This right, indeed, is the right of the State to do that which Cicero (p), with so much eloquent reason, truly maintained was the innate right of every individual: it is the Right of Self-Defence, which is as lawfully exercised in preventing as in repelling attack (9).

How anxiously this right, "founded so much on common "sense and obvious reasoning," was asserted and cherished by the Greeks, is well known to all readers of Thucydides and Xenophon, and above all of Demosthenes, whose eloquence was never more "resistless" (r) than when exerted

Ancillon über den Geist der Staatsverf. 320 u. s. w.

Klinkhammer's Disp. Hist. Pol. de Bello propter Success. Regni Hispan., &c. (1829, Amstelodami), pp. 52–66.

De Gardens, Traité complet de Dipl. t. i. p. 257.

Foreign Quarterly Review, vol. viii. (1831), vol. xiii. (1834). Mackintosh's second Review of Burke's Letter on a Regicide Peace. Ortolan, vol. ii., Du Domaine international (tit. iii., De l'Equilibre politique), contains, among other passages worthy of attentive perusal, an elaborate review of the projects of Henry IV. and Sully to found a République très-chrestienne, and thereby maintain a perpetual European equilibrium—an idea which M. Ortolan thinks pervaded the minds of the framers of the Treaty of Westphalia.-Gentz, Ausgewählte Schriften, iv. i. Fragmente aus der neuesten Geschichte des politischen Gleichgewichts.

Fénelon, Euvres de, t. iii. p. 361, ed. 1835: Examen de la Conscience sur les Devoirs de la Royauté, in which work, written for the instruction of the Duke of Burgundy, Mr. Wheaton remarks (Hist. p. 82) that the principles of Intervention to maintain the balance of power are laid down with accuracy and moderation.

Mably, vol. ii. pp. 88, 107, 212.

(p) Pro Milone.

(9) "Ainsi quand un Etat voisin est injustement attaqué par un ennemi puissant, qui menace de l'opprimer, il n'est pas douteux que vous ne deviez le faire. N'objectez point qu'il n'est pas permis à un souverain d'exposer la vie de ses soldats pour le salut d'un étranger, avec qui il n'aura contracté aucune alliance défensive, il peut lui-même se trouver dans le cas d'avoir besoin de secours; et, par conséquent, mettre en vigueur cet esprit d'assistance mutuelle, c'est travailler au salut de sa propre nation."— Vattel, l. ii. c. 1–4.

(r)

"Whose resistless eloquence Shook the arsenal, and fulmin'd over Greece

To Macedon and Artaxerxes' throne."

Milton, Par. Reg. iv. 268-271.

for the purpose of rousing his countrymen to adopt and act upon this principle (s).

In the history of Rome the opportunities for the development of this principle were fewer; but the pages of Livy and Polybius have recorded some remarkable instances of its operation. The reflection of the latter historian upon the conduct of Hiero, King of Syracuse, who, though an ally of Rome, sent aid to Carthage during the war of the Auxiliaries, may claim a place even in a modern work upon International Law. Hiero esteemed it necessary, Polybius tells us, "both "in order to retain his dominions in Sicily, and to preserve "the Roman friendship, that Carthage should be safe; lest "by its fall the remaining Power should be able, without let "or hindrance, to execute every purpose and undertaking. "And here he acted with great wisdom and prudence, for "that is never on any account to be overlooked; nor ought "such a force ever to be thrown into one hand, as to incapa"citate the neighbouring States from defending their rights "against it."

Most justly does Mr. Hume remark upon this passage, "Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express "terms" (t).

It was the natural tendency of the Feudal System, introduced into Europe after the fall of Rome, to restrain each State within its boundaries (u); and it may be said, that from the reign of Charlemagne to the invasion of Italy by

(8) Among the passages, see κατὰ Φιλ. Γ. ίε: Τοὺς ἄλλους ἤδη παρα καλῶμεν, καὶ τοῦς ταῦτα διδάξοντας ἐκπέμπωμεν πρέσβεις πανταχοί, εἰς Πελοπόννησον, εἰς Ρόδον, εἰς Χίον, ὡς βασιλέα λέγω-οὐ δὲ γὰρ τῶν ἐκείνῳ συμφερόντων ἀφέστηκε τὸ μὴ τοῦτον ἐᾶσαι πάντα καταστρέ ψασθαιῖν ἐὰν μὲν πείσητε, κοινωνοὺς ἔχητε καὶ τῶν κινδύνων καὶ τῶν ἀναλωμάτων, κ.τ.λ.

(t) Polybius, 1. i. c. 83: Τότε δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο πεπεισμένος συμφέρειν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δυναστείαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων φιλίαν τὸ σώζεσθαι Καρχηδονίους, ἵνα μὴ παντάπασιν ἐξῇ τὸ προτεθὲν ἀκονιτὶ συντελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἰσχύουσιν, πάνυ φρονίμως καὶ νουνεχῶς λογιζόμενος, κ.τ.λ. Hume's Essays, vol. ii. p. 323, Essay vii. On the Balance of Power.

(u) See Koch, Tableau des Révolutions, t. i. pp. 314-15, &c.

Charles VIII. of France, towards the close of the fifteenth century, the state of the civilized world was not such as to call into any general operation this principle of International Law (r). To repel this invasion, the ingenious and refined Italians strove to induce the European Powers to adopt that policy of preventing the undue aggrandisement of any one Power, by which they had for some time maintained the equilibrium of the petty States of their own Peninsula. During the century which followed (y), and from the time that the liberties of the German Protestants were secured, under the guarantee of France and Sweden, by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, this principle of International Law has been rooted in the usage and practice of the whole civilized world. The preservation of the Balance of Power has been the professed object of all, and the real end of most of what may be called the Cardinal Treaties. The recital and analysis of the events which led to them belong to the history of the progress, rather than to a treatise on the principles, of International Jurisprudence. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to notice briefly those Treaties in which this feature is most conspicuous.

CCCCIII. In the year 1519 (z), enormous territorial possessions rendered the Emperor Charles V. more powerful than any sovereign who had existed in Christendom since the reign of Charlemagne; a natural apprehension was felt by the other States of Europe, which the personal character of Charles was well calculated to foment (a). No better occasion could arise for the practical application of that refined and sagacious policy, which had so lately crossed the Alps. France took upon herself the task of adjusting the equilibrium of power in Europe; Francis I. actually concluded for this object a Treaty of Alliance with the Turks, the first Treaty contracted by an European Sovereign, and by which the Porte

(x) Koch, as to English conquests in France, t. i. P. 314.

(y) Wheaton's Hist. p. 81.

(z) Koch, i. 317.

(a) Ib. i. 318.

VOL. I.

PP

may be said to have been introduced into the political system of the West, and to have become a consenting party to a branch of positive International Law. The next step taken by France was to constitute herself protectress of the minor German States; and in the intensity of her zeal to effect her object, she availed herself of the tremendous weapon which the Religious war of the Reformation offered to her grasp. The all-important succour which Queen Elizabeth of England afforded to the revolted Netherlands was a natural consequence both of the political and religious condition of her kingdom (b).

But the effects which this maxim of preserving the liberty of all States by preventing the undue aggrandisement of one produced upon the policy of France, are such as must have baffled all previous calculation. Then was unfolded that remarkable page of history, in which Roman Catholic France was seen, under the governments of Richelieu and Mazarin, repressing with one hand, and that a hand of iron, the Calvinistic subjects of her own land; while with the other she supported the Protestants of Germany in their long and successful opposition to the aggressions of the Imperial power.

To preserve the Balance of Power was the real object of the terrible and desolating war of the Thirty Years. The creation of the Federal System of the Germanic Empire, and the recognition of the two new independent States— the United Netherlands, and the Swiss Cantons-guaranteed by France and Sweden in the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) and the Pyrenees (1659), were intended and supposed to form an effectual barrier to the undue preponderance of Austria, and to have secured the equilibrium, and thereby the peace of Europe.

The independence and liberties thus secured to the States of Southern Europe were, about the same time, guaranteed, by the Treaties of Copenhagen (1658), and Oliva (1660), to

(b) Sully's memorable proposition to Queen Elizabeth, Koch, i. 519.

the States of Northern Europe (c), which composed, in some sort, a distinct system.

The equilibrium of power in the North, which had been endangered by the ambition of Sweden, was adjusted by the Treaties between Sweden, Denmark, Poland, and the Electorate of Brandenburg, under the guaranteeship of Austria, France, England, and the United Provinces.

Before the close of the century in which these Treaties were made, the aggrandisement and ambition of France united against her the same Powers which had formerly, for like causes existing elsewhere, leagued themselves with her; aud to these Powers were now added Great Britain and the United Provinces.

The principal object of the Treaties of Utrecht (1713), Rastadt and Baden (1714), was to secure Europe against the universal dominion of France.

By the fundamental articles of these Treaties, the second great landmark of modern history, it was declared that the kingdoms of France and Spain should never be united under one sceptre; and that the Spanish Netherlands should be transferred to the House of Austria, to which Milan and Naples, with less reason, were also assigned (d).

The avowed object of the memorable wars which preceded

(c) Bynkershoek considers this forcible pacification of the North to have been an infringement of International Law: "Ut iniquum est" (he says)" principem invitum ad bellum cogere, ita et ad pacem. Cum tamen Ordines Generales sibi a Francis metuerent, et Franciæ quoque magnitudo liminibus Anglicis videretur officere, Angliæ et Sueciæ reges, itemque Ordines Generales, 23 Jan. 1668 iniverunt fœdus, quo inter alia cautum est, ut Hispani, quos inter et Francos bellum erat, quasdam conditiones, illo foedere præscriptas, tenerentur accipere, et, iis acceptis, si Francia Rex pergeret regi Hispaniæ bellum facere, se armis intercessuros, coactis sic ad pacem Franciæ et Hispaniæ regibus. Rursus, cum publice non expediret Sueciæ regem etiam Daniam habere, Sueciæ regem cum Dano pacem facere coëgerunt Franci, Angli et Ordines Generales 21 Mai. 1659, erepto sic Daniæ rege mediis ex faucibus Orci, in quas se præcipitaverat, vicino potentiore in se concitato. His injuriis prætexitur studium conservandæ pacis," &c.—Quæst. Jur. Pub. 1. i. c. xxv. s. 10.

(d) Koch, ii. 7, 27.