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it was subdued, the sovereign power might perhaps legally declare the occurrence of such a forfeiture, and in that case, as the forfeited rights would at once revert to the source from which they were derived, the sovereign would to that extent be liberated from constitutional restraints in the exercise of power over the offenders and over their territory. But the same reason does not apply to a similar case arising in this country, because the process by which the existing relations between the States and the people on the one hand, and the Federal Government on the other, were created, was exactly the reverse of that by which the relations between the sovereign and the people have been created in constitutional monarchies. Instead of the rights of the States and of the people originating in grants from the general Government, they were derived from a successful rebellion against the British crown, and the general Government was created by them, for their own convenience, safety, and prosperity, and all its powers depend upon affirmative grants made by them. And instead of the general Government being the ultimate depository of all power not delegated to the States and the people, its powers are specifically enumerated, and the States and the people are expressly made the ultimate depositories of all other powers. There is, therefore, a complete failure of all analogy between the relations which the general Government will

pear to the southern States after the suppression of the rebellion and those which would exist between a victorious sovereign and discomfited rebels. There are, indeed, certain privileges and rights which are the creatures of the Constitution, and dependent exclusively upon it, and which a State or a people may therefore forfeit by its own misconduct. But these are merely the benefits of the Union; and the only method of enforcing their forfeiture, is to allow the State which seeks to secede to “depart in peace.”

It is also evident that the constitutional limitations and expansions of Federal and State powers are graduated in accordance with the general interest, as well as the interest of the particular State. They therefore exist for the benefit of all as well as of each particular member of the Union. For instance, one State cannot constitutionally establish a monarchy, even if Congress, her authorities, and a majority of her inhabitants should agree to waive the constitutional requirement that her form of government should be republican, because the existence of the monarchical form of government within any part of the territory of the Union is prohibited, not for the benefit of a particular State, but as being prejudicial to the inter ests of all.* For the same reason, a State cannot

* “ The more intimate the nature of such an Union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political


even with the consent of Congress and a majority of her citizens, voluntarily surrender to the Federal Government any one of her constitutional rights. How, then, can she be deprived for any misconduct of her authorities, or even of her citizens, of rights which she cannot voluntarily cede? It is the right and interest of all the States that their common Government shall not, anywhere in the Union, exercise any other jurisdiction than such as the Constitution has confided to it. Citizens of New York, Ohio or Pennsylvania would be injured by an expansion of Federal jurisdiction in South Carolina, Georgia or Alabama, for many reasons, which may be briefly comprehended in the general expression that the whole balance of our politica! system would be disturbed thereby. We have, therefore, a right, for our own sakes, to insist that the constitutional balance of power shall remain in all respects intact throughout the whole territory of the nation, and that it shall not be disturbed by the central Government drawing to itself powers and functions which our forefathers for wise reasons denied to it. This is a right of which we cannot be



institutions of each other, and the greater right to insist
that the forms of government under which the compact
was entered into, should be substantially maintained.
'Greece was undone,' says Montesquieu, 'as soon as the
king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphyctions.”'

-The Federalist, No. 43.

deprived by any action of Congress, because that body has not been vested with power to give our consent to any such modification of the relations between the Federal Government and the people of any State. Such modifications can only be made by an amendment of the Constitution in the manner provided for that purpose in the instrument itself.

THE FUTURE to which the nation stands committed by the instrument which alone legalizes the war, is therefore the restoration of the States and the people of the South to their fornrer position in the Union, and that the former political rights and privileges of all the individuals within the seceded States shall remain intact, except so far as they may be affected through the regular operation of the ordinary courts of justice. I will now consider the manner in which we reaffirmed that pledge, and the circumstances which attended its reaffirmation.

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The Theory upon which we entered into the War—The Assurances

respecting its Object and Termination which were given to Foreign Nations—The Adoption of the Crittenden Resolution-Its Obligatory Character as a National Pledge.

WHEN this war broke out, it is not probable that one in fifty of the American people would have hesitated to announce his perfect concurrence in all the sentiments expressed in the two preceding chapters, and to ridicule the idea that the war would result in the slightest interference with the constitutional sovereignty of the southern States and the political independence of the southern people.

The Administration and its party, and a very large number of the opposition, were firmly persuaded that outside of South Carolina, the condition of the South in 1861 was very similar to the condition of England in 1688. It was well known that a very considerable portion of the southern people did not consider Mr. Lincoln's election a sufficient cause for secession : that in every Stato except South Carolina, the Union party was not overpowered without a severe struggle: that in several of the States a majority of the delegates to

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