mine owners come to terms, even if it involved the taking over of the coal properties by the government. By September the problem had ceased to be local and assumed such national proportions that it could no longer be ignored. President Roosevelt accordingly called a conference of the warring factions, October 3, 1901. This he did in spite of the fact that the mine owners had threatened his political extinction if he intervened in the affair. The President recognized his lack of power to intervene in an official capacity, but appealed to their patriotism, pleading that they sacrifice all personal considerations for the good of the country. Mr. Mitchel agreed to the appointment of a board of arbitration, and pledged his organization to accept its terms. The others, however, denounced the government as a "contemptible failure that was compromising itself with the instigators of violence and crime."

Their defiance and the arrogance of their attitude had but one result: the closing of the conference with nothing gained save injury to their cause. They had also made an enemy of a man who not only dearly loved a fight, but who had sufficient power back of him to carry the fight to a finish. In addition public indignation was rising to such a pitch that the President perceived that further temporizing would prove disastrous. The result was the immediate capitulation of the mine owners. What method was employed

by him in gaining his point is not wholly clear, the generally accepted theory being that he threatened to appoint a committee which would investigate the situation in the anthracite region, particular attention to be given to the relationship between the railways and the coal mining companies. Whether this is the explanation or not, suffice it to say that J. Pierpont Morgan, after a conference with President Baer, sought an interview with President Roosevelt and offered on the part of the coal operators to accept the arbitration of a commission to be appointed by him, the decision of the same to be binding for a period of three years. He endeavored to dictate the character of the personnel of this commission, but the miners refused to accept his proposal, declaring that the President should be free to appoint whom he pleased. The operators were forced to accept these terms, and accordingly, at a convention of the United Mine Workers at Wilkesbarre, October 20, the strike was declared at an end.

The President appointed on this commission Judge George Gray, of the United States Circuit Court; the Commissioner of Labor, Carroll D. Wright; Thomas H. Watkins; General John M. Wilson; E. E. Clark, and Archbishop John L. Spalding. This commission was not only representative, but it was thoroughly equipped for the task before it. Exhaustive hearings were held, each side of the controversy being given ample

opportunity to present its evidence. The result, however, was a sweeping victory for the strikers. A 10 per cent. increase in wages was awarded; an eight-hour day after April 1, 1903; an increase of 1 per cent. in wages to all employees for each 5 cents added to the price of coal f. o. b. at the New York harbor. Other findings were also made, among which was the establishment of a permanent board of conciliation for settling future disputes, the removal of all limitations placed on the output of miners; and the cessation of discriminatory acts against non-union miners. The agreement was to remain in force until March 31, 1906. The commission also recommended the discontinuance of the employment of a "coal and iron police, a stricter enforcement of the law regarding the employment of children, and State and Federal machinery for the investigation of difficulties similar to those referred to this commission." port rendered March 21, 1903.)'

(Re

One of the most important results of this arbitration was unquestionably the hastening of the passage of an act organizing the Department of Commerce and Labor, an important function of which is to perform the duties defined in the quotation from the report of the Anthracite Arbitration Commission. This new branch

* Another strike took place in the gold mining districts of Colorado in 1903-4. Though local in scope this also commanded public attention by the extremes to which the leaders on both sides permitted themselves to go. These disturbances lasted until the autumn of 1904.

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of the Federal service was formed by a law passed by Congress, February 11, 1903. Bureaus from several departments, especially those relating to industries, commerce and transportation, statistics, immigration, and other kindred phases, were united under the direction of a new Cabinet officer. The first secretary under this act was George B. Cortelyou, appointed February 16, 1903; who was followed by Victor H. Metcalf in 1904, Oscar S. Straus in 1907, and Charles Nagel in 1909.

The prestige gained by the United States in international affairs as a result of the war with Spain soon began to bear fruitage. One result was the restoration of amicable relations with the German empire, which had been disturbed by the activities of the latter in the Philippines. The German Kaiser made a number of overtures of friendship, one of which was the sending of his brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, in January, 1902, on a visit to America. The ostensible purpose of this was the launching of a yacht which was being built near New York City, and which Miss. Alice Roosevelt was invited to christen, but the underlying reason was clearly to remove a suspicion cherished for a long time by the American people with regard to the unfriendly intentions of the Emperor William.

The restoration of an entente cordiale between the two nations stood in good stead during another one of the perennial endeavors of the European

a

powers to collect pecuniary claims against Venezuela which took place during the same year. Great Britain, Germany, and Italy sent a joint expedition to Venezuelan waters early in 1902, and established blockade of the ports. Barring the shelling of a few forts, the blockade was essentially a peaceful " one, yet it had the effect, however, of bringing President Castro to terms. As the allies disclaimed any purpose of presenting claims for territory, the Monroe Doctrine was not involved, and accordingly no official objection to the movement was made at Washington. President Roosevelt was invited to act as arbitrator, but declined, using his influence, however, in hastening a settlement of the affair, which was accomplished February 28, 1903.

The most important and far-reaching event of the first administration of President Roosevelt was the successful inauguration of a movement for the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. By the ratification of the Hay-Herran Treaty, March 17, 1903, the Senate of the United States virtually pledged that the nation would undertake the construction of the canal, thereby insuring the realization of a dream that had been present in the mind of man since Balboa struggled across the narrow strip of land, and caught the first glimpse of the Pacific. Thus in the Twentieth century the quest of Columbus for a short route to the

Indies bids fair to become an assured fact.

The first hope was for a natural strait, but a score of years of fruitless search proved its non-existence and therefore in 1529 Alvaro de Saavedra Ceron, a follower of Balboa and cousin of Cortez, prepared a scheme for cutting a canal at the narrow isthmus of Panama. Four routes were proposed and it is interesting to note that they were identical with the four destined to be considered and examined by the modern engineers. The real beginning of the canal enterprise, however, was in 1534, when King Charles V. ordered surveys to determine the most feasible route. From then on the project alternately woke and slumbered, and though a king of Spain promised the headsman's axe to any any one energetic enough to suggest even a revival of the scheme, the traffic needs of the South Sea country tended to keep the idea alive.

The era of Spain's commercial supremacy slipped by without advantage being taken of opportunity and until the beginning of the Nineteenth century a canal at Panama received scarcely a serious consideration. Alexander von Humboldt then put new life into the plan and in 1814 the Spanish crown, seeking to strengthen its weakening grasp upon its American colonies, determined upon the construction of an isthmian canal. A cedula was issued, but before practical steps could be taken the revolu

tions of Miranda and Bolivar wrested Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia from Spain. Panama declared its independence in 1822, and allied itself with Colombia under the title of New Grenada. The turmoil of the political rearrangement that followed in Central America had hardly subsided before the first Central American envoy, Señor Antonio Jose Jose Canaz, approached Secretary of State Henry Clay with the suggestion of a canal through Nicaragua, and though lacking official authority to enter into such a scheme, Clay's appreciation of the project was such that he ordered a survey of the route.

The Central American congress the same year granted a concession which was afterward transferred to an American company known as the Central American & United States Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company, among the members of which were De Witt Clinton, Monroe Robinson and A. H. Palmer." This company's conception of the magnitude of the task may be gathered from the

fact that it was capitalized at $5,000,

000. A concession to a Dutch company in 1829 proved an equal failure. A franchise for a canal at Panama was granted by Simon Bolivar, president of New Grenada, who, on the failure of the grantee undertook the work himself, but progressed no further than to obtain a faulty survey. For some years thereafter nothing

* See House Report No. 145, 20th Congress, 2d session.

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but futile projects based upon more or less honest intentions are to be noted and, until the gold excitement of 1849 in California, the United States had shown little more than an attitude of approval toward the canal question. In 1846, however, before any whisper of the presence of the yellow metal had been heard, the United States negotiated a treaty with the republic of New Grenada, consisting then of the two independent states of Panama and Colombia, obtaining for Americans entry-port privileges and transit rights, equal in every respect to those enjoyed by the Grenadian citizens, their vessels and merchandise. Under this treaty,* the Panama Railroad Company, composed of William Henry Aspinwall, John Lloyd Stephens and others, obtained a concession from New Grenada, and work on a line from Aspinwall (now Colon) to Panama was begun in 1849 and the first train was run over the entire line in January, 1855. The construction difficulties in this then stupendous work can scarcely be imagined. The country

produced nothing, and was a desolate wilderness and every scrap of food and clothing had to come from New York.t

Great Britain's seizure of the Mosquito Coast and San Juan River roused President Polk to send a special envoy, Elijah Hise, to that coun

*New Grenada Treaty ratified June 10, 1848. An account of this first real struggle with the problem will be found in Wolfred Nelson's Five Years in Panama.

try in 1849 to examine into the situation with a view to discovering how far British actions were controverting the Monroe Doctrine. As a checkmate to Great Britain's designs, Hise negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua granting to the United States or its citizens exclusive right to construct a road, railroad or canal across the country from coast to coast, to fortify and protect the same and in return to guarantee to Nicaragua the maintenance of her territorial sovereignty. This treaty was rejected by the Senate and the diplomatic machinery at Washington set in motion by Secretary of State John M. Clayton. Negotiations on the the subject were opened with the British Minister and E. G. Squier was sent to replace the embarrassingly active Mr. Hise. The meat of the nut lay in the possibility of interference by Great Britain with the canal project of the New York capitalists and her defiance of the Monroe Doctrine by her Mosquito Coast occupancy. Confronted by a Democratic majority in the Senate it was Secretary Clayton's pleasing task to obtain seemingly impossible concessions from Great Britain or, failing that, to present the possible in such form as would pass muster before the opponents of the administration. Clayton's offer was in the nature of a compromise; British right to control the Mosquito Coast would be diplomatically conceded provided such control would not interfere with the

construction and maintenance of a canal. This was acceded to, but the American minister at London, Abbott Lawrence, injected a strong dash of pepper into the fraternal pudding by declaring that Great Britain's claim to the Mosquito Coast was without right or reason, with no foundation in law or justice, and that it should be abandoned. Lawrence was ignored by Washington, a question of Nicaragua's right to the Mosquito Coast was raised as a foil, and Sir Henry Bulwer was sent to America to carry on the negotiations. The New York company had already established a line of transportation across the country by stages, and steamers on the Nicaragua lake with steamship connections between New York and San Francisco under a franchise which Squier secured, and his substitute treaty with Nicaragua varies but little from the Hise agreement as to neutrality and guaranteed sovereignty.

While Bulwer and Clayton were struggling with the preliminary draft of a treaty, Great Britain was pressing Honduras for payment of an old claim, and her designs embraced the seizure of Tigre Island and the Bay of Fonseca in default of payment. Squier endeavored to check this aggression, as Hise had done, by a treaty with Honduras which practically ceded both island and bay to the United States. A British fleet next appeared off the coast and forcibly seized the territory in ques