or

This was the condition of affairs on What Schley's message from Santhe land, termed by Secretary Alger,* tiago had been to the navy depart

, the “ darkest day ” of the war. Cer- ment, this telegram was to the detainly the dispatch forwarded by partment of war. l'pon the great General Shafter did not tend to re- columned building where the departlieve the gloom. In it he said: ment made its home gloom settled so “We have the town invested on the north and

thick that it enveloped everybody east, but with a very thin line. Upon approach- from the President and the Secretary ing it we find it of such a character and the

down to the most insignificant mesdefenses so strong it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am senger boy. Imperative orders were seriously considering withdrawing about 5 miles

sent forth to obtain transports and and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with

start reinforcements to Santiago. our left at Sardinero, so as to get our supplies General Wilson's division was to a large extent by the means of the railroad

dered to be ready to move at a which we can use, having engines and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date will aggregate

moment's notice, and Shafter was 1,000, but list has not yet been made. But little

notified that he could have any reinsickness outside of exhaustion, intense heat and exertion of the battle of day before yesterday

forcements he wished. This was the and the almost constant fire which is kept up state of affairs until 7 P. M., when the on the trenches. Wagon road to the rear is kept

war and navy departments were up with some difficulty on account of rains, but I will be able to use it for the present. General both appalled by the additional mesWheeler is seriously ill and will probably have to

sage from Shafter to the effect that go to the rear today.ỉ General Young also is very ill; confined to his bed. General Hawkins

it was reported that Cervera's fleet slightly wounded in foot during sortie enemy had escaped. For three-quarters of made last night, which was handsomely repulsed.

an hour the whole administration was The behavior of the regular troops was magnificent. I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt in despair. The American cause had to force the entrance to the harbor, and will have received a blow to its prestige that consultation with him this morning. He is com

would have a fatal effect upon the ing to the front to see me. I have been unable to be out during the heat of the day for four course of the whole war. But the days, but am retaining the command.

truth regarding Cervera's fleet was Shafter, Major General.”

soon to follow, for at 7:19 P. M. came *R. A. Alger, The Spanish-American War. † “I regretted very much to see that General

the message announcing the glorious Shafter had telegraphed as he did regarding my victory of the fleet, and with it passed health. It is true that I had an attack of fever,

the mood of despondency. The capbut the same is true of every other General in the army in Cuba.

* After six days of ture of Santiago, at one stroke ceased this character of exposure I was taken with the

to be a matter worth endangering the fever ; but by placing myself under the charge of

lives of American soldiers. The army, a doctor and taking all the prescribed medicine, I was up and ready for duty on the morning of indeed, had fulsled its function, for July 1st, the day of the Battle of San Juan. I

it had rendered Cervera's position so was engaged during all this day; and even after dark I remained on the advanced line, to get up desperate that it was a question of entrenching-tools and to encourage the construe

scuttling his ships in the harbor or of tion of breastworks.”- Wheeler, The Santiago ('ampaign.

making a dash for liberty. He chose

a

the latter, and the world knew the cruiser Reina Mercedes in the channel result on the night of July 3.

narrows. It was assumed that SampNevertheless General Shafter and son's fleet would follow up its victory the authorities at Washington felt by an endeavor to force the harbor, so that Santiago should be taken if pos- the sole war-ship left to the defenders sible, hence orders were given to push was sacrificed in an endeavor to shut affairs at that place to a conclusion.* out American ships. As soon as the Already, on the morning of the 3d, Mercedes was discovered a continuous Shafter had forwarded a message to fire was opened on the ship and batGeneral Toral, who had superseded teries. In spite of this the vessel was Linares, informing him that if Santi- scuttled, but like the Merrimack, in ago were not surrendered immediately such a way as to leave the channel he would shell the city. The Spanish still open. This attack, joined with general curtly refused to accede to the General Shafter's ultimatum, threw demand, adding that there were 20,000 the people into a frenzy of fear. At non-combatants who were entitled to daybreak they commenced to emigrate protection, should the threat to bom- from the city. Carrying their propbard be carried out. In view of this erty on their backs 20,000 women, fact, General Shafter agreed to post- children, old men, and, as Lieutenant pone action until July 5, in order to Müller asserts, able-bodied men, bepermit these people to leave the city. gan their march toward the American When the situation was made clear to lines, establishing themselves finally the President and Secretary of War, at El Caney. Here they remained for Shafter was advised to strengthen his eleven days, without adequate food, position, but to avoid operations as water or shelter, resulting in an epifar as possible that would endanger demic which hurried a good share of the safety of the army.

them to their graves. “ Those eleven The foreign residents and non-com- days at El Caney have caused more batants of Santiago, believing that a victims in Santiago than the three general bombardment was imminent, years of war.” (Müller y Tejeiro.) on July 5, began an exodus to El There had been more or less fricCaney. The immediate cause of this tion between the army and the navy was a fearful attack on the harbor de- ever since the former had established fenses on the night of the 4th, when itself in front of Santiago. This, the Spanish attempted to sink the however, assumed an acute stage was, nevertheless, on the way to con- teries, and the fleet free to coöperate fer with Shafter on that point when with the army all tended to make the he was suddenly recalled by the exit Spanish position hopeless. “I make of Cervera. With the Spanish fleet this suggestion of a surrender,” he eliminated, General Shafter felt that proceeds," purely in a humanitarian the way was open for the American spirit. I do not wish to cause the ships to enter the harbor and co- slaughter of any more men, either of öperate with the army in forcing the your excellency's forces or my own; capitulation of the city. The fleet, the final result under circumstances however, still delayed action, Admiral so disadvantageous to your excellency Sampson maintaining that the army being a foregone conclusion.” After should capture the shore batteries be- a third demand for surrender, the fore an entrance be attempted.

threat to bombard on July 9, General In the meanwhile Shafter kept up a Toral communicated with the Spanish correspondence with Toral, a sort of

government and finally presented a truce being maintained between the counter-proposition in which he agreed two armies. He sent the wounded

to evacuate Santiago, retreating to Spanish officers and men back to San

Holguin, retaining all arms and postiago, under parole; an act that went. sessions. Without consulting with far to remove the false conception his generals, Shafter forwarded this held by the Spaniards as to the inhu

offer to Washington, recommending manity of the American soldiers.

that it be accepted. The reply from This act probably hastened the ex- the President and Secretary Alger change of Lieutenant Hobson and his

was a positive refusal of the terms men, who were liberated July 6.

offered by Toral: Toral, however, persisted in his re

“ You have been repeatedly advised that you fusal to capitulate, his attitude being

would not be expected to make an assault upon determined by the arrival of Colonel the enemy at Santiago until you are prepared Escario with 3,579 men.* On July 6,

to do the work thoroughly. When you are ready

*

holding the position you now have, and which without the harbor, and it was equally you regard as impregnable. Acknowledge receipt.

evident that Admiral Sampson had no By order of the Secretary of War. H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General."

intention of going in until there was

no possibility of endangering his In such“ unequivocal language,'

ships.* The gloom of the situation as Secretary Alger phrases it, was

was somewhat relieved by the arrival the general from Michigan rebuked

of Major-General Miles, the comby his compatriot, the Secretary of mander-in-chief of the army, on July War. It was sufficient. Telegraphing

11. He was empowered with auto Washington: “ The instructions thority to act only in

an advi. of the War Department will be carried

sory capacity, General Shafter beout to the letter,” General Shafter

ing advised by the Secretary of War notified Toral that nothing but uncon

to that effect. General Miles was ditional surrender would be consid

present during the preliminary negoered. The situation, in spite of rein

tiations respecting the surrender, and forcements, was becoming serious in

after seeing the condition of the army both armies; the Spaniards were re

recommended that immediate steps be duced to the lowest rations; and in the

taken to complete the taking of the American camps the rainy season had

city, either by means of attack or comset in with all of its distressing accompaniments, and, worst of all, yel- promise. The question of the sur

render thus dragged on; Toral inlow fever had made its appearance.

sisting that he could do nothing until Haste, above all things was impera

Havana and Madrid gave him permistive. It was thought that General

sion to yield up the city. This was Toral knew the condition of the

probably true, for General Linares, American army and was only seeking

from his bed of sickness addressed a to gain time. It was therefore de

pathetic letter to the Minister of War, cided to bring an end to the truce, so

in which he set forth the desperate on receipt of Toral's refusal to sur

condition of Santiago, making it clear render, a general bombardment was

that a policy of temporizing would in begun at 4 P. M. July 10, which lasted

no wise alter the final outcome, but until noon of the next day.

would only result in needless sacrifice As was the case with previous bom

of human life. bardments, the effect of the firing was

This and General Toral's represennot commensurate with the ammuni

tations had the desired effect, and on tion used. A number of buildings in

July 14 the latter informed General the city were damaged, but very few

Shafter that he was willing to capitulives were lost, the city being practi