The violation of rights stricti juris may be redressed by forcible means, by the operation of war, which in the community of nations answers to the act of the Judicial and Executive Power in the community of individuals. But the departure from the usage of Comity cannot be legally redressed by such means. The remedy, where expostulation has failed, must be a corresponding reciprocity of practice on the part of the nations whose subjects are so treated. "Illud quoque sciendum est," observes Grotius; "si quis 'quid debet, non ex justitia propria, sed ex virtute alia, "puta liberalitate, gratia, misericordia, dilectione, id sicut "in foro exigi non potest, ita nec armis deposci" (c). It is, however, often a question of some nicety and difficulty to ascertain to which class an asserted claim belongs, because the usage which had its origin in the precarious concession of Comity may be, and in many instances has been, transferred, through uninterrupted exercise and the lapse of time, into the certain domain of Right.

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councils are authorized to determine in what cases it may be fit to do so, the particular captor having in no case any other right and title than what the State itself would possess under the same facts of capture."1 C. Rob. Adm. Rep. 367, 368.

And again, further on in the same case, he says: "It is lastly said, that they have proceeded only against the merchant vessels, and not against the frigate, the principal wrong-doer. On what grounds this was done whether on that sort of comity and respect which is not unusually shown to the immediate property of great and august Sovereigns, or how otherwise, I am again not judicially informed; but it can be no legal bar to the right of a plaintiff to proceed, that he has for some reason or other declined to proceed against another party, against whom he had an equal or possibly a superior title."-Ib. p. 376.

"De officiis innoxia utilitatis, quæ, si primam illorum originem spectaveris, sunt imperfecta, per ea, quæ accedunt, autem in perfecta mutari atque transire possunt; paullo difficilior est disquisitio."-De Necessitate et Usu Juris Gentium Dissertatio, c. ii. s. 17.-Pestel.

See the part of this work which relates to COMITY for distinction between Jus Gentium and Jus inter Gentes.

(c) Grotius, 1. ii. c. xxii. s. 16.

CHAPTER II.

RIGHTS OF INDEPENDENCE AND EQUALITY.

CXLIV. SOME of the Rights of nations appear to flow more directly from the first, and some more directly from the second of those propositions which have been laid down as together constituting the basis of International Law (a).

CXLV. From the first proposition-namely, that States are recognized as free moral persons-seem to be more especially derived the Rights incident to INDEPENDENCE, which are the following:

1. The right to a Free Choice, Settlement, and Alteration of the Internal Constitution and Government without the intermeddling of any foreign State.

2. The right to Territorial Inviolability, and the free use and enjoyment of Property.

3. The right of Self-preservation, and this by the defence which prevents as well as by that which repels attack.

4. The right to a free development of national resources by Commerce.

5. The right of Acquisition, whether original or derivative, both of Territorial Possessions and of Rights.

6. The right to absolute and uncontrolled Jurisdiction over all persons and things within, and in certain exceptional cases without, the limits of the territory. Under this head may be considered the status of Christians in Mohammedan or Infidel countries, not being subjects of those countries, and the question of Extradition of criminals.

(a) Vide ante, ch. iii.

Kaltenborn, Kap. v. s. 9: "Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Systematik des Völkerrechts."

CXLVI. The limitations which the abstract Rights of one nation may receive in their practical exercise from the existence of similar Rights in another nation, will be considered in a chapter on the doctrine of INTERVENTION.

CXLVII. From the second proposition-namely, that each State is a member of an Universal Community—seem to be more especially dervived the Rights incident to EQUALITY, which are the following:

1. The Right of a State to afford protection to her lawful subjects wheresoever commorant; and under this head may be considered the question of debts due from the Government of a State to the subjects of another State.

2. The Right to the Recognition by Foreign States of the National Government.

3. The right to External marks of Honour and Respect. 4. The Right of entering into International Covenants or Treaties with Foreign States.

CHAPTER III.

RIGHT TO A FREE CHOICE OF GOVERNMENT.

CXLVIII. I.—WE will now consider the rights which flow as necessary consequences from the INDEPENDENCE of States.

And first in the rank of internal and domestic rights is, the liberty incident to every Independent State, of adopting whatever form of government, whatever political and civil institutions, and whatever rulers she may please, without the interference or control of any foreign Power. This elementary proposition of International Law is so unquestionable that it would be superfluous to cite authorities in support of it (a).

CXLIX. This proposition, nevertheless, however true and however important, generally speaking, is not without some limitations in its practical application; because, rights on the part of other States, members of the same system, may control, to a certain extent, the right of unlimited liberty generally incident to a State in the establishment of its

(a) It is nowhere more faithfully enunciated than in Günther, i. 284, ss. 6, 7: "Keine Nation ist befugt, sich in die Handlungen der andern zu mischen, am wenigsten in die innere Staatsverfassung." The principle is recorded in many treaties; e. g. Treaty of the Pyrenees, 1659 (Art. 60-France promises not to interfere in the affairs of Portugal); Peace of Lübeck, 1629 (Arts. 2, 3-the Emperor of Germany takes a similar engagement as to Denmark-a reciprocal one being taken by Denmark); Peace of Neustadt, 1721 (Art. 7-Russia makes a like promise with respect to Sweden). Most of the great European Powers have, on various occasions, formally, at least, promulgated the same doctrine. Vide post, INTERVENTION-BALANCE of Power.

government, as the right of an individual in society to perfect liberty is, to a certain extent, limited by a similar right in his neighbour. The limitation of which this right is susceptible will be discussed hereafter in the chapter on INTERVENTION.