impossible canal on the Atrato route. This effort failed, but under the direction of Secretary Bryan another was negotiated in April, 1914, by which the United States was to express "sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between the two nations" and was to pay $25,000,000 as a douceur. This treaty seemed like a direct censure of President Roosevelt for his action in annexing the Canal Zone, and no action was taken on it down to the middle of 1916.

Mexico, 1910-1916.

None of the difficulties just discussed seemed likely in any case to lead the United States to war. It was otherwise in Mexico, where a civil war was raging and the lives and property of the Americans were constantly in jeopardy. These troubles went back to 1910, when Francisco Madero headed an insurrection against the Diaz government. Apparently neither the aged President nor his rival realized that the so-called Republic was on the point of breaking up. In 1911 United States troops were sent down to the Texas frontier, because the Mexicans occasionally crossed the border and even attacked Americans on their own soil. The troops remained indefinitely, and from that time on there was a feeling among many Americans that the United States ought to intervene.

The Diaz government maintained itself only till May, 1911, when Diaz resigned and left the country. His government had been efficient but severe, and never deserved the name of a republican or representative government. Madero was at once "elected" as President and took up his residence in the capital city and the United States recognized him as head of the Mexican government. When insurrections broke out against him, Congress authorized the President to prohibit the shipment of arms and munitions of war, so as to avoid seeming to take part in the struggle.

At this juncture it was reported (1912) that the Japanese were nego. tiating with the Madero government for Magdalena Bay on the peninsula of southern California, to be used as a naval station. The Japanese government absolutely denied any official negotiations or intentions, although a private Japanese corporation undoubtedly made some effort to secure rights on the coast. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, introduced a resolution, which was duly passed by the Senate, to the effect that

"when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power or control for national purposes."

Whatever the intentions of the Madero government, it was unable to

carry them out, for it was pressed by several local revolutions. General Victoriano Huerta, an old officer of Diaz, secured control of the army in the capital, and overthrew and imprisoned Madero. The President of the Republic was barbarously killed while in the custody of officials taking orders from Huerta (February, 1913). The Maderists grouped themselves around Carranza as the head of their party, which they called the Constitutional.

This was the situation that confronted President Wilson when he came into office. He sent John Lind as a special envoy to Mexico, instructing him to insist that Huerta shouldnot be recognized as head of the state by the United States. A so-called election was held in October, 1913, as a result of which Huerta was declared officially elected President. A few hours later he arrested 110 of the deputies, the official representatives of the nation. Wilson steadily refused to recognize Huerta as head of the state, on the ground that he was a military despot who came to power by murdering his predecessor. Wilson adopted the phrase of "Watchful Waiting," as indicating his state of mind.

A new revolutionary centre developed around General Francisco Villa, who took the side of the Constitutionalists. For his benefit, President Wilson withdrew the embargo on arms (1914), but Villa proved to be a bandit of the worst character who

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plundered and murdered Mexicans and foreigners right and left. In April, a difficulty arose because some of Huerta's officers at Tampico took several American sailors out of a boat in the harbor. They were released in a few minutes, but Admiral Mayo insisted that the American flag must be saluted. When the administration at Washington showed fight, Huerta agreed to make this salute, but insisted that there should be a simultaneous salute of the Mexican flag.

Upon this punctilio, President Wilson (April 20, 1914), decided to send an armed force to Mexico. Of course he was influenced by the long course of the civil war and the sufferings of Americans in residence. A naval expedition of 5,000 men was therefore sent, which captured Vera Cruz with a small loss. Later a small military force was sent. The diplomatic representatives between Mexico and the United States were withdrawn. Meantime the governments of Argentine, Argentine, Brazil and Chile, commonly called the A. B. C. powers, proposed a mediation. An armistice was secured with Huerta, and in May the A. B. C. diplomats met at Niagara Falls, and reported that if a provisional government could be formed in Mexico under the leadership of Carranza, it would be proper for the United States to withdraw. In accordance with this plan, the American forces left Vera Cruz, November 23.

Following out this plan of mediation, a Pan-American conference was

held at which the A. B. C. powers, together with Bolivia, Uruguay and Guatemala, urged the Mexicans to cease their warfare and come to an understanding. It was finally agreed that the best thing to do was to recognize Carranza as the head of the state. This was brought about in December, 1915. Villa, a fierce, intractable and aggressive man, was now opposed to Carranza and kept up a revolution in the North; nor did it appear that Carranza himself was a man of force or the choice of the Mexican nation. Mexico was almost in a state of anarchy. The whole country was distracted by five years of civil war, with its ravages of ranches, mines and towns, its destruction of railroads and oil wells and factories, its forced loans and seizures of property.

A large number of Americans were brought out of the country at the time of the Vera Cruz incident, for it was the policy of President Wilson to insist on Americans keeping out of such dangerous and disturbed countries. By the consent of European powers, the whole Mexican situation was left to the United States for the time, and our government was expected to look after the safety of the English, Germans, Spaniards and other foreigners in Mexico. Nobody down there seemed able to organize the forces of law and order, if there were such forces. On the other hand, to send an army into Mexico to restore order would be looked upon by the Mexicans and all the Latin-Americans as a

causeless invasion, and would probably unite all parties against the "Gringos."

In the midst of this difficulty and confusion Villa threw a bombshell in March, 1916, by crossing the American border and attacking and looting the town of Columbus, New Mexico, in which there was a small Federal garrison. The President ordered an expedition of American troops to follow and capture the bandit, which penetrated several hundred miles.

The European War, 1914-1916. One reason why the administration found it hard to deal with the Mexican situation was that on August 1, 1914, a European war broke out which soon involved most of the European powers, together with the colonies of the belligerent powers all over the world, and the Asiatic empire of Japan. Whatever the causes of this war, whether Germany's desire for "A place in the sun," or Russia's desire for a water route to the Ægean Sea, or English monopoly of sea-power, the United States was not concerned in those rivalries and had no wish but to remain neutral. The people of this country included immigrants and their children from all the countries at war. Those who were naturalized were looked upon as complete Americans, and the unnaturalized aliens were considered welcome visitors who would not involve the country of their residence in the difficulties of their home governments.

The sudden outbreak of the war, in which every great power charged its opponents with preventing an adjustment, unexpectedly raised a flame of passionate interest in the struggle and the occupation of Belgium, and brought out strong rivalries between the "Pro-Germans" and "Pro-Allies" in the United States. Great pressure was brought to bear by Colonel Roosevelt and others, who urged Wilson's administration to protest against the invasion of Belgium, and even to go to war in defense of Belgian neutrality. With these internal preferences, the United States as a government would have nothing to do. The President issued a proclamation of neutrality on August 4, warning Americans not to take service on either side, or to prepare any military expeditions. By another proclamation (November 13), the Panama Canal was declared to be open to the ships of war of all belligerents. In a public address (August 18) President Wilson urged his countrymen to preserve a neutral spirit.

As regards trade, the administration took a wholly neutral attitude. No vessel of war of any belligerent was allowed to use the harbors of the United States except for necessary repairs; and none could load coal except enough to take her to the nearest home port. So far as official declarations could go, the United States was strictly neutral. In accordance with the ordinary usages in such cases, the

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United States did not restrain American ships from departing for the ports of the belligerents, with whatever cargo they might choose to carry. The State Department was fully aware that ships carrying contraband - that is, arms and munitions of war-must run their own risk of being captured by belligerent cruisers on the high seas; and that if a blockade should be declared, they might be seized on their way to known blockaded ports.

Here came in the first distinct attempt by politicians and voters to influence the government in favor of one or another side. In a few weeks the English gained control of almost the whole of the high seas, capturing or driving into ports the German and Austrian merchantmen, and dispersing the ships of war. ing the ships of war. This left the road open for shipments of all kinds to the Allies, while the Germans were not in a condition to protect commerce directed to their ports. This state of things led to a strong demand, especi ally from aliens and citizens of German blood, for an embargo upon shipments of munitions of war, such as had been laid a few years earlier in Mexico. Secretary Bryan seemed to sympathize with this idea, but President Wilson opposed it, partly because it was contrary to the interests of the United States to close a trade which might be essential to this country in some later war.

Difficulties now arose with regard to contraband and the treatment of ships

carrying contraband. The British cruisers stopped numerous American ships, carried them into port, and in some cases made them unload on suspicion of their carrying contraband. Forsaking the declaration of London, which was drawn up at the desire of Great Britain in 1909 (though never ratified by that country), the British went far beyond any previous understanding of what was meant by contraband. On the list of articles which they would seize in transit, they put copper, iron ore, rubber, oils and many other articles, later adding foodstuffs and cotton.

They followed out the principle, which was admitted by the United States, that genuine contraband could be seized if bound to any neutral port, with the intention to forward it thence to one of the enemies; but the State Department did not clearly and loudly protest against the British arbitrary extension of the contraband lists, which were intended to stop the regular innocent commerce of the United States with the enemies of Great Britain. On December 14, 1914, a strong formal protest was lodged against the British system of holding vessels which had been seized on suspicion for an unreasonable time. The British government replied in a conciliatory manner and this particular grievance was relieved.

War Zone and the Lusitania, 1915. Early in 1915 arose a violent controversy which much resembles the

difficulties between Great Britain and the Emperor Napoleon a century ago. It began with an order of the German government for administering the food supplies in Germany for the benefit of the civil population (January 26, 1915). Great Britain at once assumed that this order gave to all imports of food-stuffs into Germany the character of contraband, since part of the food might be used for the army. The result was the capture of the American steamer Wilhelmina, laden with food-stuffs (February 9), and this was followed by many like captures. The Germans insisted that making food-stuffs contraband was a breach of international law and in retaliation (February 4) they issued a proclamation announcing that "the waters around Great Britain including the whole of the English channel are declared hereby to be under the zone of war. * Neutral vessels

cannot always be prevented from suffering from the attacks intended for enemy ships."

No one could deny the right of the Germans to pursue, capture and carry off as prizes any British merchantmen wherever found; and if circumstances did not permit their being brought into port as prizes, they might be destroyed. The attempt to establish a "war zone" on the high seas was contrary to the rights of nations and the great principle of freedom of the seas. Nevertheless in the course of the next twelve months over 50 vessels, some British, some neutral,