Lectures on the Growth and Development of the United States: Illustrated

gress in which he appealed for an act enabling him to meet the exigencies of the situation. The independence of the island of Cuba was the price that Spain must pay for her misdeeds, and it was impressed upon him at last that nothing short of war could persuade her to relinquish its sovereignty. Assured of this fact he commanded that the consulate at Havana be closed, and after Consul-General Lee and other Americans had departed, he issued his able message of April 11. In this he reviewed the story of Cuba's three generations of suffering; referred to the destruction of the Maine as an evidence of Spain's inability to preserve order, and finally based the right of the United States to intervene on the following specific grounds:

"First, In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties in the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. Second, We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indefinitelyfor life and property which no government there can or will afford. Third, The right

to intervene may be justified by the serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people. Fourth, And which is of the utmost importance, the present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Government enormous expense

The aggressive element was strongly in the ascendency in Congress, and to the leaders of that group the wording of the message came as a distinct disappointment. They looked in vain for the recommendation that the Cuban republic be recognized, with the result that for six days there was a deadlock. The supporters of the Cuban insur

gents were determined that a clause recognizing the independence of Cuba should be incorporated. This failed, however, in the House (yeas, 150; nays, 191) and the resolution that finally passed merely declared in favor of intervention (yeas, 334; nays, 19), containing only the following clause regarding Cuban independence: "The people of the island of Cuba of right ought to be free and independent."

When the House resolutions were presented for adoption by the Senate, the latter saw fit to substitute for them a set of resolutions that had been formulated by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which was appended a special report from the minority members of the Committee favoring immediate recognition of the Republic of Cuba. The debate on the question of Cuban recognition was even more bitter in the Senate than in the House, resulting finally in the passage of the minority, or co-called Foraker resolutions by a vote of 51 to 37. In addition, an amendment offered by Senator Teller of Colorado was adopted which, in effect, declared that the United States had no intention of asserting dominion over the island of Cuba. It was thought by many that the House would concur in these resolutions, but a motion was made to strike out all references to recognition, which was carried by a majority of 22. The effect of this amendment was to necessitate the appointment of a conference committee of both Houses with the result that on April 19, by a vote of 42 to 35 in the Senate, and 311 to 6

STATE OF WAR EXISTENT.

in the House of Representatives, the following resolution was adopted:

"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Rep

resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

gress. He accordingly asked for his passports and departed for Paris, suffering no little molestation on the journey through Spain from the angry people of that country. Thus without

"First, That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independ- actual declaration, a de facto state of

ent.

“Second, That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the government of the United States does hereby demand, that the gov ernment of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third, That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several states, to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

"Fourth, That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accom

plished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

The passage of this resolution was tantamount to a declaration of war, and was accepted as such by the Spanish nation. It was signed by the President on April 20, and on the 21st, the Spanish minister, Señor Polo y Bernarbé asked for his passports. General Stewart L. Woodford, United States minister at the court of Spain, was notified by Secretary of State Sherman of the passage of the resolution, and requested to deliver the ultimatum of the government of the United States to Premier Sagasta and the Spanish ministry. It was never destined to be delivered, however, for the Spanish authorities notified him of the rupture of relations before he could present the resolutions of Con

war between the two nations was existent.*

As a result of these developments in the United States, the Spanish people were wrought up to an almost hysterical degree. The proclamations and pronouncements issued by officials in Porto Rico, the Philippines, and in the Spanish cities were in striking contrast with those that emanated from American sources. The temper of the people was reflected, too, in the action of the Spanish Cortes, which, after an impassioned address by the QueenRegent, Maria Christina, voted that they would go to any extreme to defend the honor of Spain.

On April 22 the President issued orders to Acting Rear-Admiral Sampson directing him to institute a blockade of the Cuban ports. The existence of this blockade and of the state of war between the United States and Spain was also announced in a proclamation given forth on the same date. Neutral vessels lying at any of the Cuban ports were allowed thirty days for departure. The same day the blockade was instituted, the first shot of the war was fired by the gunboat Nashville, which captured the

Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vii., p. 171: "It is universally admitted that a formal declaration is not necessary to constitute a state of war." See also Sargent, Campaign of Santiago, vol. i., p. 34.

Spanish merchantman Buena Ventura; a significant name for it may be rendered into our English phrase "Good luck."

At the outbreak of the war, the army of the United States was far inferior to that of Spain in number; its maximum strength being 28,000, at which time it fell short by approximately 5,000 men. These were trained and seasoned soldiers, but totally unprepared to meet the 80,000 men Spain was known to have sent to Cuba. In the matter of war vessels, Spain was thought to have slightly the advantage. While she possessed only one battleship, of the first class, the Pelayo, as against the four American battle

ships, the Massachusetts, Indiana, Iowa, and the Oregon, and one secondclass, the Texas, nevertheless Spain was known to have a powerful fleet of fast armored cruisers, of which six were considered superior to the vessels of the same class in the American navy. In addition, Spain had a fleet of 27 torpedo boats, and six torpedo boat destroyers, the latter an instrument of war comparatively untried and vastly dreaded. The Spanish navy, on paper, at least, totaled 88 to 86 in the American fleet, manned by 23,460 to 16,441 officers and men in the Spanish and American fleets, respectively.

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF AMERICAN AND SPANISH NAVIES.
Compiled from Brassey's Naval Annual, 1898.