer is under the necessity of using on almost every page, and which, from the frequency of their occurrence, cannot be carefully weighed. In the latter, especially the second, it is not only in the application, but in the definition of terms that the defect manifests itself; in those controlling statements which require the most careful and accurate expression. In support of our remark, we refer our readers to p. 60 of vol. II. They will find there a brief chapter entitled " Definition of the Will," which commences thus: "Will is employed to express the causality of the mind." .. "To this usage I mean to confine it in the following investigation." causality denotes something which belongs to a cause, a quality or property of a cause; and this language implies, beyond dispute, that the will is not a cause, but only some quality or property of one. But on p. 294, in the formal announcement of the result of a lengthened discussion on motives, this language occurs: "The important conclusion at which we arrive is this will is cause, and there is no cause but will." this very chapter, the former definition of the will as causality is again and again repeated; and yet, the matured language of this important conclusion affirms, with numerous other passages of the book, that the will is not causality, but cause.

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The former of these seems the more deliberate and care

ful statement; while the latter is of much the more frequent occurrence. Which of them Prof. T. really deems correct, it is of course somewhat difficult to say. We are inclined to think the latter; since, however inconsistent it may be with the formal definition above mentioned, some extended portions of the work are constructed on the theory that the will is

cause.

There is another prominent term which demands notice from its remarkably wide application in the discussion; it is the word nisus. It seems to have been selected by the author for the sake of having a word which should be free from the ordinary ambiguity of language. If this was the design, we regret that it is not more fully borne out in the execution. Several distinct applications of it are easily discernible. First, it is used to express the active quality of a cause, its power, or energy. For instance, it is called (Vol. I. p. 190) "an energy"-(p. 197) "its nisus, its self-determining energy" (p. 281) "The nisus of the divine will is essential power." It denotes in these cases, the active nature of a cause; and is identical with the will, according to Prof. T.'s use of that word; both will and nisus being repeatedly explained by the same words energy and power. In other instances, it is applied to the operating or acting of power. It is defined to be "the most original movement of a cause;" (p. 192)" its first going forth to effects." Here it signifies not the power, but the acting-the "movement" of a cause. Lastly it is employed to denote the result of this movement or action—the effect. "This nisus to him becomes an effecta phenomenon." (P. 191.) It is very frequently identified with volition, (which latter is every where termed an effect,) as in this expression, "in man the most original movement is this nisus likewise, which in him we call volition." (P. 91.)

Three distinct conceptions are thus blended into the appli cation of a single term. Nisus is power or energy-nisus is ac tion or movement-nisus is volition or the effect. Nor is nisus the only word which rejoices in this curious latitude of signification; we have selected it only because the singularity of the

word marks more distinctly the peculiarity of its application. We ought, perhaps, to remark here, that Prof. Tappan contends strenuously for the identity of the last two of these three conceptions; a point on which we shall have more to say hereafter.

This unhappy looseness of language lays the work open to the charge of numerous inconsistencies. Some of these are quite glaring, as for example the following: "There is no intervention of any thing between the cause and the effect; between will and volition. A cause producing its phenomena by phenomena, is a manifest absurdity." (Vol. I. p. 187.) Compare with this some statements on p. 190. "We observe phenomena, and by a law of our intelligence we refer them to cause. But how do we conceive of cause as producing them? By a nisus, or effort. Is this nisus itself a phenomenon? It is when it is observed. Is it always observed? It is not." ***Where then do we observe this nisus? Only in will." A cause, then, produces phenomena by a nisus; in the case of will, this nisus is observed, and is a phenomenon ; yet a "cause producing its phenomena by phenomena is a manifest absurdity!"

Nor is it to the charge of inconsistency alone, that the work is from this cause obnoxious. The inconsistency sustains the worst form possible of self-determination; viz., that we choose our choices and will our volitions. Volition is the observed effect-the phenomenon-it is produced by a nisus; nisus, however, is itself a volition; the mind, therefore, produces volitions by volitions, effects by effects. Volition comes into existence by a power "which at the moment of causation is conscious of ability to withhold the causative nisus." (P 274.) The will produces volitions, then, by a causative nisus; nisus is itself an effect-a volition; of course the will produces volitions by volitions.

The extracts on which these latter remarks are founded, are taken entirely from the third part of the Review of Edwards, and might be greatly multiplied by a similar examination of the remaining volumes. This unguarded and ambigu