were sunk without warning, and hundreds of non-combatants were killed by the shock or drowned by the sinking. So far as this applied only to British vessels, the United States had no cause to interfere, but several American ships were sunk by German submarines, notably the Gulflight. The German government admitted that these attacks were unjustified.

The British government retaliated by an Order in Council announcing that they would capture every merchant ship, including neutrals, bound to German ports or even bound to a neutral port, if there were reason to suppose that the cargo was intended to reach Germany or Austria. The British called this method a "blockade," although it lacked the methods of a legal blockade. There was no blockading squadron off the German coast, and it established a blockade of neutral ports which was contrary to all precedent.

The German policy was brought to a head May 7, 1915, when the great steamer Lusitania, carrying passengers and crew numbering 1,917 persons, was sunk without warning by a German submarine; and 114 Americans, including women and children, were killed. The American government at once protested, declaring that the sinking of the Lusitania and the whole German submarine policy were contrary to the rights of American citizens. President Wilson warned Germany not to "expect the government of the United States to omit any

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word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty." The Germans defended the sinking of the Lusitania and of the American citizens on the ground that the ship had formerly carried troops and had some cases of ammunition on board, and that the Americans had no business to take passage on the Lusitania, especially since the German ambassador issued a public warning before she left America that there was danger of her being sunk. President Wilson advocated a strong reply. Secretary Bryan thought that milder methods. would bring about the desired result. On this difference of opinion Mr. Bryan resigned his secretaryship, June 8, 1915, and after a short time was succeeded by Robert Lansing, of New York.

Long discussions followed, lasting through many months, with abundant notes on both sides. In the midst of these palavers, the British steamer Arabic was torpedoed by a German submarine without warning (August 19) and two Americans were drowned. For a time this was almost accepted as a defiance, but on August 27 the German ambassador Count Von Bernstorff communicated to the State Department the instructions of the German government to the effect that "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." This left an opportunity for discussions on the

general question of the legal responsibility for the sinking of the Lusitania. In October the Italian liner Ancona was sunk in the Mediterranean by a submarine bearing the Austrian flag. In December, the British steamer Persia was mysteriously sunk, no power admitting that the act had been committed by a submarine flying its flag.

Internal Disturbances.

As soon as the war broke out, efforts were made to supply food and fuel to belligerent war vessels, both English and German, from the coasts of the United States. The British had access to the Canadian and West Indian colonies and made little effort

to use the United States as a base. The Germans could not keep their cruisers and commerce destroyers at sea without supplies; and vigorous efforts in their behalf were made to get

ships out of American ports without a proper clearance. Several officials of German lines were convicted of participating in this attempt to deceive the port officials. A system of fraudulent passports was unearthed in 1915, and three of the guilty parties who were Germans were sent to prison.

In August, 1915, a New York paper managed to secure some documents from the files of Captain Von Papen, the military attaché of the German Empire. Soon after, letters were secured by the British authorities which involved C. T. Dumba, the Ambas

sador of Austria-Hungary, in several attempts to stop the operation of munitions factories. As a result the United States demanded the withdrawal of Dumba, Von Papen and Captain Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché, and they were obliged to leave the country. Several powder mills and munitions factories unaccountably blew up. In March, 1916, a single private German made himself master of the British steamer

Matoppo, with a crew of 56 men, until it was seized by an American revenue cutter. In April a man named Wolf Von Igel was arrested for aspiring to blow up the Welland Canal in Canada. He had been Von Papen's private secretary and claimed to be an employee of the German embassy.

Some effort was made to make a

political question out of the sympathy of American citizens and voters

with one or the other of the groups of belligerents; there were threats to defeat members of Congress who did not show desired sympathies in the foreign contest, and also to build up such an opposition to President Wilson as would prevent his renomination for the Presidency.

It became evident that the outcome of the foreign war depended in large part on the ability of the rivals to keep themselves supplied with arms. and munitions. All the European belligerents were eager to purchase wherever they could, but the lack of control of the sea prevented the Germans from importing contraband of

war from the United States. The Russians, British and French placed heavy orders in this country, which made necessary the building of new arms factories at Bridgeport, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and other places. Unsuccessful efforts were made also to buy several hundred thousand stands of arms of a disused pattern which the United States government held in its arsenals. It was more than a year before any American factory was ready to deliver rifles to the European powers, and almost as long before shells could be turned out in large quantities. By 1916 the Allies were at last securing the advantage of American supplies. Congress showed some leanings toward an embargo on the shipment of munitions but was kept in hand by President Wilson.

Blockade and Submarine Questions Revived, 1916. Notwithstanding protests from the United States, the British continued to stop American vessels and other neutral vessels. On June 17, 1915, the American State Department submitted a list of about 170 vessels which had been compelled by the British to put into the port of Kirkwall in the Orkney Islands. The British insisted that they had a right to stop any trade from the United States to Holland and the Scandinavian states, except through a special corporation under control of the British government. Cargoes of American dressed meats were seized, used by the British government, and paid for at what

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the owners thought an unreasonably low rate.

About a year after the first German announcement of the submarine policy, notice was given that after March 1, 1916, German submarines would stop and destroy, without warning, any vessel bound to British ports. The result was that more British steamers were sunk with Americans on board and more American lives were sacrificed, especially by the sinking of the channel steamer Sussex (March, 1916). For a time it looked as though the only recourse for the United States would be to withdraw its ambassador from Berlin; in which case the Germans could of course withdraw Count von Bernstorff from Washington. On April 18 President Wilson demanded an adjustment of submarine question, on pain of immediate severance of diplomatic relations, and on May 5 Germany agreed to modify her submarine warfare.

Preparedness, 1914-1916.

The difficulties with Mexico and the European powers brought out clearly the military and naval weakness of the United States. If it became necessary to send an army into Mexico, where was the army? Of the 100,000 authorized troops, only about 80,000 were under the colors, and of these not more than 20,000 would be ready for active service in case of sudden need. This seemed a small force compared with the millions of trained soldiers who were fighting each other

in Europe. The United States was almost without aeroplanes, which were so important in Europe. Heavy guns of the type used by the French, Germans, English and and Austrians might make the coast fortifications of the United States useless, since they could not compete with such long range guns on hostile ships. The

navy was in better condition, having a considerable number of new ships of modern types, but was very defective in submarines, light fast cruisers and destroyers. Neither army nor navy had proper stores of food, clothing and military materials, nor the organization of a powerful general staff to make plans and preparations in advance.

In the quarrels with Great Britain and Germany it seemed doubtful whether the President could lay down an ultimatum which would be respected by either of those great powers. He had no organized force which could back up his determination not to "omit any word or act necessary to the performance of this sacred duty." Those who felt the need of better defenses, and of a larger army and navy, gave the term " Preparedness" to their movement, and tried to rouse the American people to what they believed to be the great danger of invasion sooner or later. Several national societies were organized for this purpose and were joined by thousands of persons. The sense of

immediate danger was felt more strongly by the people of the eastern and western coasts than in the interior. The American people had always been accustomed to think of the ocean as a defense against invasion and were slow to realize the changes in warfare by sea and land.

The agitation came to a head in Congress, though the President was slow to awake to the situation. In his message of December, 1914, the President still stood by the old-fashioned militia system, which he called "A citizenry, trained and accustomed to arms." The next year, he saw reason to change his position and to urge upon Congress the need of "disciplined might." In 1916, he made a trip through the Middle West, and pleaded for preparedness. With Garrison, Secretary of War, he pushed a bill for enlarging the army. When the majority of the House of Representatives showed that it was not willing to accept the kind of army thus proposed, the President gave way and on February 10, 1916, the Secretary resigned. In his place on March 9, 1916, was appointed Newton D. Baker, who had been mayor of Cleveland, Ohio. Congress showed a willingness to spend money freely and to authorize considerable increases for the army and navy, but was unwilling to abandon the old-fashioned militia system, which had shown its weakness in every war since 1775.