The treaty, although signed by the contracting parties, could not as yet, under the Constitution of the United States, become effective. To do this required a ratification by two-thirds. vote of the Senate. And there was very great doubt as to the possibility of securing this majority. To many sincere and patriotic people, the idea of acquiring colonial possessions, particularly so far distant and little known as the Philippine Islands, was so repugnant that a powerful movement sprang up in opposition to the treaty. Anti-imperialistic societies were organized, and began a propaganda against the same, based on constitutional and sentimental grounds. Public opinion so strongly expressed, as would be expected, found its reflection in House of Representatives and the Senate. Party lines which

185

had almost been obliterated during the course of the war now reappeared, and it was found that the Democrats were uniformly anti-imperialistic, while the Republicans favored the ratification of the treaty, trusting that the problems that might arise would be solved when they presented themselves. Nevertheless there were men of great ability in the Republican ranks who were opposed to a policy so new and foreign to the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. One of these was Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, who fought the treaty with all the power of a logical and forceful mind.

It was due to these conditions that when the Senate took up the ratification of the Treaty of Paris on Monday, February 6, there was much doubt as to the passage of the resolution; 60 votes were needed, and there were only 58 that could safely be depended upon, the opposition numbering 29, with 3 doubtful. The decision was in doubt to the final vote, the earlier ones seemingly indicative of a defeat. However, at 2:30 the resolution was carried by a vote of 57 to 27, or, counting the pairs, 61 to 29. With the exchange of ratifications on April 11, 1899, Spain drops out of American history as a significant figure, and America begins a new era.

Zapote bridge

On the departure of General Merritt, the command of the forces in the Philippine Islands was intrusted to Major-General Elwell S. Otis, and to him also descended the difficult problem of dealing with the leaders of the Filipino insurrectos. The situation was much complicated by the encouragement they drew from the indefinite status of the islands, and the opposition to their annexation by the anti-imperialists in the United States. The latter were in the minority, but it was a powerful minority, and the support given by them to Aguinaldo's representative, Agoncillo, at Washington, no doubt was responsible for much of the delay in bringing drastic measures to bear in putting an end to a menacing situation. The attitude of the country as a whole was at first in sympathy with the struggle of the Filipinos for freedom, but there was grave doubt as to their capacity for self-government. At any rate, there was no need for deciding the question hastily, and in order to discover the wisest plan to follow, Presi

dent McKinley appointed a commission which was empowered to investigate conditions in the Philippines, and to suggest a policy to be followed.

President McKinley's own attitude regarding the Filipinos is best expressed in his words delivered before the Boston Home Market Club, February 15, 1899:

"The Philippines, like Cuba and Porto Rico, were intrusted to our hands by the war, and to that great trust, under the providence of God and in the name of human progress and civilization, we are committed. It is a trust from which we will not flinch +

"There is universal agreement that the Philippines shall not be turned back to Spain. No true American would consent to that.

"The suggestion that they should be tossed into the arena for the strife of nations or be left to the anarchy or chaos of no protectorate at all were too shameful to be considered. The treaty gave them to the United States. Could we have required less and done our duty?

187

"Until Congress shall direct otherwise, it will be the duty of the executive to possess and hold the Philippines.

That the inhabitants of the Philippines will be benefited is my unshaken belief.

"No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to American sentiment."

The first Philippine Commission* consisted of President Jacob Gould Schurman, of Cornell University; Major-General E. S. Otis; Rear-Admiral George Dewey; Hon. Charles Denby, of Evansville, Ind., formerly minister to China; and Professor Dean C. Worcester, of the University of Michigan. It thus contained representatives from widely different classes of American citizens, yet each for some reason had peculiar fitness for the task assigned him. Upon the civilian members of the Commission would of necessity fall the burden of the investigation, yet throughout the sessions they had the advice and coöperation of the others. The report of the Commission, issued in 1900, contains in its four volumes a most exhaustive study of the social, economic, and political conditions of the islands.

The result of this careful investigation only served to corroborate the impression held by the administration that the Filipinos as yet were incapable of controlling their own destinies. The civilian commissioners went to the Philippines carrying with them the President's personal sug*Appointed, January 18, 1899; first session, March 20, 1899; report delivered, November 2, 1899.

VOL. X - 13

gestions as to the policy to be pursued, and possessed more or less by his idealistic enthusiasm regarding the duty of the United States to the natives. Their experiences in Manila had a decidedly cooling effect upon their enthusiasm, but increased their sense of America's duty. In their preliminary report to the President the results of their investigation are summed up:

"Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the commission believe that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the eventual division of the islands among them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing, and united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable. And the indispensable need from the Filipino point of view of maintaining American sovereignty over the archipelago is recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate. The latter, it is true, would take the revenues and leave us the responsibilities. Nevertheless, they recognize the indubitable fact that the Filipinos can not stand alone. Thus the welfare of the Filipinos coincides with the dictates of national honor in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We cannot from any point of view escape the responsibilities of government which our eignty entails; and the commission is strongly persuaded that the performance of our national duty will prove the greatest blessing to the peoples of the Philippine Islands."

sover

From the purely abstract point of view, the disappointment and indignation of the Filipino leaders at their treatment by the United States was entirely justified. The last revolt against the Spanish, to their mind, was not far from the goal of attainment when Dewey's ships appeared upon the scene; the Spanish army apparently controlled little more than

Manila itself.* Aguinaldo, too, from the treatment of his envoy, Agoncillo, at Washington, saw clearly that there was no hope from that quarter, and when the treaty of Paris finally settled the questions of the war, the question of the right of the Filipinos was wholly ignored. The result was the transformation of the Filipinos from quasi allies to avowed enemies, and again Manila was practically in a state of siege; this time with the American forces instead of the Spaniards defending the inner lines and the Filipinos surrounding. It was a menacing situation and so pregnant with evil possibilities that Gen. Otis entered into an agreement with Aguinaldo to the effect that the soldiers of neither side should enter the lines of the other.

It was at this time that Aguinaldo learned that the authorities of the United States stood irrevocably in the way of all despoiling of the inhabitants, Spanish or other. The attitude of the Filipino leader, too, had much to do with the condition of affairs for it became more and more arrogant, his real purpose being revealed in his proclamation of June 18, 1898, in which he styled himself dictator. Encouraged by the hope that the strong anti-annexation movement in the States would develop power enough to tie the hands of the Executive and the army, he persisted

Aguinaldo was offered $800,000 by Spain to suppress the revolt, certain reforms, in addition being promised. $400,000 of this was paid, which Aguinaldo used in preparation for renewed hostilities. He was transported to the Philippines on one of Dewey's ships, soon after the battle of Manila Bay.

in a course that could have but one result - armed hostilities.

It was clear that the insurrectos had decided to force the conflict, and members of Aguinaldo's forces were continually passing the American lines in spite of the agreement to the contrary. United States pickets were often shot at in the dark, and one narrowly escaped assassination by knife. No American was safe from molestation, and so audacious did they finally become that a party of engineers engaged in a topographical survey was captured and imprisoned at Malolos on no pretext whatsoever. For months the inhabitants of Manila were beset with the specter of rapine and murder, and the greatest vigilance on the part of the army was necessary to check the malicious contrivings of a cunning foe. The climax came on February 4, when a strong force of the insurrectos, headed by one of Aguinaldo's officers, endeavored to force a passage into the city across the Santa Mesa Bridge. The sentry, Private Grayson, of the Nebraska Volunteers, ordered the party to halt, and upon their refusal fired, killing the officer. That the Filipinos had planned to precipitate a crisis is shown by the fact that immediately there was an attack on the entire American lines. The firing was continued throughout the entire night but the American ships took no part, lest they do injury to their own men. The Filipinos did not advance, trusting that the attack would cause an uprising of sympathizers in Manila, for it was proved by proclamations to the natives after

wards found in the streets that there was a widespread plot to massacre all foreigners and others opposed to the plans of the insurrectos. On the same day Aguinaldo had issued a vindictive proclamation to his followers declaring war against the Americans, which he followed up by others in a similar strain. Another complication was the attitude of the Spaniards, who encouraged Aguinaldo, and did much harm to the American cause by sending false reports regarding the acts of the army, and many, indeed, were reported to have entered the Filipino army.

The effort to create an uprising in Manila was a failure, although numerous incendiary fires occurred, the greatest damage being done in the Tonga district, the native quarters. The fires were extinguished with great difficulty as the work of the firemen was interfered with as much as possible by the natives cutting the hose and damaging the engines. At daybreak the attack was renewed, the army now being supported by the navy, which did much execution with shells hurled into the trenches of the enemy. Against this double attack the insurgents could make no headway, and during the course of the day (February 5) their firing degenerated into intermittent skirmishes. Step by step their line was driven back until it occupied a position four to six miles further from the city. One of the objective points of the enemy was apparently the pumping station on Santolan hill, which was damaged by them but later repaired. The desperate nature of their enterprise is

189

indicated by this effort to destroy the water supply of a city of 500,000 inhabitants, with the untold suffering that would have followed. Fortunately, however, they were frustrated in this attempt.

As the result of the three days' fighting around Manila, San Juan del Monte, Santa Ana, San Pedro Macati, Santa Mesa, Lomia, and the Santolan pumping station fell into the hands of the American forces.

For nearly a fortnight there were no new developments, the Americans contenting themselves with strengthening their positions, and the insurgents busying themselves in attempting to foment a general uprising. Aguinaldo issued a "most barbarous order given inhabitants of city by insurgent government to rise en masse on night of 15th; the scheme defeated by activity of provost marshal who had city well in hand."*

In the meantime General Miller had been ordered to Iloilo, the second important city in the islands and a stronghold of the insurgents, and had been stationed there since January 1, 1899, with two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery (18th United States Infantry; 51st Iowa Volunteers and Battery G, 6th Artillery). By specific command of President McKinley, who did not desire to precipitate a rupture with the Filipinos, no active measures were taken, the men remaining on board the transports under the guns of their convoy, the Baltimore, until the outbreak at Manila. Reinforced by the

* Gen. Otis's report to Adjutant-General, February 18.