Mr. DANIELSON. May I have two more questions, please? One, I think I can answer myself, but I want to be sure I understand the bill, and that is under your section 8, the incidence of clemencies discharged, the clemency discharged is not statutorily defined, as I understand it, to prescribe exactly what benefits are granted or not granted under the clemency discharge. But in section 8, you say that the clemency discharge shall not automatically confer rights.

I assume that if the President under that language, wishes to do so, under your first three words, he may grant all the rights he feels like up to and the equivalent of an honorable discharge.

Mr. NELSON. Correct.

Mr. DANIELSON. But if he fails to, then, and I think this is proper, we would be empowering the Veterans Administration and the Department of Defense to detail what benefits the applicant is to receive. Mr. JAVITS. That is correct.

Mr. DANIELSON. Which the President might not bother to spell out. Mr. JAVITS. That is correct.

Mr. DANIELSON. That settles that in my mind.

The other one, in your section 6, reacquisition of U.S. citizenship, that language, I think, is constitutionally possible, that the Congress could do that in legislation, no discretion of the Preisdent, but it calls for an absolute, it confers an absolute right on any applicant to reacquire U.S. citizenship-on any applicant. I stress the word "any." Even if the applicant had been turned down, even if the facts establish he was guilty of the most outrageous conduct, he might even have practically committed treason, could have led a battalion against our troops, for example, he still has the right under section 6 to reacquire U.S. citizenship. I would think and I don't know how to state it at this time, but I think we should allow that some condition in there, some kind of a burden of proof or at least some kind of a threshold that would have to be crossed. I would think out of our draft evaders and military deserters, were probably 99 and 44/100's percent are not guilty of any conduct of that type, but there is probably a Benedict Arnold here and there in the crowd, and I am loath to give him back his U.S. citizenship. Mr. JAVITS. I think the word "may" in line 18, indicates certain discretion of the courts but I believe it could be buttressed-I might have to examine the law-by merely establishing the jurisdiction of the court upon the same criteria which would have determined that court allowing granting citizenship. We will have to check it out, but that would be the simplest definition.

Mr. DANIELSON. OK. I have raised my point, and I am sure you do understand it, and-well, if we, as I say, should take this-I am going to try to tailor that a little bit. I am always reluctant, I criticize the courts as often as anybody, but I feel that we contribute to their error by sometimes not spelling out our legislation well enough. Mr. JAVITS. Criteria. That is correct. I agree.

Mr. DANIELSON. Thank you.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. In behalf of the committee, I would like to express our thanks to both Senator Jacob Javits of New York, and Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin. The Chair would also like to announce that Senator Philip Hart of Michigan was not able to be here this morning because of an urgent executive session of his com

mittee. Senator Hart, I think, will be here tomorrow morning, Friday, April 18, at 10 o'clock for our hearings, together with Mr. Henry Schwarzchild, who is director of the ACLU's project on amnesty; Rev. Barry Lynn, United Church of Chirst; Mr. Gerry Condon; Colonel Ed Miller; and also Mr. Thomas Alder, publisher of the Selective Service Law Reporter; as witnesses on this question tomorrow morning.

Until that time, this committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m. on Friday, April 18, 1975.]

THE PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY PROGRAM

FRIDAY, APRIL 18, 1975

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES,

AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Kastenmeier, Danielson, and Pattison. Also present: Bruce A. Lehman, counsel; Timothy A. Boggs, legislative assistant; and Thomas E. Mooney, associate counsel.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. The subcommittee will come to order this morning for the purpose of continuing our hearings on the subject of amnesty and the Presidential clemency program.

We are here for the purpose of considering the President's program, its efficacy, or its failures, and for the purpose of ascertaining whether any legislation is appropriate or what response the Congress ought to make to this question.

We are pleased to have as our first witness an old friend, a gentleman who was not able to be here yesterday because of very urgent committee business on the other side, and I am very pleased to greet this morning Senator Phil Hart, of Michigan.

Senator Hart?

TESTIMONY OF HON. PHILIP A. HART, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. HART. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my thanks for the welcome and my apologies for yesterday.

I have it really is a brief statement if I may read it.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Please do.

Mr. HART. I am delighted that you provided the opportunity to discuss the amnesty issue. There are a good many thousand young men who continue to suffer because of a principled objection to the Vietnam war, and I believe the Congress has an obligation to respond definitively and promptly to their situation.

Last month, I introduced a bill that has a rather pompous but I hope accurate title, the National Reconciliation Act of 1975. It would grant general immunity from prosecution to those charged with draft resistance or desertion during the Vietnam period. In brief the bill grants immunity on a general basis, thereby avoiding the problems of an administratively burdensome and unnecessarily arbitrary case-by

case review, requires no alternative service. It would not give immunity to charges arising from offenses involving violence or charges not related to draft evasion or desertion, but provides an honorable discharge for all servicemen who receive immunity.

It wipes out from the individual's record references in official files. to any charge for which immunity has been granted, and where necessary, restores citizenship.

Now, from our beginning as a country, we recognized that respect for the individual's conscience was basic to our concept of freedom. Those constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, religion, and press are based upon that respect, and we have recognized also that the right to follow one's conscience carries with it certain responsibilities.

My decision to introduce legislation which would grant a general and unconditional amnesty is, I believe, grounded in a deep respect for the exercise of the responsibility which freedom of individual conscience requires. In the past, I had argued that amnesty ought to be granted on a case-by-case basis, but I have switched. I have come to reject that approach because it would create an unworkable administrative task, and it is bound to foster an arbitrariness which would favor the better educated, more affluent among those seeking and needing amnesty.

And further, the difficulty inherent in reaching back into the past,. in some cases up to 12 years, reaching back and trying to figure out a given individual's motive or the mix of motives, and in measuring these against some standard of behavior persuades me that a general approach is the only way we can affect a true amnesty.

Among the other questions which often come up in any amnesty discussion is that of alternative service. Now, as I am sure we have been told time and time again, amnesty means to forget, not necessarily forgive. An unconditional amnesty admits no right or wrong on anyone's part and dishonors no one who fought honorably, but it can serve to close, as world events are now closing a deeply troubled, tragic period in our history by a determination that suffering which can be eliminated by a human act be eliminated, and to require that those who have exercised a responsibility of conscience to accept terms which imply an admission of guilt, I think does not add up.

And also, if we consider how few men out of the number available were called and how many were not called for reasons other than the luck of the draw, how long the disruption of so many lives has lasted, and how difficult it would be for men to find jobs of any kind, I think the case for requiring alternate service is undercut.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would emphasize that the bill I have introduced is but one response to the plight of the objectors to the Vietnam war. Hearings such as yours are a means of bringing the many competing claims to light, of correcting where the evidence is persuasive, and finally acting.

If, as an interim measure, the subcommittee and the committee should decide to recommend enactment of a program similar to the President's Clemency Board, so that those who such a program does help may avail themselves of it while Congress debates the larger issue, I would not construe this as inconsistent with our objective of relieving suffering.