There seems to be no reason why this reasonable and settled doctrine should not be applied to each ship where several | are engaged successively p. 555 in one transaction, namely, the conveyance of a contraband cargo to a belligerent. The question of liability must depend on the good or bad faith of the owners of the ships. If a part of the voyage is lawful, and the owners of the ship conveying the cargo in that part are ignorant of the ulterior destination, and do not hire their ship with a view to it, the ship cannot be liable; but if the ulterior destination is the known inducement to the partial voyage, and the ship is engaged in the latter with a view to the former, then whatever liability may attach to the final voyage, must attach to the earlier, undertaken with the same cargo and in continuity of its conveyance. Successive voyages, connected by a common plan and a common object, form a plural unit. They are links of the same chain, each identical in description with every other, and each essential to the continuous whole. The ships are planks of the same bridge, all of the same kind, and all necessary to the convenient passage of persons and property from one end to the other. There remains the question whether the Bermuda, on the supposition that she was really a neutral ship, should be condemned for the conveyance of contraband. For, in general, as we have seen, a neutral may convey contraband to a belligerent, subject to no liability except seizure in order to confiscation of the offending goods. The ship is not forfeited, nor are non-offending parts of the cargo. This has been called an indulgent rule, and so it is.1 It is a great, but very proper relaxation of the ancient rule, which condemned the vessel carrying contraband as well as the cargo. But it is founded on the presumption that the contraband shipment was made without the consent of the owner given in fraud of belligerent rights, or, at least, without intent on his part to take hostile part against the country of the captors; and it must be recognized and enforced in all cases where that presumption is not repelled by proof. | The rule, however, requires good faith on the part of the neutral, and p. 556 does not protect the ship where good faith is wanting. The Franklin, therefore, carrying contraband with a false destination, was condemned, after mature consideration, by Sir William Scott in 1801.2 He said that, the benefit of the relaxation could only be claimed by fair cases.' This doctrine was shortly after applied to The Neutralitet by the same great judge; 3 and it received the sanction of this court in an opinion delivered by an equal judge, in 1834. The leading principle governing The Ringende Jacob, 1 Robinson, 90; The Sarah Christina, Id. 238. See opinions of Bynkershoek and Heineccius, cited in notes to The Mercurius, Id. 288, and The Franklin, 3 Id. 222. • The Franklin, 3 Robinson, 224. 4 The Neutralitet, Id. 296. Carrington v. Merchants' Insurance Co., 8 Peters, 518, opinion by Story, J. P. 557 this class of cases was stated very clearly by Mr. Justice Story in that opinion, thus: The belligerent has a right to require a frank and bonâ fide conduct on the part of neutrals in the course of their commerce in times of war, and if the latter will make use of fraud and false papers to elude the just rights of belligerents and cloak their own illegal purposes, there is no injustice in applying to them the penalty of confiscation.' Mere consent to transportation of contraband will not always or usually be taken to be a violation of good faith. There must be circumstances of aggravation. The nature of the contraband articles and their importance to the belligerent, and the general features of the transaction, must be taken into consideration in determining whether the neutral owner intended or did not intend, by consenting to the transportation, to mix in the war. The Ranger, though a neutral vessel, was condemned for being employed in carrying a cargo of sea stores to a place of naval equipment under false papers. The owner had not consented, but the master had, and Sir William Scott said, 'If the owner will place his property under the absolute management and control of persons who are capable of lending it in this manner to be made an instrument of fraud in the hands of the enemy, he must sustain the consequences of such misconduct on the part of his agent.' 1| So, too, The Jonge Emilia, a neutral vessel, was condemned on the ground that she appeared to have been altogether in the hands of enemy merchants and employed for seven voyages successively in enemy trade; 2 and The Carolina was condemned for employment in the transportation of troops, though the master alleged that it was under duress, and the actual service was at an end. Now, what were the marks by which the conveyance of contraband on the Bermuda was accompanied? First, we have the character of the contraband articles, fitted for immediate military use in battle, or for the immediate civil service of the rebel government; then the deceptive bills of lading requiring delivery at Bermuda, when there was either no intention to deliver at Bermuda at all, or none not subject to be changed by enemies of the United States; then the appointment of one of these enemies as master, necessarily made with the knowledge and consent of Haigh, if he was owner; then the complete surrender of the vessel to the use and control of such enemies, without even the pretence of want of knowledge, by the alleged owner, of her destined and actual employment. We need not go further. We are bound to say, considering the known relations of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. with the rebel leaders; and the relations of John Fraser & Co. to the same combination, justly inferable from 'The Ranger, 6 Robinson, 126. 2 The Jonge Emilia, 3 Robinson, 52. The Carolina, 4 Id. 256, the fact that they were the consignees of the whole cargo; and considering, also, the ascertained character of most of it, that it seems to us highly probable that the ship, at the time of capture, was actually in the service of the so-called Confederate government, and known to be so by all parties interested in her ownership. However this may be, we cannot doubt that the Bermuda was justly liable to condemnation for the conveyance of contraband goods destined to a belligerent port, under circumstances of fraud and bad faith, which make the owner, if | Haigh was owner, responsible for unneutral participa- p. 558 tion in the war. The cargo, having all been consigned to enemies, and most of it contraband, must share the fate of the ship. Having thus disposed of the questions connected with the ownership, control, and employment of the Bermuda, and the character of her cargo, we need say little on the subject of liability for the violation of the blockade. What has been already adduced of the evidence, satisfies us completely that the original destination of the Bermuda was to a blockaded port; or, if otherwise, to an intermediate port, with intent to send forward the cargo by transshipment into a vessel provided for the completion of the voyage. It may be that the instructions to Westendorff were not settled when the steamship left St. George's for Nassau; but it is quite clear to us that the ship was then at the disposition of John Fraser & Co., and that the voyage, begun at Liverpool with intent to violate the blockade, delayed at St. George's for instructions from that firm, continued toward Nassau with the purpose of completion from that port to a rebel port, either by the Bermuda herself or by transshipment, was one voyage from Liverpool to a blockaded port; and that the liability to condemnation for attempted breach of blockade was, by sailing with such purpose, fastened on the ship as firmly as it would have been by proof of intent that the cargo should be transported by the Bermuda herself to a blockaded port, or as near as possible, without encountering the blockading squadron, and then sent in by a steamer, like the Herald, of lighter draft or greater speed. We have not thought it necessary to examine the questions made by counsel touching the right of belligerents to make captures within cannonshot range of neutral territory, for there is nothing in the evidence which proves to our satisfaction that the Bermuda was within such range. Our conclusion is, that both vessel and cargo, even if both were neutral, were rightly condemned; and, on every ground, the decree below must be AFFIRMED. [After the preceding confirmation of the decree of the District Court of Phila- p. 559 delphia—which, it will have been noted by the reader, was one condemning only p. 560 the vessel (claimed by Haigh), and the munitions of war, &c. (claimed by Captain NOTE. Along with the preceding case was submitted another, much like it, the case of The Hart. (3 Wallace, 559) 1865. Neutrals who place their vessels under belligerent control, and engage them in THE present case came here by appeal from a decree of the District The whole cargo consisted of arms and munitions of war, taken on Mr. Coffey, for the captors; no one appearing, nor any argument being submitted for the claimants. | The CHIEF JUSTICE: The case in its principal features resembles that of the Bermuda and her cargo; they are, perhaps, even more irreconcilable with neutral good faith. It is enough to say that neutrals who place their vessels under belligerent control, and engage them in belligerent trade, or permit them to be sent with contraband cargoes under cover of false destination to neutral ports, while the real destination is to belligerent ports, impress upon them the character of the belligerent in whose service they are employed, and cannot complain if they are seized and condemned as enemy property. The principles recognized in the preceding case require the affirmance of the decree of the District Court; and it is AFFIRMED ACCORDINGLY. The Admiral. (3 Wallace, 603) 1865. 1. A case in prize, carried by appeal from a District Court into a Circuit Court, before the statute of March 3, 1863, allowing appeals in prize directly from the District Courts to this court, is properly here on appeal from the Circuit Court. 2. A vessel setting sail from England on the 9th September, 1861, with actual knowledge of a proclamation which the President of the United | States made p. 604 on the 19th of the April preceding, that is to say, made nearly five months previously, declaring that certain of our Southern States were in insurrection, and that a blockade would be established of their ports,-had no right, under an allegation of a purpose to see if the blockade existed, to sail up to one of those ports actually blockaded. 3. The declaration in the President's proclamation of the date just mentioned, that if a vessel, with a view to violate the blockade, should approach or attempt to leave either of the said ports, she would be duly warned by the commander of the blockading vessels, who would indorse on her registry the fact and date of such warning;' and that if the same vessel 'shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port she will be captured,' does not apply to such a case; but the vessel is liable without any previous warning. 4. Mere sailing for a blockaded port is not an offence; but where the vessel has a knowledge of the blockade, and sails for the blockaded port with the intention of violating it, she is clearly liable to capture. 5. Where, during our civil war, the clearance of a vessel expressed a neutral port to be her sole port of destination, but the facts showed that her primary purpose was to get cargoes into and out of a port under blockade,—the outward cargo, if got, to go to the neutral port named as the one cleared for, the fact that the vessel's letter of instructions directed the master to call off the blockaded port, and, if he should find the blockade still in force, to get the officer in command of the blockading ship to indorse on the ship's register that she had been warned off (in accordance with what it was asserted by the owners of the vessel was their understanding of neutral rights under the President's proclamation above mentioned), and then to go to the port for which this clearance calledwill not save the vessel from condemnation as prize in a case where she has been captured close by the blockaded port, standing in for it and without ever having made an inquiry anywhere whether the port was blockaded or not. Presumption of innocent purpose is negatived in such a case. On the 19th April, 1861-seven days after Fort Sumter was fired on, and near the beginning, therefore, of our late civil war-the President of the United States issued a proclamation, by which he declared that an insurrection existed in certain of the Southern States, and that he deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the said States.' 'For this purpose,' the proclamation proceeded, 'a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid.' 'If, therefore,' the document continued, 'with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach, or shall attempt to leave either of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the p. 605 commander of one of the blockading vessels, who will indorse on her registry the fact and date of such warning; and if the same vessel shall again |