P. 717 This case involves the capture of enemy's property on the sea, and executive action, and if the position that the alleged rule proprio vigore limits the sovereign power in war be rejected, then I understand the contention to be that, by reason of the existence of the rule, the pro clamation of April 26 must be read as if it contained the exemption in terms or the exemption must be allowed because the capture of fishing vessels of this class was not specifically authorized. The preamble to the proclamation stated, it is true, that it was desirable that the war' should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations and sanctioned by their recent practice,' but the reference was to the intention of the Government not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris; and the proclamation spoke for itself. The language of the preamble did not carry the exemption in terms, and the real question is whether it must be allowed because not affirmatively withheld, or, in other words, because such captures were not in terms directed. These records show that the Spanish sloop Paquete Habana ' captured as a prize of war by the U. S. S. Castine' on April 25, and 'was delivered' by the Castine's commander' to Rear Admiral Wm. T. Sampson, (commanding the North Atlantic Squadron,)' and thereupon' turned over' to a prize master with instructions to proceed to Key West. And that the Spanish schooner Lola' was captured as a prize of war by the U. S. S. Dolphin,' April 27, and was delivered' by the Dolphin's commander 'to Rear Admiral Wm. T. Sampson, (commanding the North Atlantic Squadron,)' and thereupon turned over ' to a prize master with instructions to proceed to Key West. | That the vessels were accordingly taken to Key West and there libelled, and that the decrees of condemnation were entered against them May 30. It is impossible to concede that the Admiral ratified these captures in disregard of established international law and the proclamation, or that the President, if he had been of opinion that there was any infraction of law or proclamation, would not have intervened prior to condemnation. The correspondence of April 28, 30, between the Admiral and the Secretary of the Navy, quoted from in the principal opinion, was entirely consistent with the validity of the captures. The question put by the Admiral related to the detention as prisoners of war of the persons manning the fishing schooners' attempting to get into Havana.' Non-combatants are not so detained except for special reasons. Sailors on board enemy's trading vessels are made prisoners because of their fitness for immediate use on ships of war. Therefore the Admiral pointed out the value of these fishing seamen to the enemy, and advised their detention. The Secretary replied that if the vessels referred to were attempting to violate blockade' they were subject' with crew to capture, and also that they might be detained if 'considered likely to aid enemy.' The point was whether these crews should be made prisoners of war. Of course they would be liable to be if involved in the guilt of blockade running, and the Secretary agreed that they might be on the other ground in the Admiral's discretion. All this was in accordance with the rules and usages of international law, with which, whether in peace or war, the naval service has always been necessarily familiar. I come then to examine the proposition that at the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of international law, founded on considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual convenience of belligerent States, that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed, and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling p. 718 of catching and bringing in of fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war.' This, it is said, is a rule' which prize courts, administering the law of nations, are bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the absence of treaty or other public act of their own government.' At the same time it is admitted that the alleged exemption does not apply to coast fishermen or their vessels, if employed for a warlike purpose, or in such a way as to give aid or information to the enemy; nor when military or naval operations create a necessity to which all private interests must give way;' and further that the exemption has not 'been extended to ships or vessels employed on the high sea in taking whales or seals, or cod or other fish which are not brought fresh to market, but are salted or otherwise cured and made a regular article of commerce.' It will be perceived that the exceptions reduce the supposed rule to very narrow limits, requiring a careful examination of the facts in order to ascertain its applicability; and the decision appears to me to go altogether too far in respect of dealing with captures directed or ratified by the officer in command. But were these two vessels within the alleged exemption? They were of twenty-five and thirty-five tons burden respectively. They carried large tanks, in which the fish taken were kept alive. They were owned by citizens of Havana, and the owners and the masters and crew were to be compensated by shares of the catch. One of them had been two hundred miles from Havana, off Cape San Antonio, for twenty-five days, and the other for eight days off the coast of Yucatan. They belonged, in short, to the class of fishing or coasting vessels of from five to twenty 1952 PRIZE CASES IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT tons burden, and from twenty tons upwards, which, when licensed or enrolled as prescribed by the Revised Statutes, are declared to be vessels of the United States, and the shares of whose men, when the vessels are employed in fishing, are regulated by statute. They were engaged in what were substantially commercial ventures, and the mere fact that the fish p. 719 were kept alive by contrivances | for that purpose-a practice of considerable antiquity-did not render them any the less an article of trade than if they had been brought in cured. p. 720 I do not think that, under the circumstances, the considerations which have operated to mitigate the evils of war in respect of individual harvesters of the soil can properly be invoked on behalf of these hired vessels, as being the implements of like harvesters of the sea. Not only so as to the owners but as to the masters and crews. The principle which exempts the husbandman and his instruments of labor, exempts the industry in which he is engaged, and is not applicable in protection of the continuance of transactions of such character and extent as these. In truth, the exemption of fishing craft is essentially an act of grace, and not a matter of right, and it is extended or denied as the exigency is believed to demand. It is, said Sir William Scott, a rule of comity only, and not of legal decision.' The modern view is thus expressed by Mr. Hall: England does not seem to have been unwilling to spare fishing vessels so long as they are harmless, and it does not appear that any State has accorded them immunity under circumstances of inconvenience to itself. It is likely that all nations would now refrain from molesting them as a general rule, and would capture them so soon as any danger arose that they or their crews might be of military use to the enemy; and it is also likely that it is impossible to grant them a more distinct exemption.' In the Crimean War, 1854-5, none of the orders in council, in terms, either exempted or included fishing vessels, yet the allied squadrons swept the Sea of Azof of all craft capable of furnishing the means of transportation, and the English admiral in the Gulf of Finland directed the destruction of all Russian coasting vessels, not of sufficient value to be detained as prizes, except 'boats or small craft which may be found empty at anchor, and not trafficking.' It is difficult to conceive of a law of the sea of universal obligation to which Great Britain has not acceded. And I am not aware of adequate foundation for imputing to this country the adoption of any other than the English rule. In his Lectures on International Law at the Naval Law College the late Dr. Freeman Snow laid it down that the exemption could not be asserted as a rule of international law. These lectures were edited by T 1 Commodore Stockton and published under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy in 1895, and, by that department, in a second edition, in 1898, so that in addition to the well-known merits of their author they possess the weight to be attributed to the official imprimatur. Neither our treaties nor settled practice are opposed to that conclusion. In view of the circumstances surrounding the breaking out of the Mexican War, Commodore Conner, commanding the Home Squadron, on May 14, 1846, directed his officers, in respect of blockade, not to molest 'Mexican boats engaged exclusively in fishing on any part of the coast,' presumably small boats in proximity to the shore while on the Pacific coast Commodore Stockton in the succeeding August ordered the capture of all vessels under the Mexican flag.' The treaties with Prussia of 1785, 1799 and 1828, and of 1848 with Mexico, in exempting fishermen, unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages or places,' did not exempt fishing vessels from seizure as prize; and these captures evidence the convictions entertained and acted on in the late war with Spain. It is needless to review the speculations and repetitions of the writers on international law. Ortolan, De Boeck and others admit that the custom relied on as consecrating the immunity is not so general as to create an absolute international rule; Heffter, Calvo and others are to the contrary. Their lucubrations may be persuasive, but are not authoritative. In my judgment, the rule is that exemption from the rigors of war is in the control of the Executive. He is bound by no immutable rule on the subject. It is for him to apply, or to modify, or to deny altogether such immunity as may have been usually extended. | Exemptions may be designated in advance, or granted according to p. 721 circumstances, but carrying on war involves the infliction of the hardships of war at least to the extent that the seizure or destruction of enemy's property on sea need not be specifically authorized in order to be accomplished. Being of opinion that these vessels were not exempt as matter of law, I am constrained to dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court; and brothers Harlan and McKenna concur in this dissent. my On January 29, 1900, the court, in each case, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of the United States, and after argument of counsel thereon, and to secure the carrying out of the opinion and decree according to their true meaning and intent, ordered that the decree be so modified as to direct that the damages to be allowed shall be compensatory only, and not punitive. p. 98 The Newfoundland. (176 U.S. Reports, 97) 1900. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE No. 156. Argued November 3, 6, 1899.—Decided January 15, 1900. THE case is stated in the opinion of the court. W. Theodore G. Barker for appellants. Mr. G. A. R. Rowlings was on his brief. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Hoyt for appellee. Mr. Joseph K. McCammon and Mr. James H. Hayden, for the naval captors, were on his brief. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court. The Newfoundland, a British steamship, was seized off the coast of Cuba on 19th July, 1898, by the United States ship of war Mayflower, on the ground that she was trying to violate the blockade of Havana. She was sent to Charleston, South Carolina, and there libelled with her cargo as prize of war. Testimony was taken in preparatorio, and the court determined it to be insufficient for condemnation, and on motion of the attorney for the United States ordered further proof. Upon that proof a decree was entered condemning and forfeiting the ship and cargo, and they were ordered to be sold. From the decree this appeal is prosecuted. The assignments of error may be reduced to two contentions: I. That the court erred in making an order for further proof because the testimony taken in preparatorio afforded no legal foundation for doubt, or proof of any overt act to justify the condemnation of the ship. 2. That the additional testimony taken still left the evidence insufficient for condemnation. (1.) Of the testimony taken in preparatorio the court said: 'Taking the testimony which alone is now before the court, there is nothing in it which shows or tends to show that the Newfoundland, at the time of capture or at any other time, was heading for the port of Havana or any other port.' And further: 'So far as its examination has extended, no case has been found where a sentence of condemnation was passed upon such a state of facts |