of which will be most fully realized by those to whom, as to Virginians, it has come, "borne," in very deed, "with bier and pall."

Yet in spite of an experience so bitter, true sons of the stricken commonwealth will say of her, as was said of Athens, in language the noble simplicity of which touches and thrills us, even now, through the veil of translation, and after the lapse of more than twenty centuries, with something of the feeling it must have inspired in its hearers, "I affirm that if the future had been apparent to us all * ** nevertheless the State ought not to have deviated from her course, if she had regard to her own honor, the traditions of the past, or the judgment of posterity."

WM. BAIRD,

Essex County, Va.

"No heroic sacrifice is ever lost; the characters of men are moulded and inspired by what their fathers have done-treasured up are all the unconscious influences of good deeds. It was such an influence that led a young Greek to exclaim, two thousand years ago, when he heard the news from Marathon: 'The trophies of Miltiades will not let me sleep!'"'

FRAGMENTS OF WAR HISTORY

RELATING TO

The Coast Defence of South Carolina, 1861-'65,

AND THE

HASTY PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF HONEY HILL, November 30, 1864.

"In hazardous undertakings there is a necessity for extraordinary vigor of mind, and a degree of fortitude and confidence, which shall raise us above the dread of danger, and dispose us to take risks, which the cold maxims of prudence would forbid.”

[The excellences of the original essentials of manliness in one who has so notably exemplified them as has Major Courtenay, as defender and sustainer of right, in the fields of war and journalism, and so continuously in historical research and in municipal governmentgive earnest of the privilege of reprinting, in these pages, the fol

lowing contribution to the Sunday News, Charleston, S. C., in which it appeared November 6 and 13, 1898. Reference may be made also to another earnest contribution, published in the News, and reprinted in this volume, “Charles Colcock Jones"-an excellent biographical sketch. See ante, p. 32.-ED.]

On St. Andrew's Day, 1864, near Boyd's Landing, in old Beaufort District, a desperate battle was fought and won by citizen soldiers of Georgia and South Carolina against enormous odds.

Thirty-three years have passed since, many of the actors in the honor and glory of that November day have joined the majority, yet no effort has been made to record this great military achievement at Honey Hill-to garner up even some of the details of this wonderful victory.

I have been requested at this late day to do this work; to correct erroneous official records; to unravel the now tangled and complex personal recollections of that eventful day. Many of the chief actors have "crossed over the river," memories of the events of that day are related differently by gentlemen who have no motive but the truth. Lapse of time has brought these results. I can only promise an impartial pen, and my closest attention and if I satisfy myself as to the truth, and the facts, I will write an account of this battle. not, such information as may be possible.

It

Introductory to such battle narrative, it is properly in place here to recall the general military situation on the seacoast of South Carolina during those eventful four years; as well for the information of those at a distance, as for later generations of Georgians and Carolinians, that they may learn of the invincible spirit of their fathers, which, under every disability, kept inviolate the entire coast line. from the Ashley to the Savannah, from the opening to the close of the struggle in South Carolina.

On November 7, 1861, a Federal fleet of seventeen ships and two hundred guns captured Port Royal-subsequently General T. W. Sherman took possession of its shores with a large army of occupation. From this commanding base the entire coast region of South Carolina, was from that day, possibly open to the army and navy of the United States; the Stono, North and South Edisto, Ashepoo, Combahee, Coosaw and Broad rivers and their tributaries, gave to the Federal forces short water lines to many vulnerable points in our exposed territory.

It appeared at first that the undisputed control of the ocean, and

access to these bold inland water ways gave to the Federal forces complete dominion in this region, the South having no ships for defensive service; yet despite these recognized advantages and our many disabilities, the enemy was kept at a safe distance all through the four years, by means of rifles and field artillery, and when their armed vessels ventured inland they were uniformly driven off, more than once with loss of ships and heavy casualties.

Against these short and fully protected water advantages, with an unlimited command of men, guns and vessels, operating from a military and naval base close at hand, we had for our base 103 miles of railroad between Charleston and Savannah, with its bridges seriously exposed at half a dozen points. To protect this long line we had practically only mounted riflemen (cavalry) and field pieces.

Our outpost service was maintained under serious difficulties, at every point of observation overlooking the enemy's water lines; from Stono to Broad River, we had to maintain our thin line of videttes, who kept watch through winter cold and rain, and summer heat, sand-flies and malaria.

These outposts were from eight to sixteen miles from the telegraph offices on the railroad line, communicating with headquarters; in case of alarms, these intervening distances, from picket stations to the railroad, were traversed by mounted couriers, so that several hours necessarily passed before news could be wired to the commanding general. From these outposts, not a few, but many incursions were made at great peril within the enemy's lines. These gallant enterprises were frequently rewarded by valuable information for department headquarters; the capture of officers and men proved also very advantageous. In this way we obtained the United States. signal code, by Captain Mickler, Company E, 11th South Carolina Infantry, bringing off a signal officer from the station at "Spanish Wells."

As the needs of the armies in Virginia and the West had to be supplemented with fresh forces, the troops in this coast region were reduced to minimum numbers, infantry, cavalry and field artillery being ordered elsewhere; as a matter of fact, during 1863 and 1864, this extended coast line was held by a relatively small force of mounted men and light batteries, distributed at convenient points. Sections of two field pieces each were placed at intervals along this one hundred and odd miles of front, ready for rapid movement in any direction.

The limited infantry supports were stationed at Charleston and its

vicinity, with a restricted railroad transportation service for their movement outward in cases of emergency.

I have no space in this narrative for details of this gallant, selfsacrificing retention of our coast line, but the reader will find in that invaluable history, "Johnson's Defence of Charleston Harbor," page 277, "a calendar of events on the coast, January 9, 1861, to February 18, 1865," which records the numerous attempts to destroy our railway line, the enemy's objective point for four years, uniformly resulting in utter failure and defeat, as shown in this indispensable military record. This invaluable encyclopædia of local military annals, as its title indicates, was intended to record the events of the war in Charleston harbor during a stated period; the author, however, in addition, kept a diary of such other events relating to our coast defence as was possible at the time, and so preserved what now proves to be of great value to the war history of those years; in this thoughtful and painstaking way this "calendar of events" has been preserved to us.

*

*

An interesting chapter of war history is yet to be written of this unequalled defence of exposed coast territory between the railroad and seashore, below Charleston, marked, as it was, by conspicuous courage, patient endurance and a continuous self-sacrifice on the part of each and all, to say nothing of fighting successfully in numerous engagements against heavy odds. It was an unobserved, daily and nightly routine of arduous and exposed service, and it is due to the heroism and fidelity with which this duty was discharged that the honorable record has been indelibly made, that not a rail on our base line was ever disturbed by the enemy during four long years of frequent attempts and effective resistance.

Germane to the successful defence of this coast territory, and especially to the victory of Honey Hill, the officers and men on duty may well be remarked upon here. The rapid growth of the Confederate army to large dimensions soon exhausted the roster of graduates from West Point, Annapolis, Virginia Military Institute and Citadel Academy, then the only sources from which to secure educated military men. Relative to the whole number of officers in the armies of the Confederacy these were few indeed; their influence for good was felt and recognized during the struggle, but the fact remains that our armies were, necessarily, officered by civilians. From both classes, and especially from the civilians, officers were advanced to high positions, and won great distinction in the war, rising from

minor positions in battalions, squadrons and regiments to be general officers in highest commands, trusted leaders on large occasions.

In the civil war in England, two and a half centuries ago, among the same race of people, this fitness for command and leadership from civil life presented itself, and it is curious to read the great historian's comment on those far-off times.

Macaulay, in his eloquent tribute to Hampden, says: "It is a remarkable circumstance, that the officers who had studied tactics, in what was considered the best schools, under Vere, in the Netherlands, and Gustavus Adolphus, in Germany, displayed less skill as commanders than those who had been bred to peaceful employments, and who never saw even a skirmish until the civil war broke out! An unlearned person might be inclined to think that the military art is no very profound mystery; that its principles are, the quick eye, the cool head and a stout heart will do more to make a general than all the diagrams of Jomini! This, however, is certain, that Hampden, the great leader, who neither sought nor shunned greatness, who found glory only because glory lay in the plain path of duty, showed himself a far better officer than Essex, and Cromwell than Leslie."

I think it may be stated with truth, that the peculiar character of our Southern life led largely to similar results. Every plantation, with its admirable organization and discipline; with its quartermaster and commissary departments, and the daily exercise of authority, trained Southern men unconsciously for leadership-the war developed and enlarged it. *

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The events of the war on the coast of Carolina, more so in Charleston harbor than elsewhere, presented the happy combination of trained officers with the "quick eye," "cool head" and "stout heart" from civil life, proving ever equal to new conditions in directing the varying fortunes of the unequal contest. A series of mili tary object-lessons is prominently in view, and the recital of a few will suffice to make reply to the general allegations, ignorantly asserted, that Southern men are inert, and wanting in enterprise, energy and inventive genius; certain it is, that in these respects, as well as in skill, courage and endurance, no higher achievements in the military records of any nation have ever been witnessed than theirs.

Heavy odds in men and equipment were uniformly encountered, but the possession of one end of a causeway in our coast region, by

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