school district. Wilson v. School District No. 2, 17 Kas., cited. Opinion by HORTON, C. J.-State v. Conrad.

INSUFFICIENCY OF RECORD -MODE OF COMPUTING PRESENT VALUE OF DEBT PAYABLE AT FUTURE TIME.-1. Where the record fails to contain the motion for a new trial, this court can not say whether there was error in -overruling it, nor pass upon questions in the admission of testimony or the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of verdict. Ferguson v. Graves, 12 Kas. 39; Nesbit v. Hines, 17 Kas. 2. The present worth of a debt payable at a future time is ascertained by dividing the debt by the amount of $1.00 for the given rate and time, and the quotient is the present worth. Opinion by BREWER, J.Hover v. Cockins.

INSURANCE POLICY - CONSTRUCTION OF CONFLICTING CLAUSES.-An insurance policy provided in writing for insuring Bernstein's "stock of boots and shoes, dry goods, -drugs, liquors and such other goods as are usually kept for sale in a country store," and provided in printing that gunpowder, saltpetre, phosphorus, petroleum, naptha, benzine, benzole or benzine varnish, are positively prohib ited from being deposited, stored or kept in any building insured, or containing any property insured by this policy unless by special consent, in writing indorsed on this policy, naming each article specially, otherwise, the insurance shall be void;" and accompanying the policy, and a part of it, is the application of assured, in the body of which he obtains in writing, special permission to keep one of the prohibited articles, in the following words, to wit: "Permission given to keep coal oil not to exceed three barrels at any one time;" held, that the court should not construe the written and printed clauses in said policy so as to make them conflict with each other if such a construction can be avoided; but, on the contrary, should construe them so as to make them harmonize if such a construction is possible, and should construe them so as to give to each and all their terms full force and operation; and, in construing them, should also take into consideration the rest of the instrument, the acts of the parties, and all the surrounding circumstances, for the purpose of arriving at the real intention of the parties; for the real intention of the parties is the great end and object in the construction of all instruments; and, therefore, held, that said insurance policy should be read substantially as follows: The insurance company insures Bernstein's "stock of boots and shoes, dry goods, drugs, liquors, and such other goods, (including gunpowder, saltpetre, phosphorus, petroleum, naptha, benzine, benzole or benzine varnish) as (the same) are usually kept for sale in a country store," provided, however, that, as to "gunpowder, saltpetre, phosphorus, petroleum, naptha, benzine, benzole or benzine varnish, (said insurance does not extend, except by the "special consent" of the company "in writing endorsed on this policy-naming each article specially," and said articles) are positively prohibited from being deposited, stored or kept in any building insured or containing property insured by this policy, unless by special consent (of the company) in writing endorsed on this policy,-naming each article specially," and, further, held, that the assured could not keep gunpowder in any shape or quantity in his store, along with his other goods, without the consent of the insurance company in writing, naming such article specially, without violating the terms of his policy. Opinion by VALENTINE, J.-Cobb v. Ins. Co. of North America.

LICENSE MONIES-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES-TITLE -OF STATUTES.-1. Monies received for license of the sale of malt, spirituous and vinous liquors, in cities of the second class, belong to the school fund of the county, and should be paid over to the treasurer of the proper county. When such monies are not paid voluntarily, the treasurer may maintain an action in his own name to recover the same. 2. In the construction of statutes, the earliest continues in force, unless the two are clearly inconsistent

with and repugnant to each other. 3. The object of the constitutional provision that, "no bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title," is to prevent surreptitious legislation by incorporating into a bill obnoxious provisions, which have no connection with the general object of the bill, and of which the title gives no indication. Judgment reversed. Opinion by MAXWELL, J.-White v. City of Lincoln.

RELEASE OF SURETY BY CASHIER.-A cashier of a bank, by virtue of his office, is not authorized to release a surety upon a note or bill belonging to the bank, without pay. ment. The mere fact that a bank holds other security for the payment of the note, to which it might resort, is no ground for the release of a surety. Statements made by a cashier, at casual interviews away from the bank, as to payments having been made upon its securities, are not binding upon the bank. If the cashier, on inquiry by a surety, who is not an officer of the bank, state that the note upon which he is surety, has been paid by the principal, the bank is estopped from denying the truth of such statement, when to do so would entail a loss upon the surety, which he would have guarded against had it not been made; contra if he is an officer. And when a firm is surety, and one of its members is also a member of the board of directors of the bank, all the members of such firm are affected with the notice, which the one who is director is presumed to have. Judgment reversed. Opinion by LAKE, C. J.-Merchant's Bank v. Rudolph et al.

RESCISSION OF SALE ON GROUND OF FRAUD.-Where a seller of personal property, who honestly believed that a mortgage, which he knew had existed against it, had been cancelled or suffered to lapse, represents to the purchaser, that it is free from incumbrance, but it turns out that he was mistaken; this will not entitle the purchaser to rescind the contract, when he has used the property for several months without molestation, especially if the seller is ready and able to remove the incumbrance at once, or to give ample indemnity against loss. When the purchaser of a large quantity of hotel furniture, claims the right to rescind the contract and force the property back upon the seller, on the ground of fraud in the sale, it is proper, on cross-examination, to ask him whether his landlord had not terminated his lease and taken possession of the house about the time of the attempted rescission. If a party had derived a material advantage from a partial performance of a contract, he can not hold such advantage and rescind the contract, but must seek his remedy in damages. Judg. ment reversed. Opinion by LAKE, C. J.-Clark et al v. Tennant.

WITNESS FEES WHERE WITNESS ATTENDS IN Two CAUSES-APPEAL-PRACTICE.-1. A party is entitled to tax full fees for his witnesses in a court of record, though the same persons may have attended as witnesses for another party in another cause at the same term. 2. An appeal from an order taxing the costs does not lie after judgment; but exceptions to such order will be reviewed on appeal from the judgment. Opinion by COLE, J.-McHugh v. C. & N. W. R. R.

ORDER CONTINUING CAUSE NOT APPEALABLE.-1. An order continuing a cause is not appealable. 2. After an amendment of the complaint had been allowed on plaintiffs' motion, the court, on defendant's motion and affidavit of surprise, made an order of continuance, with leave given plaintiffs to file and serve an amended complaint. Held, on plaintiffs appeal, that the order was essentially one for a continuance; the appeal was dismissed. Opinion by COLE, J.-Bassett v. Jenkins.

NEGLIGENCE IN CONSTRUCTION OF STREET.-When a city constructs a street in a negligent and unskillful manner (as without proper culverts or drains), so as to prevent

the water of a neighboring river, in times of high water, from passing in their natural course into another river, and thus causes land to be overflowed and injured, it is liable in damages to the owner of the land. Alexander v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 64; Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Id. 223, and Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 Id. 646, distinguished. Opinion by COLE, J.-Spelman v. City of Portage.

VILLAGE PLAT NOT RECORDED-EVIDENCE TO IDENTIFY LAND-PAROL EVIDENCE.-1. Although a village plat not acknowledged so as to be entitled to record does not operate as a grant to the public of lands therein designated as streets, yet it may be resorted to for the purpose of identifying land conveyed by reference to it. 2. A deed conveys certain blocks according to a certain plat, not entitled to record, and such blocks are described on the plat as containing a certain area, and the lots therein as having certain dimensions; but the original stakes at the corners of the blocks are still standing or can be established. Held, that the positions of such stakes must govern in ascertaining the true boundaries of the lands conveyed; and it was not error to exclude oral evidence that, to obtain the area and dimensions named, the lines of such blocks must be run so as to include in each one-half of a strip marked as a street. Opinion by COLE, J.-Fleischfresser v. Schmidt. WHEN EQUITY WILL NOT ANNUL A JUDGMENT-EVIDENCE OF JURISDICTION OF COURT-DECLARATIONS OF DECEASED DEBTOR.-1. Equity will not annul a judgment or discharge from the lien thereof land of which the debtor died seized, on the ground that the execution issued thereon is without a seal, and is for a somewhat larger sum than that named in the judgment; nor on the ground that the judgment-creditor knew of the debtor's death, and failed to file any claim against his estate, and that the administrator has sold said land by order of the court. 2. Where the record of an action shows a written admission, by a defendant, of service upon him of a copy of the summons and complaint therein, this is sufficient evidence that the court had acquired jurisdiction. Whether correct practice requires any other proof of service, is not here determined. 3. In an action by an administrator to prevent the enforcement of a judgment against his intestate, evidence of declarations of the debtor in his life-time as to payment of the judgment, is inadmissible. Opinion by COLE, J.-Jilsun, Admr., v. Stebbins.

Judges.

RAILROAD NEGLIGENCE CATTLE GUARD FENCELEASE.-1. In an action against a railroad company for injuries resulting from a defective cattle guard, evidence that another cattle guard, constructed like the one in controversy, had proved sufficient was properly rejected. 2. While it was the duty of the injured party to use all reasonable care to protect his property, he would not be allowed to go upon the railway to repair the cattle guard, or required to fence the road. 3. A railway company is required to construct cattle guards wherever its track enters or leaves any improved land, and is liable for any injuries resulting from a failure to construct them; and this duty and liability attach equally to its lessee. Opinion by DAY, J.-Downing v. C. R. I. & P. R. R.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -EXCAVATIONS IN STREETS -MEASURE of Damages.-1. If a person, for his private advantage, makes an excavation in a street, and fails to surround it by suitable barriefs, he is liable for any injuries resulting from such failure. 2. That the barriers are erected under the direction of the mayor of the city, or with his approval, will not release the party erecting them from liability, the mayor not being authorized to determine in advance what precautionary measures are necessary for the protection of the public. 3. If the injured party shall first recover from the city, the person causing the injury appearing in the action and defending, the measure of damages in an action against him by the city is the amount of the judgment with interest and taxable costs. Unless

an appeal from the judgment shall have been taken by the city at his instance, he is not liable for the costs thereof. Opinion by ADAMS, J.-City of Ottumwa v. Parks.

RAILROAD Negligence-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEE - INSTRUCTION - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW— JURY FEES.-1. Where a brakeman attempted to pick a coupling pin from the track as a train was slowly backing towards him, having first signalled the fireman, who was in charge of the locomotive, to stop; and was injured by the failure of the fireman to obey the signal, he was held to be free from contributory negligence depriving him of the right to recover. 2. An instruction to the effect that plaintiff was entitled to recover for the injury if he did not by his own carelessness contribute thereto, was held to be correct. 3. A fact may be stated hypothetically in an instruction, the question of its existence being left to the consideration of the jury. 4. It does not constitute negligence for an employee of a railroad company to step on. the track, in the course of duty, in the way of a train backing down toward him, if he has reason to believe the train will be stopped before reaching him. 5. Chapter 24, Laws of 1874, which authorizes jury fees to be taxed as a part of the costs of a case, is not in conflict with the Constitution. Following, Adae v. Zangs, 41 Iowa, 536.-Steele v. Central R. R. Co.

NOTES.

A MISNOMER.-To call those two big volumes which are chained to the judges' table in the United States Court room at St. Louis "the Statutes at Large."

IN a former number of this journal, referring to the Cabinet of President Hayes, we called attention to the fact that all the members were lawyers except Mr. Schurz. Mr. Hayes did even better than we then gave him credit for. Mr. Schurz is himself a lawyer. He formerly practiced

law in Wisconsin, and was a partner of Byron Payne, afterwards a judge of the Supreme Court of that state.

CURRAN was once addressing a jury, when the judge, who was thought to be antagonistic to his client, intimated his dissent from the arguments advanced by a shake of his head. "I see, gentlemen," said Curran, "I see the motion of his lordship's head. Persons unacquainted with his lordship would be apt to think this implied a difference of opinion; but be assured, gentlemen, this is not the case. When you know his lordship as well as I do, it will be unnecessary to tell you that when he shakes his head there really is nothing in it."

ANOTHER anecdote of Senator Davis of Illinois, is told in this manner: Once at Indianapolis, which was within his circuit, while he was Justice of the Supreme Court, a lawyer named Ketchum was ready when his case was called, but his opponent was absent, and had sent word that he couldn't arrive for an hour or two. Ketchum insisted on proceeding at once. The judge remonstrated in favor of the absent lawyer, but to no purpose. "Well," said he, finally, "if you insist upon going on, Mr. Ketchum, you have, of course, the technical right to do so; but if I were you, I wouldn't urge the matter. Over at Springfield, the other day, there was just such a case; the lawyer would insist upon going on with the trial; and so I had to look after the interest of the other party-and do you know, curiously enough, Mr. Ketchum, we beat him!" Mr. Ketchum concluded to wait.

A PARLIAMENTARY return of the capital convictions, in the Dominion of Canada, showing the names of convicts, the nature of the crime, the action of the executive, and the date of such action, has just been published. It dates from July 1, 1867, to December 31, 1876. The capital convictions are 114 in number, for the following offenses: Murder, 77; rape, 24; wounding or stabbing with intent, 4; burglary, 3; levying war, 1; piracy and murder, 4; attempt to murder, 1. Total, 114. The disposition of the cases has been as follows: Murder-executed, 32; commuted to imprisonment for life, 36; do, 15 years, 1; do, 14 years, 3; do, 10 years, 2; do, 2 years, with banishment, 1; pardoned, 2. Total, 77. Rape: Commuted to imprisonment for life, 15; do, 14 years, 2; do, 10 years, 1; do, 7 years, 3; do, 5 years, 2; do, 6 months, 1. Total, 24. Wounding with intent: Commuted to 15 years' imprisonment, 1; do, 14 years, 1; do, 5 years, 1; do, life, 1. Total, 4. Burglary: Commuted to 5 years' imprisonment, 4. Attempt to poison: Commuted to imprisonment for life, 1. Levying war: Commuted to imprisonment for 20 years, 1.

SAINT LOUIS, APRIL 20, 1877.

CURRENT TOPICS.

"SOMETHING too much of this, good Mother." We know that this is what our readers at large say when they see the space which we are devoting to Missouri statutes. Brethren, have patience. We formed the rash design of publishing in this journal the statutes at large of Missouri, at a time when it took two or three weeks to pass a single bill. But now that they are being ground out at the rate of a dozen or so a day, it makes us groan inwardly. But we have got our foot in it, and can not turn back. 66 Returning were as tedious as go o'er." We have also rashly undertaken to publish the statutes at large of Illinois, and we propose to go through, if we have to enlarge the JOURNAL to do it.

OWING, we presume, to the fact that the time of the last session of Congress was entirely taken up with the presidential contest, Congress failed to make the necessary appropriation to meet the expenses of the department of justice, and the federal courts consequently find themselves crippled for want of funds. In the United States Circuit Court at St. Louis the juries were discharged for this reason, leaving many jury cases to go over to next term; and the same thing will happen, we understand, at Jefferson City. In the supreme court, on Monday, the chief justice announced the following order: "On account of the insufficiency of the appropriation by Congress for printing the records, it is apparent that we shall not be able to continue the hearing of causes at the present term later than the 15th or 20th of May. We shall, therefore, close this term on May 7th, and thus enable the justices to give attention to their business upon the circuits, which could not be done in many of the districts if we continued later. An announcement will be made hereafter of the time when the call-docket will be stopped."

THE CONSTITUTION OF MISSOURI, article 6, § 12, provides that" appeals shall be from the decisions of the St. Louis Court of Appeals to the supreme court, and writs of error may issue from the supreme court to said court in the following cases only: In all cases where the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of two thousand dollars; in cases involving the construction of the Constitution of the United States or of this state; in cases where the validity of a treaty or statute of, or authority exercised under, the United States is drawn in question; in cases involving the construction of the revenue laws of this state; in cases involving title to real estate; in cases where a county or other political sub-diVol. 4.-No. 16.

and in all cases of felony." Such are the provisions of the organic law, which the legislature in its inscrutable wisdom has seen fit to repeal by the following provision:* "Any person aggrieved by any final judgment or decision of any circuit court, or the St. Louis Court of Appeals, may make his appeal to the supreme court in any civil case." It has long been conceded that no legislature, in giving expression to "the sovereign will of the people," is required to couch its enactments in grammatic language, or so that men of ordinary sense could understand them. But we did not know that the body of statesmen convened at Jefferson City, wise and learned as it is, possesses the power of repealing a provision of the constitution of the state. What is worse, this particular bill must have passed through the judiciary committee of each house-bodies composed of lawyers. Such lawyers could be spared, both from the legislature and from the bar.

WHEN the Brooklyn theatre burned, considerable stir was created in legislative and municipal councils, with the view of devising methods to prevent the loss of life attendant upon the burning of public buildings. But the excitement soon died out, and the matter has been suffered to drop, only to be revived by the sickening horrors of the burning of the Southern Hotel at St. Louis. A number of bills have been introduced in the Missouri legislature, all of them more or less imperfect -designed to remedy the evil. One of them simply stations a watchman on each floor of large hotels, and requires him to alarm the guests on the discovery of a fire. Another one provides that "every hotel or public inn of more than two stories in height in this state, and of more than fifty rooms, shall be so constructed as to permit of easy egress from the rooms of different stories to the first or ground floor." Of course. But there is not a hotelowner in the state who will not claim that his hotel is so constructed. It proceeds: "There shall be not less than two main stairways leading up from each story." But the Southern Hotel had three stairways leading up from the ground floor, and four from those above it. It continues: "In all hotels or public inns where elevators, steam engines and furnaces are used, there shall be kept at least one watchman on duty at all hours of the night, in the basement or apartment in which the engine and furnaces are situated.” Well, this is good, as far as it goes; but suppose the watchman is caught asleep, where is the provision punishing him? Again: "There shall be at least one night clerk or watchman on duty in the office at all hours of the night, who shall immediately on the alarm of fire being given notify all the guests and persons in said hotel or inn." And so there is in every hotel of any size, and his duty is undoubtedly to alarm the guests in case of fire. But why not provide for his punishment in case he fails in this duty? "There shall be an * See the act in full, ante n. 306.

electric fire alarm communicating from the general office with every sleeping room or other apartment in such building, which shall be sounded by the clerk or night watchmen immediately upon the discovery of fire." This is good; but again no punishment is prescribed for neglect to sound the alarm. "All hotels or inns now in use shall be conformed to this law as far as practicable." This is ridiculous. "As far as practicable" spoils everything which precedes it; because every parsimonious publican can say that it was not " practicable" for him to conform to the law. The last section is as follows: "Any proprietor, lessee or keeper of any such hotel or public inn, who shall fail to comply with the provisions of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor; and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not less than six nor more than twelve months, or by a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment." This is a wholly unnecessary waste of words. After allowing hotel proprietors to creep out under the plea of practicability, what is the use in trying to punish them? Besides, no punishment is denounced against clerks and watchmen who fail to do what the law requires of them.

A BILL introduced by Mr. Martin is much better. It extends to "every manufacturing establishment, public inn, hospital, school, or other building in which persons are confined, located or congregated, of more than two stories in height." It provides for stairways to permit of easy egress, and efficient fire-proof escapes.". Such buildings are also required to be equipped with wirerope ladders of certain dimensions, and with a fire alarm bell, "to weigh not less than twenty pounds," and to be sounded by the watchman or other person on duty upon the first discovery of fire.

Another section provides for a watchman in the basement or engine room, "whose duty it shall be, in case of fire or explosion, to immediately ring the fire alarm bell situated on said floor." Section 7 provides for an inspection every six months by the mayor or other chief officer of the incorporated town, and it is made his duty "to report any delinquent to the court having criminal jurisdiction in such city," and the court is required to give the act in special charge to the grand jury. In the imperfect report of this act which we find in the daily papers, we do not observe any provision for the punishment of watchmen who fail to do their duty, although delinquent or recusant proprietors are punishable by fine and imprisonment. It would seem wise to add a clause that a printed copy of the act should be kept posted in every room of the hotels subject to it. We hope the bill will pass. It is probably the best matured measure that we are entitled to expect from the legislature on the eve of adjournment. As soon as it becomes a law, we hope the mayor of St. Louis will devote his attention to our numerous public fire-traps, among which we

especially point out the Mercantile Library Hall and Armory Hall. Neither of these halls has any adequate means of egress in case of fire or panic. The latter will probably seat 2,000 people, and the only means of egress is down a winding stairway about six feet wide, to a door which opens inward from the street. During Col. Ingersoll's last lecture, if any drunken vagabond had cried " "fire! that stairway would have become a pit which would have been filled from bottom to top with the bodies of men and women, as Milhaud's cavalry filled up the sunken road of Ohain. That such a building was erected, was a crime. That it should be permitted to be kept open for public gatherings, is a reproach to our laws.

WHAT, at one time, threatened to cause a serious conflict of jurisdiction between a state supreme court on the one hand, and the federal supreme court and one of the inferior federal courts on the other, by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Doyle v. The Continental Ins. Co. of New York, has been withdrawn. A statute of Wisconsin requires all foreign insurance companies doing business in that state to first take out a license, and, as a considertion upon which such license is granted, the insurance company is required to sign an agreement not to remove any suits that may be brought against it, under the penalty of having its license revoked. The Home Insurance Co. of New York, which had obtained a license under this statute, petitioned for a removal of a suit which had been instituted against it in a state court. The state supreme court, in Morse v. Insurance Co., 30 Wis. 406, held that the agreement was a valid relinquishment of the right of removal, and allowed the action in the state court to proceed to judgment against the company as if no transfer had been made. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, reversed the judgment of the state court upon the ground that the statute was unconstitutional; as the constitution of the United States secures to citizens of a state other than that in which a suit is brought, an absolute right to remove their cases into the federal courts upon compliance with the terms of the act of 1789; that, although an individual may lawfully omit to exercise his right to transfer a particular case from the state courts to the federal courts, and may do this as often as he thinks fit in each recurring case, he can not bind himself in advance by an agreement which may be specifically enforced thus to forfeit his right; upon this principle, that every man is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country to invoke the protection which all the laws and all the courts may afford him, and that he can not barter away his life, his freedom, or his constitutional rights. The state supreme court yielded to the decision of the federal court, but issued a mandamus requiring the secretary of state to cancel the license granted to the company, for the violation by it of the agreement. "It was within the appellate jurisdiction of the federal court,"

said Chief Justice Ryan, "to refuse effect to the agreement as ousting the jurisdiction of the federal courts; but it is not within its jurisdiction to hold foreign insurance companies entitled to license without the agreement when made, as repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States; it can not excuse the agreement as a condition precedent to the license under the state statute.

* * In authorizing voluntary licenses with absolute right to annex any condition to them, the state may exact agreements morally, although not legally, binding on the licensees. The statute is indeed inoperative to give validity to the agreement ousting the jurisdiction of the federal courts. So the Supreme Court of the United States has decided. But it is operative to prescribe the conditions on which the state, in the exercise of its sovereign authority, sees fit to license foreign corporations within it. This is for this court, not that, to determine. No foreign insurance company need come here under the agreement; coming, every foreign insurance company violating the agreement is guilty of a moral fraud upon the state." Meanwhile an inferior federal court had issued an injunction enjoining the secretary of state from cancelling the license. In noticing this the learned chief justice expressed himself in somewhat stong language: "And if any one to be found within the state should molest any officer of the state for obeying the process of this court in the administration of the state government, and the fact be properly brought before us, we think we should be able to afford ample and summary remedy. We regard this matter as a grave attempt to baffle state authority in the administration of state affairs, in a way to be a temptation for the use of a somewhat unjudicial adjective, and we are thoroughly in earnest, as is our duty under our oaths, to enforce state authority, in state affairs, over state officers, and on foreign corporations who come here ex gratia of state law and then set the law at defiance. We mean to suffer no trifling here."

BUT the case of the Home Insurance Company did not undertake to decide what were the powers of the State of Wisconsin in revoking a license previously granted to an insurance company; and this was precisely the question which threatened to bring about an unfortunate conflict of jurisdiction. The lower federal court, in the case just decided, Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., had issued an injunction preventing the secretary of state from revoking the license to the company; but now, upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reverses the action of the lower court. The supreme court reiterate the opinion expressed in Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, as to the invalidity of an agreement not to remove a case to the federal courts, but hold that a state may impose upon a foreign corporation, as a condition of coming into, or doing business within, its territory, any terms, conditions and restrictions it may think proper, that are not repugnant to the constitution or laws

of the United States, citing Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; La Fayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 494. The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by a state is always revocable. Rector v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; People v. Roper, N. Y. 629; People v. Commissioners, 47 N. Y. 50. The power to revoke can only be restrained, if at all, by an explicit contract upon good consideraation to that effect. Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454. "The argument," says Mr. Justice Hunt, who delivered the opinion of the court, " that the rovocation in question is made for an unconstitutional reason, can not be sustained. The suggestion confounds an act with an emotion or mental proceeding, which is the subject of inquiry in determining the validity of a statute. An unconstitutional reason or intention is an impractical suggestion which can not be applied to the affairs of life. If the act done by the state is legal, is not in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, it is quite out of the power of any court to inquire what was the intention of those who enacted the law. In all the cases where the litigation of a state has been declared void, such legislation has been based upon an act or a fact which was itself illegal. Thus, in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, a tax was imposed and collected upon passengers in railroad and stage companies. In Almy v. State of California, 24 How. 169, a stamp duty was imposed by the legislature upon bills of lading for gold or silver transported from that state to any port or place out of the state. In Brown v. The State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, a license, at an expense of $50, was required before an importer of goods coulds sell the same by the bale, package or barrel. In Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 205, 3 Cent. L. J. 238, the statute required the master to give a bond of $300 for each passenger, conditioned that he should not become a public charge within four years, or to pay the sum of $1.50. In the passenger's case (7 How. 572) the requirement was of a like character. In all these cases it was the act or fact complained of that was the subject of judicial inquiry, and upon the act was the judgment pronounced. It is said that we thus indirectly sanction what we ncodemn when presented directly, to wit: That we enable the State of Wisconsin to enforce an agreement to abstain from the federal courts. This is an "inexact statement." The effect of our decision in this respect is that the state may compel the foreign company to abstain from the federal courts or to cease to do business in the state. It gives the company the option. This is justifiable, because the complainant has no constitutional right to do business in that state; that state has authority at any time to declare that it shall not transact business there. This is the whole point of the case, and without reference to the justice, the prejudice, or the wrong that is alleged to exist, must determine the question. No right of the complainant under