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HOSTILITIES CEASE IN PHILIPPINES.
"On the 16th a cablegram containing the text of the President's proclamation directing a cessation of hostilities was received by me, and at the same time an order to make the fact known to the Spanish authorities, which was done at once. This resulted in a formal protest from the Governor-General in regard to the transfer of public funds then taking place, on the ground that the proclamation was dated prior to the surrender. To this I replied that the status quo in which we were left with the cessation of hostilities was that existing at the time of the receipt by me of the official notice, and that I must insist upon
the delivery of the funds. The delivery was made under protest.
"After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of my office as military governor, I had direct written communication with General Aguinaldo on several occasions. He recognized my authority as military governor of the town of Manila and the suburbs, and made professions, of his willingness to withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at the same time askThe matters in ing certain favors for himself.
this connection had not been settled at the date of my departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt in the ranks and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted to enjoy the occupancy of Manila, and there is some ground for trouble with them owing to that fact, but, notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement.
"On the 28th instant I received a cablegram directing me to transfer my command to MajorGeneral Otis, U. S. V., and to proceed to Paris, France, for conference with the peace commissioners. I embarked on the steamer China on the 30th in obedience to these instructions."
THE PEACE PROTOCOL AND THE TREATY OF PARIS.
Manzanillo and the Bay of Nipe - Spain's desperate condition - - Ambassador Cambon presents proposals for peace-The protocol signed - The Treaty Commissioners meet at Paris, October 1, 1898 -The pleas of Spain for intervention fruitless-Treaty of Paris signed December 10, 1898- The contest over ratification in the Senate Ratification Text of the treaty - Exchange of ratifications.
During the course of the blockade there were many incidents of a minor nature such as the taking of prizes, chases after blockade-runners, occasional shelling of shore batteries or detachments who ventured within range of guns of the ships, but only
two of these attained the dignity of maritime battles: the attacks on Manzanillo and the Bay of Nipe. The former was esteemed one of the strongest positions on the southern coast of Cuba, and as early as June 26 an endeavor had been made by the
Hist, Hornet and Wompatuck to destroy the Spanish vessels in the harbor, but were repulsed after disabling a torpedo boat and sinking a smaller vessel. Another attack made a day later by the Scorpion and the Oceola met the same fate, and Manzanillo was left at peace until July 18, when the same vessels reinforced by the Helena and Wilmington stood off from the harbor, just out of effective range of the Spanish guns, and poured a heavy and deliberate fire upon the shipping lying at the wharfs. This was completely destroyed, among the vessels being three blockade runners that had been active in bringing supplies to the Spanish forces. On August 12 a determined attack was made by Commander Goodrich of the Newark in an attempt to capture the city. With him were the Resolute, Suwanee, Oceola, Hist, and the Alvorado, one of the vessels captured from the enemy at Santiago. Early on the following day a general bombardment was commenced, after a refusal on the part of the Spanish commander of the garrison to surrender. An intermittent firing was kept up throughout the day and night.
The next day, however, flags of truce were seen flying over the city, and from a boat put out from the same the American ships learned of the signing of the peace protocol and the declaration of an armistice.
The Bay of Nipe is situated on the northeastern coast, across the island and directly north of Santiago de Cuba. It is a splendid harbor with a narrow entrance like that of Santiago.
As this was a point of rendezvous for Spanish gunboats, it was decided to occupy it, destroying or capturing any of the vessels that might be within. Accordingly on July 21 the Annapolis, Topeka, Wasp and Leyden appeared at the mouth of the harbor, which was reported to be strongly mined. In spite of this the Wasp and the Leyden steamed into the narrow channel and by good fortune escaped injury from the mines, finding within the harbor the gunboat, Don Jorge Juan. The other ships were signaled to enter, and the four sank the Spanish vessel after a few minutes of firing. A number of mines were raised but few of them appeared to be effective.
Thus point by point the American forces were advancing towards Havana. Each day meant a loss to the Spanish cause, and each day it became more and more apparent that the disorganized and corrupt administration of Spain could not meet the exigencies of the situation. At last the light began to dawn upon the other European powers that further continuance of the struggle could only result in disasters perhaps still more serious,- disasters, indeed, that might endanger the peace of Europe. Pres
NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.
First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba and her im mediate evacuation of the island.
Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now put forward any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless
by the United States early in the war tions demanded by the United States to carry the same across the Atlantic, for cessation of hostilities were exand after the destruction of Cervera's plictly stated. These were: fleet, the organization of a fleet for the purpose was fully determined upon. This was to be under command of Admiral Watson, and was to consist of the Iowa, Oregon, Yankee, Yosemite, and Dixie, with the Newark as flag-ship. Spain was almost without maritime protection; Camara, with the few remaining ships of war, was still dallying at the Isthmus of Suez, and should the threat be carried out Cadiz, Barcelona and the other coastal cities of the Peninsula would be at the mercy of the American fleet. To the continental powers this would not be a blow at Spain alone, but at all of Europe.
Subject thus to pressure from their own people within, and from influences without, the Spanish ministers decided to take steps leading towards a cessation of hostilities. Accordingly, the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, the Minister of State, through the offices of the French ambassador at Washington, Jules Cambon, sent a note to Secretary of State Day, the central point of which is expressed in the words: "To end calamities already so great and to avert evils still greater, our countries might naturally endeavor to find upon which conditions the present struggle could be determined otherwise than by force of arms."
This communication was received July 22, and four days later a reply was forwarded in which the condi
he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the Island of Porto Rico and the other islands in the West Indies now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and the cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States.
Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a
treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.
The reply of Spain to these conditions was received August 7. The demands contained in the first two clauses of the letter of the Secretary of State, Spain was already willing to accede; with regard to the third, however, there was an evident tendency expressed to temporize and make further conditions. Secretary Day, however, ignored this fact, and assuming that the Spanish government had agreed wholly to the conditions imposed, invited Ambassador Cambon to sign the peace protocol on August 10. Spain writhed under what she conceived to be severe conditions. In the words of the third clause she saw the passing of the last shreds of an empire that had been the greatest the world had seen. That the United States would be content with the city
and harbor of Manila, the Spanish authorities did not dream, for they possessed no lofty conception of the altruistic ideals of the American people. They saw intuitively, what the logic of events afterwards proved to be true, that America must give up all, or retain all, as far as the Philippines were concerned. Thus peace was disastrous, but war under the present conditions would be more so, and Spain humbled her pride and accepted the inevitable. Therefore, possessed of plenary power to act for the defeated nation, Ambassador Cambon signed the protocol on August 12. The result of this agreement was only a truce or armistice, but as it contained provisions for the estab lishment of a conference for the purpose of framing a treaty of peace, it was the virtual end of the war.
The signing of the protocol, however, could have no binding power on either of the powers, and, until a definite treaty could be drawn up and ratified, hostilities might be resumed at any time. To attain this highly desirable end, President McKinley appointed five commissioners to represent the United States in formulating the treaty of peace. A similar group was appointed by the Spanish administration, and on October 1, 1898, the first session of the conference was held at Paris. The United States commissioners consisted of William R. Day, who resigned the position of Secretary of State in order to become a member of the same; Senators William P. Frye, of
The American representatives were all men of ability, and were deeply versed in constitutional and international law. They had with them in addition an advisory staff of experts, the chief of whom was the secretary of the commisison, John Bassett Moore, one of the foremost authorities on international law in the United States. He served also as counsel for the American commission, and presented their arguments before the conference. The Spanish commissioners were also men of unusual force, and made a splendid but hopeless fight for every contested point. They were prepared to yield up Cuba and Porto Rico, but there were other points involved and concessions they demanded upon which they were deAs termined to hold their ground. the result the negotiations lasted for two months and a half, the treaty being signed on December 10, 1898. The conditions imposed by the United States seemed exceedingly severe to Spain, and if she had seen any hope of an alliance with a powerful nation, she would undoubtedly have accepted further hostilities rather than accept them. Her efforts in that way, however, were unavailing. There were but two powers to whom she could
THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PARIS.
turn: France and Germany. first was her friend because of the ties of a common Latin ancestry, and to another and more immediate cause for sympathy: the fact that the French people were in possession of vast aggregate of Spanish securities. Nothwithstanding such strong incentives for intervention, France was in no condition to come to the aid of Spain. In fact, she was having serious troubles of her own just at that time. Her relations with England were strained as a result of a result of the Fashoda incident, and at home the people were in a state of semihysteria over the Dreyfus affair. Then again, the French have always been a people of chivalry and hospitality; the Americans were guests of the nation, and hostile activities under such conditions in that respect would have stigmatized her good name.
Just what the Emperor of Germany had in mind in adopting an attitude of antagonism to America will doubtless never be known. It may be that, in his visions of Germany as a world power, he had cast longing eyes on the colonial possessions of Spain, which were clearly ready to fall into the hands of a more virile nation. It may be that it was disappointment that dictated the Kaiser's attitude throughout the Spanish-American war, but whatever it was it could not bear the test of overt opposition to the United States which a formal alliance with Spain would involve. In fact, as some one has said, the attitude of Germany was probably nothing more than a
bluff, for Emperor William was too great a man to fail to see that an alliance with Spain would have been a hostile act against those millions of German-born men and women who had found homes and prosperity in America.
So it was that the final pleas of Spain for intervention failed and she was forced to meet squarely the demands of the United States, clearly and immutably laid before her. The two points productive of most controversy at the sessions of the conference were the status of the Philippines and the Cuban debt. With regard to the former Spain maintained that the protocol did not involve the question of sovereignty of the islands, and therefore they should be returned, the demand for their cession being in fact a piece of extraordinary injustice. The American commissioners, on the other hand, claimed that the Spanish hold on the islands was so broken that any solution of the problem than that of American occupation was undesirable, if not impossible. In view of Spain's attitude on the question of the Philippines, nevertheless, the commissioners agreed to pay the sum of $20,000,000 for possession of the islands. This proposition was ultimately accepted, but not without much temporizing and many protests. With regard to the Cuban debts, the American commissioners absolutely refused to consider any proposition leading towards their assumption or guaranty. In reply to such propositions the point was made