But it was unanimously decided that the herds of seals ought to be protected by law, and regulations binding for five years were prescribed (Articles I and II of the award) which prohibited all pelagic sealing within 60 miles of the Pribilof Islands, or from the first of May to the 31st of July in the North Pacific east of the 180th degree of longitude and north of the 35th degree of latitude.* act was passed by Congress April 5, 1894, to enforce the award as to American citizens and orders in council were enacted on April 18, 1894, by the British Parliament in relation to British subjects.

An

The United States and Great Britain were to enforce the restrictive provisions of the treaty co-jointly, but the officials in charge of the work were lax and the restrictions became absurdly ineffective. The number of seals caught during the next few seasons was so great that the herds began to show signs of extinction, but Great Britain would not listen to any change in the regulations until the stipulated five years had elapsed.†

The United States, Japan and Russia then agreed to prohibit pelagic sealing if Great Britain would do the same, but the British government re

fused to do this, laying all the trouble to the abuse of privilege on the part of the North American Company which had had a monopoly of the sealing.

A new administration (McKinley's) had now come into power (March, 1897) and John Sherman was Secretary of State. Congress, thereupon, in order to destroy the market for skins caught by Canadians, prohibited the importation of any sealskins unless accompanied by consular certificates showing that they were not seacaptures, but this did not have the desired effect, as the British government still refused to agree to the provisional treaty. On November 17, 1897, however, a meeting of experts from the United States, Canada and Great Britain was held, and the American claims were unanimously upheld.* On June 14, 1898, Congress appropriated $473,151.26 to pay for the Canadian vessels that had been seized many years before.t

In August, 1898, a joint American and Canadian commission, which had been authorized by agreement on May 30 preceding, met at Quebec, but it adjourned to meet at Washington in the following November; was then adjourned to February, 1899, and was again postponed until the summer, but it never reassembled. Unfortunately this commission had not decided any of the issues before adjournment and as the Paris regulations had expired

*Henderson, pp. 46–57.

† Moore, American Diplomacy, p. 104; Henderson, pp. 60-61.

and none had been established to take their place the seals are now entirely unprotected.*

During all these years the Chinese immigration question had been a source of anxiety to the government. After the ratification of the Burlingame treaty of 1868, a strong prejudice against the Chinese sprang up on the Pacific coast, chiefly because of their alleged monopoly of labor at reduced prices," cheap John " being a popular phrase applied to them. In 1876 a joint committee of both Houses of Congress was sent to the Pacific Coast to investigate the matter. Two reports were submitted-one by Senator Sargent, of California, who, after the death of the chairman, Senator Morton, of Indiana, assumed charge of the investigation, and the minority report consisting of notes prepared by Senator Morton before his death.†

The matter was brought to the attention of Congress, and a bill to restrict Chinese immigration was introduced early in December, 1878, and was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor. It was reported to the House January 14, 1879, and on the 29th was passed by a vote of 155 to 72. After prolonged debate in the Senate, that body amended and passed it February 15, by a vote of 39 to 27,

* Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, pp. 58-62.

Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, pp. 287-293, gives an epitome of the two reports. See also Senate Report No. 689, 44th Congress, 2d session; Miscellaneous Doc. No. 20, 45th Congress, 2d session.

Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 307, Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vi., p. 690.

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and the House concurred in the amendments on the 22d.* The principal feature of the bill was the prohibiting of any vessel from bringing more than fifteen Chinese passengers to any port of the United States.f President Hayes vetoed this bill on March 1, as being contrary to the Burlingame Treaty, and because by its terms immigration was SO restricted that it fell "little short of its absolute exclusion." Congress failed to secure the two-thirds majority necessary to pass the bill over the veto.

Therefore in 1880 a commission was sent to China to negotiate a new treaty. This was signed in November, 1880, and ratified by the Senate July 19, 1881. The treaty gave to the United States the right to "regulate, limit or suspend" the further immigration of Chinese laborers, but this country did not have the right to absolutely prohibit it. lutely prohibit it. The treaty also allowed those Chinese then in the country to remain and travel around at their pleasure, and prohibited molestation with Chinese merchants, teachers, students or travelers. § The commissioners also negotiated a treaty relating to general commercial

McPherson, Handbook of Politics, 1880, pp.

39-41.

† Foster, American Diplomacy, p. 293; Hamilton's Blaine, pp. 449-451.

Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vii., pp. 514-520.

The commissioners were James B. Angell, president of the University of Michigan, John T. Swift, of California, and Wm. H. Trescott, of South Carolina.

§ Snow, Treaties and Topics, pp. 163-165; McPherson, Handbook of Politics, 1882, p. 99 et seq.

intercourse, particularly the opium trade. This was also ratified by the Senate.*

Under the pretext of executing the treaty of 1880, an act was passed in March 1882, during the first session of the Forty-seventh Congress, suspending Chinese immigration for a period of twenty years, but President Arthur, considering that this act meant absolute prohibition, vetoed it April 4.† In order to meet this objection, Congress passed another bill (approved by the President, May 6, 1882, but amended July 5, 1884) which suspended the immigration for only ten years, but imposed some very severe provisions. The Chinese already here were allowed to remain. Those who were exempted under the act (that is those not laborers), must, if they desire to enter this country, secure certificates of identification from the Chinese government and viséd by the United States consul at the port from which they sailed, also giving rank, occupation or profession, value of business, financial standing, etc. Chinese laborers who departed must take out return certificates, upon presentation of which at the port of entry, they would be allowed to enter again, but if

* Foster, American Diplomacy, pp. 295-299; Blaine, vol. ii., pp. 651-656; Hoar, vol. ii., pp. 120-122; Foreign Relations, 1881, China; Chester Holcombe, The Real Chinese Question, pp. 281-283.

Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. viii., pp. 112-118; McPherson, Handbook of Politics, 1882, pp. 92-99.

For these laws see Statutes-at-Large, vol. xxii., p. 58, vol. xxiii., p. 115; McPherson, 1882, pp. 105-107; 1884, pp. 138-141.

subject and identification card failed to agree the rejected person must be sent back to the port of departure at the expense of the United States. Heavy penalties were provided for false registry and for forgery; and the masters of vessels who tried to smuggle Chinese into the country or land any who were unauthorized were subject to fine and imprisonment and forfeiture of their vessels.*

On October 1, 1888, the President signed a bill known as the Scott Act (passed by the House September 3, and by the Senate on the 7th) amending the acts of 1882 and 1884. By the terms of the Scott Act the permission. given to the Chinese laborer to return was taken away, the issue of return certificates was prohibited and all that had been issued were declared void. This act enraged the Chinese government so greatly that it refused to ratify a treaty then pending by which China would have prohibited the emigration of laborers to the United States.†

During the first session of the Fiftysecond Congress, the question again came up for attention. It was claimed that the provisions of the law of 1882 were being evaded by fraud and forgery, and Senator Dolph, of Oregon,

* Foster, American Diplomacy, pp. 299–301; A. C. Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, pp. 327-340; Hoar, vol. ii., pp. 123-125.

Foster, American Diplomacy, pp. 300-301; Foreign Relations, 1888, China; see also President Cleveland's message of October 1, 1888, Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. viii., pp. 630635; McPherson, Hand-book of Politics, 1890, p. 13. The text of the proposed treaty is given in McPherson, 1888, p. 193.

introduced a bill extending the restriction against "coolies "to all Chinese laborers, and provisions were made to prevent evasion and fraud. The Committee on Foreign Affairs, after careful consideration, then instructed Mr. Dolph to report a bill extending the act of 1882 for five years with amendments providing against fraud. This bill passed the Senate, and went to the House, where on February 18, 1892, a bill to absolutely prohibit the immigration of Chinese was reported and passed April 4. The Senate, however, amended the House bill, and on April 25 the amendment was agreed to by a vote of 43 to 14. As the House refused to ratify the Senate bill it went to a conference committee and after a lengthy debate was passed by both Houses and became a law May 5. Besides extending the act of 1882 for ten years, it provided that the Chinese lawfully in this country must take out a certificate of residence within one year after the passage of the act, naming severe penalties for failure to do

So.

Negotiations were then entered upon which finally resulted in the signing of a treaty March 17, 1894, which was ratified by the Senate August 13, and proclaimed December 8 of that year. This was similar to the treaty of 1888, which had not been ratified.† It extended the former term of restriction for ten years, and this term

* McPherson, Handbook of Politics, 1892, pp. 202-206.

For the text of this treaty, see Foster, American Diplomacy, pp. 450-453.

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was again extended for the same period by the act of April 29, 1902.*

In 1895 the United States was on the verge of war with Great Britain because of a dispute between the latter country and Venezuela over a boundary line, the United States claiming the right to interfere under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine.

The early history of the dispute is long and complicated, and only a general summary will be given here. Great Britain claimed that the territory of British Guiana included all the country touched by the estuaries of the Essequibo River, and thus that the boundary line between the two countries should be drawn along the summit of the hills separating the watersheds of the Orinoco and Essequibo rivers. Venezuela disputed this claim, but no settlement was reached and the matter was allowed to drift. In 1840 Sir Robert Schomburgk was commissioned to lay out the boundaries, and according to his survey Great Britain was entitled to the lands in dispute. Venezuela protested against this award also, and after much diplomatic correspondence and negotiation, Lord Aberdeen on behalf of Great Britain receded from his position, ordering the Schomburgk monuments marking the boundary removed.

Other boundaries were from time to time suggested but none decided upon, and finally in 1886 Venezuela renewed her claim for the territory included in the Schomburgk survey. She reso

*Foster, pp. 302-305.

lutely adhered to this policy, and the controversy continued until 1894 when Venezuela sent a force into the disputed territory and raised her flag at Yuruan. The British officials, how ever, soon afterward removed the flag but they were arrested for the act. Great Britain then demanded an apology and reparation. The British officials were released but the dispute still continued.*

In his annual message to Congress on December 3, 1894, President Cleveland called attention to the dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain, and expressed his belief that "its early settlement

* is in the

line of our established policy to remove from this hemisphere all causes of difference with powers beyond the sea," at the same time announcing his intention to renew his efforts to induce the disputants to submit their claims to arbitration. A few weeks later (February 22, 1895) Congress passed a joint resolution recommending that "the President's suggestion that Great Britain and Venezuela refer their dispute as to boundaries to friendly arbitration, be earnestly recommended to the favorable consideration of both parties in interest"

Secretary Olney then prepared a lengthy and exhaustive paper, sent on July 20, 1895, in the form of a letter

* For the early history see Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, pp. 411-417; Cleveland, Presidential Problems, pp. 173-227.

+ Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. ix., p. 526.

Statutes-at-Large, vol. xxviii., p. 971; Cleveland, Presidential Problems, p. 251.

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of instruction to Ambassador Bayard, reviewing the history of the dispute and of the efforts of the United States to settle it, and stating that the basis of the present intervention was the Monroe Doctrine. Olney declared that any permanent political union between a European and an American State was unnatural and inexpedient"; that European interests" are irreconcilably diverse from those of America "; that " to-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."† He also asked for a definite answer as to whether the British government would or would not submit the Venezuela matter in its entirety to arbitration. Lord Salisbury replied November 26, 1895. He denied the contention that the Monroe Doctrine gave this country the right to interfere in the boundary dispute and refused to arbitrate the matter unless upon the terms already stated by Great Britain. He gave a complete history of the dispute with Venezuela and again upheld the righteousness of the British claim.‡

On December 17, 1895, President Cleveland sent to Congress his celebrated message and with it submitted

House Er. Doc. No. 1, 54th Congress, 1st session; Henderson, pp. 417-433, where the text of the despatch is given in full; Cleveland, p. 259 et seq.

A. B. Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, pp. 221-222 (The Macmillan Co.); Moore, American Diplomacy, pp. 253-254.

For text see Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, pp. 434-440. See also Cleveland, Presidential Problems, pp. 262-269.