the laws or constitution of the United States, by its exclusion from the state, is infringed, and this is what the state now accomplishes. There is nothing, therefore, that will justify the interference of this court."

NOTICE OF PROTEST-TO WHOM GIVEN.

It may be stated generally that every party to a bill or note who will be liable in any event to pay the same, and is entitled to reimbursement from the drawee, acceptor or maker, is entitled to notice of its dishonor, and will be discharged from liability on such note or bill by a failure of the proper party to give the requisite notice within a reasonable time, barring all legal excuses for such failure. Where the bill is drawn in good faith upon a party holding funds to meet the draft, or who has authorized the bill to be drawn, the drawer is entitled to the same notice of non-acceptance or non-payment as any other party to the bill, whether it be drawn for his own use or for the benefit of another. His rights in the premises grow out of the fact of his liability, and his contingent right of action against others, which may be postponed by the delay in giving him timely and legal notice. Grosvenor v. Stone, 8 Pick. 79. But where the drawer has no good reason to believe that the bill will be accepted and paid, as where he knows there are no funds in the hands of the drawer to meet it, or where he has himself intercepted the money sent for that purpose, or knows, when he draws the bill, that the drawee is insolvent or bankrupt, he would not be entitled to notice from either holder or indorser. Rhett v. Poe, 2 How. (U. S.) 457. Where the bill was drawn on a partnership by one of the partners, notice was held unnecessary. Fuller v. Hooper, 3 Gray, 334; Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 176.

The indorser, through whose hands the bill has passed either before or after acceptance, or who has passed the note by an unqualified indorsement, is also, for the same reasons that operate to discharge the drawer who has not been duly notified, entitled to notice of dishonor. And this right to notice extends to all indorsers, whether for value, or merely for collection. Each indorser having a right to resort to antecedent parties, is equally entitled to notice of non-acceptance or non-payment from parties who are subsequent to him on the bill. McNeil v. Wyatt, 3 Humph. 125; Scott v. Lifford, 9 East. 347; Butler v. Duval, 4 Yerg. 265. But the same consequences would not follow a neglect to notify remote indorsers, as might result from a failure to give notice to the immediate indorser of the holder. In the first instance none of the parties might be discharged; as the immediate indorser who received notice might in his turn notify any or all the prior parties. Whereas, if the immediate indorser is neglected, it may not only result in his release, but in the release of prior parties. The most prudent course, in every instance however is to exhaust every means of notification to all prior parties, whatever be the

character of the paper, provided it be negotiable. Hutz v. Karthaus, 4 Wash. 1; Williams v. Bank of United States, 2 Peters, 96. In a case where plaintiff drew a bill upon a banker, who had authorized the draft, which was for the use of defendant, and drawn by his authority, it was accepted by the banker, with funds in his hands to meet it. After acceptance, and previous to the maturity of the bill, the banker became bankrupt, and the bill was through mistake paid by a stranger for the honor of one not a party thereto. There was a failure to give notice to plaintiff of the dishonor, and it was held, that he, having reason to anticipate the payment of the bill when it was drawn, was entitled to notice of its nonpayment, and was discharged by such failure. Though he was the agent of defendant in the transaction, he should not have waived his own rights to the prujudice of defendant, and after allowing judgment to go against him by default, without notice, could not recover of defendant. Grosvenor v. Stone, S Pick. 79. Where the note was payable in several instalments, falling due at different periods, it was held that the notice should have been given of the failure to pay each successive instalment when due, in the same manner as though the several sums due were evidenced by separate notes. And though there had been a failure to give notice to the indorser, of the dishonor of all the instalments but the last, this would not discharge him from his liability for the amount of the last instalment, which was dishonored, of which he received due notice. While it was not doubted that the notice given was not sufficient to fix the indorser's liability upon the prior instalments, of the non-payment of which he received no notice; as to the last amount, he was treated precisely as though there had been several notes given, which, falling due at different times, were successively dishonored, and due notice given of the non-payment of the last. Eastman v. Turman, 24 Cal. 379. In Gray v. Bell (3 Rich. 71) and Van Hoesen v. Van Alstyne (3 Wend. 75), it is substantially declared that, where the note is indorsed after maturity, the indorser is not entitled to notice of its dishonor. The only notice deemed essential in those cases was such as would arise from the bringing of a suit within a reasonable time, which might extend to several months. In the latter of these two cases the opinion is expressed that notice within two or three months was sufficient, where from the facts of the case it was manifest that immediate demand and notice of non-payment was not contemplated. The most prominent fact that seemed to be relied on as indicating a departure from the usual requirements as to notice, was that the indorsement was made after maturity. The weight of authority, however, seems to be most decidedly against the rule of exception laid down in the two cases last cited. Indorsers after maturity, as well as indorsers of paper payable on demand, occupy the same relations to each other and to the other parties to the bill or note in regard to notice of dishonor, as indorsers of time paper,

before maturity, with the addition of the right to insist upon diligence on the part of the holder, in demanding payment. Such indorsement is regarded as equivalent to drawing a new bill, payable at sight. Light v. Kingsbury, 50 Mo. 331; Thompson v. Williams, 14 Cal. 162; Bebee v. Brooks, 12 Id. 308; Jones v. Middleton, 29 Iowa, 188; McKewen v. Kirtland, 33 Iowa 384; Colt v. Bernard, 18 Pick. 260; Greely v. Hunt, 21 Me. 455. But where the indorser after maturity has paid and taken up the bill, and his liability, as well as that of the other parties, has been fixed by due notice of dishonor, and he re-issues the note, he is not entitled to notice of the subsequent dishonor. The reason is that his liabilty grows out of his indorsement, and not out of the re-issue. He has already received notice of the dishonor of the paper bearing his indorsement, by which notice his liability to pay the same became as fixed and certain as that of the original maker. Notice of the second dishonor would be as useless as notice to the maker. In cases of this kind, the rule requiring notice to be given indorsers does not apply. 2 Daniel on Negot. Inst., § 997; St. John v. Roberts, 31 N.Y.441; Williams v. Mathews, 3 Cow. 252. The contingent liability which entitles a party to notice of dishonor is not incurred by merely transferring a negotiable bill or note, or by its passing through the hands of a person, whether for value or otherwise. To be entitled to such notice, the party claiming it must have indorsed the paper, and thereby informed subsequent holders of the conditional nature of his undertaking. So, wheaer negotiable bill or note is transferred by mere delivery, the party so transferring it would not be entitled to notice of its dishonor. Van Wort v. Woolley, 3 Barn. & Cres. 439.

We have seen that notice should be sent as well to indorsers through whose hands the bill or note was passed for the purpose of facilitating its collection, as to indorsers for value. So, also, are the indorsers who pass the bill or note to the agent for collection entitled to notice from such agent, unless previously notified by a subsequent party. There are, however, agents of a certain class to whom notice may be sent, and in fact should be sent in the absence of the principal. As where R by letter of attorney constituted F his agent and attorney, general and special, with full power, for and in the name of his principal, or in his own name and for his own use, to make, indorse, draw, accept and negotiate bills, notes, etc., the letter in conclusion stating "that it was to be taken and understood in its fullest and most comprehensive sense and meaning,” F made his own note payable in bank, and indorsed it in the name of R. The note, not being paid when due, was protested, and notice of dishonor given to F for R, and the court held that as F, under the general powers conferred by the letter of attorney, was authorized to receive such notice, it was properly served, and R was duly charged with notice of dishonor. Wilcox v. Routh 9 S. M. & Marsh. 476; Smith v. Thatcher, 4 B. & Ald. 200.

It has even been held that where a bill was

accepted by two persons as partners, and prior to the dishonor the partnership was dissolved, a notice of the dishonor, served upon an agent of one of the individuals composing such partnership, would be sufficient. Brown v. Turner, 15 Ala. (N. S.) 832. For the purpose of receiving notice, the agency may be implied from circumstances, as well as by express authorization by letter of attorney. As where E, whose power of attorney from W had expired, was still in the habit of receiving letters addressed to W, and was authorized so to do by W who called or sent to the office of E for his mail matter, and the fact was established that the notice of dishonor of a bill, upon which W was indorser, was left for W at the office of E, who however had no recollection of receiving the same, it was held that the implication of agency was a question of fact for the jury, and if found to exist, the notice so served was sufficient to bind W. Wilkins v. Commercial Bank, 6 How. (Miss.) 217. And where the indorser was absent from home, and it appeared that the notiee was served upon a person who was authorized by the absent indorser to collect for him and furnish all necessary supplies for his plantation, the notice served upon such general agent was held sufficient to bind his principal. Hesters v. Petrovic, 1 Rob. (La.) 119; Wilson's Extrx. v. Senier, 14 Wis. 380. But it is not every species of agency that will authorize the service of notice, even though the agent be empowered by a letter of attorney. As where one held a power of attorney, authorizing him to receive and sign receipts for all dividends, to vote, to deposit money in said institution and draw checks, to lodge promissory notes, and to sign acceptances of bills of exchange for his principal. This large grant of powers would seem to be sufficiently comprehensive to include everything essential to the credit of the principal in dealing with commercial paper; but it was held in this case that the power was a special one, and did not include authority to accept notice of the dishonor of bills and notes. upon which the principal had become liable as indorser; and notice to such attorney would not be sufficient to bind his principal. Louisiana State Bank v. Ellery, 4 Martin, N. S. (La.) 87. See also Valk v. Gaillard, 4 Strob. (S. C.) 99, where it is held that authority to indorse for the principal does not imply authority in the agent to accept notice of dishonor, even of the bill or note indorsed pursuant to the authority. See also Wilcox v. Routh, supra.

Where the bill or note is drawn or indorsed by two or more persons forming a copartnership, and in drawing or indorsing they act in their partnership capacity, they both become liable as upon other partnership contracts, and a notice of non-acceptance or non-payment, served upon either, will be sufficient to bind them both. Therefore, it can not be said that they are each entitled to notice, because a service upon one, in contemplation of law, is service upon both, and will be as effective to fix the liability of each of the partners, as though they had severally received the notice. And in order

that the liability of both partners may be fixed by a notice served upon one, it is not necessary that the partnership relation should continue until the maturity and dishonor of the note or bill, and the service of notice of such dishonor. It is sufficient if they were partners at the time the bill or note was drawn or indorsed. Fourth National Bank of St. Louis v. Henschen, 52 Mo. 209; Caster v. Thomason, 19 Ala. (N. S.) 717. As we have seen, the notice was held sufficient, even when served upon the agent of one of the partners after dissolution. Brown v. Turner, supra. But in Hume v. Watt, (5 Kas., 34), a comparatively new question is raised as to the sufficiency of notice served upon one of two partners to bind the members of the partnership. In this case, one of the partners resided within the city of Lawrence, and the other, it was admitted, resided in the country. The case turned upon a question of diligence on the part of the notary in prosecuting his inquiries for the place of residence of the partners. It was in evidence that he knew of the residence of the one within the city, and that his place of residence had not been changed within three years; that the notary had seen him within a few days of the dishonor at his residence. But the other partner, residing outside of the city and receiving his letters at the Lawrence post-office, might be served by leaving a notice, properly addressed, for him at such post-office. This was done, and the resident partner was not served; but there was an attempt to excuse the want of personal notice upon him, which the court however did not regard as sufficient, and decided that the notice was insufficient to bind the partners, because it was not personally served upon the resident partner. The question was one of first impression, and was so decided, for the reason that the court regarded it as contrary to the policy of the law, to allow the members of a partnership to be bound by a notice served upon the member least accessible, and where the most indirect means are rendered necessary, when by proper diligence the service could be greatly facilitated, and the parties notified by the most direct means known to the law. The partner to whom the notice was sent through the post, did not receive it until several days after the time within which it might and should have been served upon the resident partner. Had it come to hand on the day following the dishonor, it is probable that it would have been held effective and binding, notwithstanding the irregularity in the

service.

Where, however, a note or bill is made payable to two or more persons jointly, and by them indorsed, the rule is different. Such joint indorsers, when they do not sustain toward each other the relation of partners in the transaction, are each entitled to notice. Sayne v. Frick, 7 Watts & Serg. 383. And as a necessary incident of the rights of such joint indorsers, where notice has been given to one within due time and by the proper party, he is not at liberty to accept service for his co-indorser or indorsers, unless by him or them specially

authorized to do so; and the mere fact of their having joined in the indorsement will not amount to a presumption or implication of his agency, or authority to accept or waive service for his co-indorsers, or to bind them in any way by his acts or admissions. Shepard v. Howley, 1 Conn. 369; Willis v. Green, 5 Hill, 232. Except in states where, as in Missouri, the common law liabilities of joint obligors have been altered by statute so as to render all such contracts both joint and several, the consequences of a failure to give notice of dishonor to both or all the joint indorsers would not be limited to the release of those to whom notice was not given. Their contract being joint and not several, the discharge of one discharges all. So that, not only would the notice fail to bind those to whom it was not given, but it would even release the joint indorser actually notified. People's Bank v. Kuch, 26 Md. 521; State Bank v. Slaughter, 7 Blackford 133. But where one of two or more joint indorsers, upon receiving due and timely notice of the dishonor of the note or bill passed by the joint indorsement, assumes to act as the agent of his co-indorsers, and accordingly accepts or waives service for them, when in reality he has no such authority, express or implied, and his assumption of the powers of an agent is merely for the purpose of repressing further diligence on the part of the holder, so as to work his own discharge from liability, he would not be allowed to reap the fruits of his fraudulent act. And even where the iniquitous purpose of the pretended agent did not appear, the doctrine that renders one personally liable upon unauthorized contracts entered into as agent of another should be applied to him, and he should be held liable for the entire amount of the dishonored paper, as though he were a several indorser. In the case of Willis v. Green, cited above, where one of two joint indorsers of a note died, and the survivor took from the maker a bond and warrant of attorney, by way of security or indemnity, and had collected thereon nearly the amount of the note, it was held to be an admission that proper steps had been taken to charge both indorsers. But in Cayuga County Bank v. Bennett (5 Hill, 236), it was held that a subsequent promise to pay the note, by two of three administrators of a deceased indorser, where there had been a failure of notice, would not amount to a waiver of the irregularities calculated to render the service of the notice insufficient in the absence of such promise.

In case of the death of an indorser, due notice given to the personal representatives will be sufficient; and where the holder has notice of the appointment of an administrator when the note or billis dishonored, such administrator is entitled to the same notice as should have been given to the instestate indorser. Oriental Bank v. Blake, 22 Pick. 206. But where an indorser died intestate before the note became due, and at its maturity no administrator had been appointed, and the notary directed the notice to Lynchburg, where the indorser resided up to the time of his death, and

where his famliy still lived, addressed to "the legal representatives" of the indorser, such notice was held to be properly served. Boyd v. City Savings Bank, 15 Gratt. 501. And where the indorser died at sea ten days before maturity of the note, and his death was not known to the holder until long after the note was dishonored, a notice left at his last dwelling plaee in New York could not be impeached on account of its not being served upon the proper party. Merchants' Bank v. Birch, 17 Johns. 25. It has also been held sufficient notice, where sent to one of several executors or administrators. Lewis v. Bakewell, 6 La. An. 359. And where the notice was regularly sent the deceased indorser by the holder who had no knowledge of his death, and such notice was in due time received by the heirs of deceased, one of whom was subsequently appointed administrator of the estate, the service of the notice was regarded as complete. Maspero v. Pedesclaux, 22 La. An. 227. So also has the notice been decided to be properly served, where the holder had been informed of the death of the indorser, but, failing after diligent inquiry to ascertain the names of the personal representatives of deceased, sent the notice directed to the indorser himself. Barnes v. Reynolds, 4 How. (Miss.) 114.

The bankruptcy of the indorser or drawer introduces a new party who is qualified to receive notice of the dishonor of notes and bills upon which he is liable, without in every instance invalidating the notice to bankrupt indorsers or drawers. When an assignee has been selected or appointed before the maturity of the note or bill, notice of its dishonor should in every instance be given him; but until the qualification of an assignee, it would always be safe to notify the bankrupt himself, who represents the estate until the selection and qualification of the assignee. Ex parte Moline, 19 Ves. 216. It has even been asserted by high authority that, after the assignment, notice may still be effectively served by the bankrupt drawer or indorser, for the reason that he still has an interest in the paper; and, in shifting the duty of payment to parties antecedently liable thereon, and by a parity of reasoning, we might say that notice would be effective if given to the bankrupt. Story on Prom. Notes, § 305. Where both the drawer and acceptor of a bill of exchange became bankrupt before the maturity of the bill, and the holder had timely notice of the appointment of assignees, and the bill was regularly demanded and payment refused at maturity; but notice was given neither to the drawer nor his assignees, though the place of business of the former was open and in charge of a messenger, and there was no excuse made for the failure to notify either the assignees or the bankrupt, except the bankruptcy of the acceptor, it was held that the bill was not provable under the commission issued against the drawer. Rohde v. Proctor, 4 Barn. & Cress. 517.

Notice should even be given an infant indorser or drawer, because he may not choose to plead his disability, which, if waived by him, can not be in

terposed as a defense by antecedent parties who receive notice of the dishonor through him; and for the same reason should it be given to a married woman or her husband. Where, however, the indorsement of the note or bill takes place prior to the marriage, the notice should be served upon her husband; except, perhaps, where it is intended to charge her separate estate in equity, or where by statute married women are held personally liable on their contracts; in which cases the notice should be served upon her. Where the drawer or indorser has become insane since the execution of the draft, or the indorsement of the bill or note, and a guardian or curator has been appointed to manage the affairs of his estate, notice should be given to such guardian or curator. Probably in no instance would a notice be held sufficiently served, where it consisted simply of a verbal message or written notification of the dishonor delivered personally to a party to a bill or note, who was, at the time, known by the holder or agent giving the notice to be non compos mentis. It would be different, if the notice were sent through the ordinary channels of communication by a holder who was ignorant of the disability of the party to be charged. See Story on Prom. Notes, § 311. W.

RIGHT OF MORTGAGOR TO INCOME FROM MORTGAGED PREMISES.

AMERICAN BRIDGE CO .v. HERDELBACH ET AL.

Supreme Court of the United States, October Term,

1876.

A pledge of rents and profits can be made available to the mortgagee, only upon his taking possession or filing a bill, having a receiver appointed and possession delivered to him.

Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

The controversy in this case has arisen out of a mortgage executed by the Kansas and Missouri Bridge Company to the appellees, as trustees, to secure the payment of the principal and interest of certain bonds issued by the mortgagor and described in the mortgage.

Besides the bridge of the company, the mortgage included "the rents, issues and profits of said bridge, as far as the same are not required to pay the necessary expenses of keeping in repair and operating said bridge, which rents, issues, and profits," "are hereby pledged to the payment of said interest as it matures, and to the establishment of a sinking fund for the redemption and payment of the principal of said bonds," etc. It was further provided that if the interest were in default for six months, the trustees, upon the written request of the holders of one-half of the outstanding bonds, might take possession of the mortgaged premises, manage and operate the bridge, and receive and collect all rents and claims dne and to become due to the company. The interest upon the bonds being in default, the trustees, on the 25th of November, 1874, filed their bill, wherein, among other things, they set forth that there was in the hands of the company a

certain amount of money which ought to be applied upon the mortgage and certain claims due to the company, the proceeds of which ought to be applied in like manner.

The appellant, the American Bridge Company, held a judgment for $15,435.88 and costs against the Kansas and Missouri Bridge Company, upon which an execution had been returned nulla bona. On the 11th of December, 1874, the judgment creditor filed a bill claiming priority of payment out of the money and the proceeds of the claim above mentioned. It appears that there is a sufficient fund to meet the demand awaiting below the termination of this litigation.

It can not be denied that the return of the execution, the filing of the bill, and the service of process gave the judgment creditor a lien upon the fund in question which must prevail unless the mortgagees have shown a paramount right to it. Miller v. Sherry, 2 Wall. 249; 2 Barb. Chy. Pr. (2 revised ed.) 157, note 13. The question as to the right claimed by the trustees is conclusively settled against them be Galveston R. R. Co. v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall., 460, and Gilman v. Telegraph Co., 91 U. S. Rep. S. C. 603; 3 Cent. L. I. Both these cases, as regards this point, present exactly the same legal aspect as the case before us. It is unnecessary to reproduce at length what was said in those adjudications.

In this case, upon the default which occurred, the mortgagees had the option to take personal possession of the mortgaged premises or to file a bill, have a receiver appointed, and possession delivered to him. In either case the income would thereafter have been theirs. Until one or the other was done the mortgagor, as Lord Mansfield said in Chinnery v. Black (3 Doug. 391), was "owner to all the world and entitled to all the profit made."

The mortgage could have no retrospective effect as to previous income and earnings. The bill of the trustees does not affect the rights of the parties. It is an attempt to extend the mortgage to what it can not be made to reach. Such a proceeding does not create any new right. It can only enforce those which exist already. The bill of trustees is as ineffectual as if the fund were any other property, real, personal, or mixed, acquired by the mortgage aliunde and never within the scope of the mortgage.

The decree of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause will be remanded with directions to enter a decree in conformity to this opinion.

NOTE. In this case the Bridge Company had due to it rents in the hands of a railroad company at the time the bill of foreclosure was filed. The bill specifically sought to reach these rents; and it was filled before the judgment creditor filed his creditor's bill. The question was as to which had priority of right to these rents. The decision of the supreme court is therefore conclusive upon the point that a pledge of rents and profits can be made available to the mortgagee only upon his "taking possession or by filing a bill, having a receiver appointed and possession delivered to him."

AN ELABORATE opinion has just been rendered by the Supreme Court of New York, declaring that the surrogate can not allow costs to a defeated party in will contests. The practice of allowing costs, the opinion declares, virtually offers a bribe to reckless contestants and their counsel to prevent the settlement of estates, by promoting litigation and engendering strife whenever the interest of the public calls for their speedy adjustment. It might lead to great abuses, and to the injury of widows and orphans and creditors of deceased persons, whom all courts should be sedulous to protect. It would be a hazardous experiment for a wealthy man to attempt to dispose of his estate by his own will if it could be distributed at the mere will of a surrogate, among the counsel of all who choose set up whatever pretense of contest the ingenuity of avarice can deise.

ATTORNEY EMPLOYED TO EXAMINE TITLE -EXTENT OF AUTHORITY-NOTICE.

JOSEPHTHAL v. HEYMAN.

N. Y. Supreme Court, First Department; Special Term, November, 1876.

1. FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE-PAYMENT-ATTORNEY. -An attorney, employed by a person about to make a loan of money," to examine the title" of premises upon which a mortgage is to be made, as security for the loan, is not necessarily the agent of the person employing him, to receive money from the borrower, to pay off prior liens and incumbrances, nor is the lender liable for the misapplication of moneys so received by the attorney.*

2.. SATISFACTION OF LIENS.-The specific employment of an attorney to examine a title does not in itself include the duty or obligation to satisfy liens; it is discharged by truly ascertaining and reporting them. Graves v. Mumford, 26 Barb. 94, examined and distinguished.

3. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO THE PRINCIPAL of liens discovered by his attorney and its effect.t

TRIAL by the court.

The action was brought by Moritz Josephthal and Louis Josephthal, against Felix H. Heyman and another, to foreclose a mortgage on real estate.

The defendant, Felix H. Heyman, applied to one Patzel, a broker, for a loan of $12,000, to be secured by a first mortgage on "defendant's" real property. Patzel called on Moritz and Louis Josephthal, the plaintiffs, and solicited the loan from them. Plaintiffs looked at the premises, and accepted them as good security, and informed Patzel that Adolph Levinger was their attorney to "examine the title." Patzel referred the defendant to Levinger, with whom he left the title papers. The defendant executed a bond and mortgage to secure the payment of $12,000, and left the same with Levinger. The plaintiffs, on receiving the bond, sent or delivered to Levinger two checks, for $6,000 each, payable to the order of the defendant; one check drawn by the plaintiff, M. Josephthal, and the other by the plaintiffs jointly;-the checks being so drawn to indicate to the plaintiffs, between themselves, separate interests in the loan. Levinger handed both checks to the defendant, who, retaining one, indorsed and delivered back to Levinger the other, with his own check for $1,245, to pay and satisfy an existing prior mortgage on the premises for $7,000 and interest, held and owned by another person. Levinger said to defendant, "that he was not allowed to give the money until the first mortgage was paid off, and that he was to retain the money to pay off the first mortgage." He said this when he handed the checks to defendant, whereupon the defendant indorsed and re-delivered to Levinger the $6,000 check, making up the deficiency with his own check. Levinger appropriated to his own use the amount of the two checks handed to him by defendant, and did not pay the first mortgage, which is still outstanding. Levinger has absconded. This action is brought for a foreclosure of the $12,000 mortgage.

* Compare Heyman v. Beringer, 1 Abbott's New Cases, p. 315. † Notes, as to constructive notice to a party of incumbrances through his attorney. Notice to attorneys or law agents employed in making purchases, affects their clients. Griffith v. Griffith, 9 Paige, 315; Perkins v. Bradley, 1 Hare, 219; Fuller v. Brunett, 2 Id. 394. But notice, to affect the principal, must be in the same transaction. Warrick v. Warrick, 3 Atk. 294. Therefore, if an attorney be employed to look over a title, and by some other transaction, foreign to the business in hand, have notice, this shall not affect the principal. Lowther v. Carlton, 2 Atk. 242; Mountford v. Scott, 1 Turn. & R. 280; Toulmin v. Steere, 3 Meriv. 210.