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THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER I.

1898.

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

President McKinley disinclined to resort to extreme measures

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The report

The patient wait of the American people for the report of the Naval Board of Inquiry on the wreck of the Maine of the same-Debates and acts of Congress - Passage of the resolution declaring for intervention Rupture of diplomatic relations-Hostilities prior to declaration of war - Comparison of armies and navies of the two powers-How the revenue was provided.

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HAVE exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs at our doors." The absolute sincerity of these words in the message of President McKinley to Congress cannot be questioned.* The President was essentially a man of peace; and, in addition, his experience as a young private in the Civil War had been of such a nature as to discourage any activity on his part that would hasten or produce the terrible fact of war. It may have been, that if the Maine had been allowed to swing unscathed at her anchor in the harbor

For the text of the message see Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. x., pp. 139-150. See also messages to 55th Congress, 3d session, in Messages and Documents, 1898-9, 6-10.

of Havana, his counsels for peace would have prevailed, and the Spanish régime in Cuba would have persisted. But the destiny of a nation is controlled by forces outside of the will of one man or group of men, and it was ordained that the story of the last revolt of the Cubans was to be other than a repetition of previous attempts toward Cuban independence. From the moment that the news of the destruction of the American battleship was flashed over the world, it was clear in the minds of the President and the people of the United States that the end of an intolerable situation had come indeed. Whether or not the guilty persons who set off the

mine would be apprehended was a point of minor importance; the crime was the result of a condition that had long existed as a menace to the peace and welfare of American republics, and it was now the imperative duty of the nation so signally wronged to take steps necessary to prevent the recurrence of such injuries. The monstrous stroke in the dark that hurled 266 American sailors to death was likewise the death blow to the forces that had so long conspired against any endeavors toward releasing Cuba from the grip of Spain. The opposition of the centres of finance, the hysterical fears of the sea-coast cities, and the pleas of those who desired peace at any cost, were drowned in the tremendous wave of indignation that swept over the land. As President McKinley had voiced it, all methods of solving the problem had been tried save the one that now appeared inevitable: the fearful expedient of war.

It is not strange that at first the policy of the administration was one of delay and of caution. For a period of 50 years the United States had been at peace with other nations. The treaty of Guadalupe, ratified in 1848, marked the close of the struggle with Mexico, the last collision with a foreign foe. It is true that relations with European powers, notably France and England, had been somewhat strained. at times during the interim, but in general the United States had been looked upon by other powers as an unknown but not very menacing factor in world politics. Even the tremen

dous conflict between the States had failed to impress Europe with a sense of the inherent power of America. But now forces and conditions apparently beyond control were conspiring to destroy her isolation and force her in spite of herself to revise the policy regarding international affairs; in fact to negative some of the fundamental provisions of her organic law.

Notwithstanding the outcries of the sensational press, the members of Congress and the public in general took counsel from the executive and waited in patience for the report of the Naval Board of Inquiry, appointed by the President to determine the cause of the catastrophe. The pause that followed the destruction of the Maine was so remarkable that some foreign critics found in it evidence of national fear, and rashly prophesied the breakdown of the Republic. Those, however, who knew the true temper of the American people were not deceived by this appearance of calm. To them the situation was ominous to a degree; they saw in it the sullen moment that presaged the breaking of the storm, and to the more prophetic souls it meant the beginning of a struggle between the Old World and the New, the consequences of which but dimly could be surmised.

So from February 17, when the Naval Board of Inquiry was appointed, until March 28, when President McKinley submitted its report to Congress, few and guarded were the

*

* Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. x., pp. 136-139.

DEBATES IN CONGRESS.

references made in the halls of Congress or by the members of the administration to the question so sternly before the American public. Yet those who conceived that the result would be nothing more than a repetition of the Virginius affair, were destined, as was Spain herself, to be sadly disabused. As soon as the President's message and the accompanying report of the Naval Board of Inquiry were received by Congress, a parliamentary struggle ensued that clearly indicated to the Spanish government the desperate state of the relations between the two powers. The report, too, of the Spanish Court of Inquiry, which was also received by Congress on March 28, served as a further source of irritation, for in its findings, the suggestion was made, after a most casual examination of the wreck, that the explosion was due to the carelessness of its own officers.

The debate in Congress was well calculated to give Spain uneasiness.* In it the question of Spanish sovereignty was hardly considered at all, intervention being accepted as a foregone conclusion, and the whole discussion turned on the wisdom of recognizing the Cuban republic. When the Spanish authorities grasped the full significance of this attitude on the part of the two houses, they endeavored by every means possible to

*Lodge, The War with Spain, contains full account of legislative proceedings. Chap. ii., pp. 31-44. See also: Congressional Record, vol. xxxi., 1898; War Legislation of the Senate by Senator John W. Daniel in American-Spanish War, pp. 297-325.

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delay, or to avoid the rapidly approaching collision. Although they refused to consider President McKinley's note calling for a cessation of the war in Cuba, nevertheless the good offices of the Pope and the ambassadors of the greater European powers were influenced to appeal to the President for peace. General Blanco was ordered to organize Cuban administration according to the principles set forth in the decree of autonomy signed by the Queen, November 26, 1897. In addition the sum of $600,000 was voted by the Cortes for the benefit of the starving reconcentrados. The offer of autonomy,* however, was a timeworn subterfuge of Spain, and the Cuban insurgents, learned in the school of bitter experience, simply ignored General Blanco's proclamation of an armistice and his proposals for constitutional reform. All of these hasty concessions were forgotten in the pressure of mighty events soon to follow.

Had there been any other means of solving the Cuban problem than that of armed intervention, President McKinley would undoubtedly have seized upon it, and he believed up to the last minute that Spain would finally agree to the terms he proposed. It was doubtless with some such hope in mind that he delayed the message to Con

*“The death blow to autonomy was given on March 9 in the appropriation by Congress, without a dissentient vote, of $50,000,000." Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain.

For an exhaustive discussion of intervention in Cuba from the standpoint of international law see Moore's Digest of International Law, vol. vi., pp. 56-239.

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