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damage that might be anticipated.* These bombardments, whether immediately effective, were tremendously so in the long run, for they served as target practice under war conditions, and as such their extravagance may be justified. War is an expensive thing at the best, and the sacrifice of ammunition that results finally in victory needs little defense. What the gunners of the American ships learned at San Juan and against Morro and Socapa, they applied with a skill that astonished the world when Cervera's ships were fleeing along the coast of Cuba.

There were several actions of this kind during the time the army was pushing the Spanish back to the inner defences of Santiago. As has been seen, the fleet joined with the army in an attack on Aguadores on July 1. Again, on July 2, Punta Gorda, Socapa, and the other batteries were heavily bombarded, the first-named being the principal point of attack, the fire of the Indiana and the Oregon being wholly directed against it. In spite, however, of the moral effect of these attacks from the sea, General Shafter knew that Santiago could not be taken until the problem of the fleet had been solved. Already the ships in the harbor had joined in the attacks

Causing us only an insignificant number of casualties. They destroyed four huts belonging to the families of the lighthouse tenders without dismounting a single gun. It is inconceivable that so little damage was done, considering how many shells were directed against it [Morro Castle], including a dynamite projectile thrown one night by the Vesuvius."- Captain Victor Coneas y Palau, The Squadron of Admiral Cervera.

on the army, firing large projectiles over the hills into the American lines. Accordingly, therefore, on July 2, he wrote to Admiral Sampson requesting that he make an active move against the Spanish fleet. The latter had already pointed out the difficulties of such an endeavor, replying, nevertheless, that he would undertake it, if General Shafter insisted. The closing words of this letter are as follows: "It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port." As the result of this correspondence, it was arranged that Shafter and Sampson should hold a conference at Siboney on the next day.

The next day was Sunday. At 8:30, flying the signal: "Disregard the movements of the movements of the Commander-inChief,' the New York steamed towards Siboney with Admiral Sampson on board. The departure of the Spanish on that day was no more anticipated than it had been on any day during the weeks that had preceded. Nevertheless, the watch on the entrance of the harbor was as alert as ever.* The crews, however, were

* June 2, Admiral Sampson issued the following order of battle which was adhered to on July 3:

U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, 1ST RATE, Off Santiago de Cuba, June 2, 1898. The fleet off Santiago de Cuba will be organized during the operations against that port and the Spanish squadron as follows:

First squadron (under the personal command of the Commander-in-Chief).— New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter.

CERVERA'S FLEET EMERGES FROM SANTIAGO.

dressed in their holiday best, and the decks of the ships were enlivened with the suits of white duck the sailors had donned for the day. Prayers had been heard, and they were enjoying themselves just as they had done during the four Sundays that preceded. If one could forget the purpose and meaning of these tremendous engines of destruction, nothing could have been more peaceful than the day and the scene. But in a twinkling all was transformed! Suddenly a signal broke forth from the yards of the Iowa, followed immediately by the report of a gun. It was signal 250, "The enemy's vessels are escaping. Thus, rudely disturbed, the quiet and peace of the Sunday morning yielded to the tumult and the horrible necessities of war.

The Iowa was stationed directly opposite the mouth of the harbor, commanding a view down the same as far as Estrella Point. Lieutenant F. K. Hill, who was on the bridge in company with the navigator of the Iowa,

Second squadron (Commodore Schley).-Brooklyn. Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen.

Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the Commander-in-Chief. The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about 6 miles from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well in shore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port, and the second squadron on the west side. If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel. It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battleships.

In smooth weather the vessels will coal on station. If withdrawn to coal elsewhere, or for other duty, the blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle thus left vacant.

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Lieutenant Scheutze, caught the first glimpse (9:30) of the Spanish ships as they rounded Cay Smith. Giving the command to display the signal, he rushed to a gun on the bridge, aimed it towards the Spanish vessel and fired. In a second the whole fleet was stirring with preparations for the approaching struggle. proaching struggle. The American

ships were not under full head of steam, but they were in perfect condition, and fully able to develop sufficient speed to cope with the Spanish vessels, whose hulls were foul after the ocean voyage and the enforced inactivity within the harbor. Within five minutes every vessel in the blockading fleet was under way, closing in on the enemy. Owing to the peculiar situation of the Spanish fleet, each ship as it emerged became the target of the guns of all the opposing vessels, without opportunity to reply save with the forward guns.

The first of the ships to emerge was the Spanish flag-ship, the Infanta Maria Teresa, with Admiral Cervera and its commander, Captain Concas y Palau, on the bridge. For ten minutes she was alone in the open, torn by the masses of steel hurled against her. Turning to the west at full speed, she replied to her opponents as well as her desperate condition permitted. It was originally planned for the Teresa to ram the Brooklyn, but the maneuver of the Brooklyn in turn

"In compliance with this order [to ram the Brooklyn], I put our bow toward the armored cruiser Brooklyn. Brooklyn

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The position of the and the danger of being rammed by these two ships [Texas and Iowa].

ing to the port* instead of the starboard carried the latter so far from the Teresa that the folly of such an endeavor became apparent immediately. The punishment, too, being réceived by the Teresa was becoming so terrible that any offensive movement was beyond the question. Before the entire fleet had cleared the channel she had received her death-blow, due to the explosion of two 13-inch projectiles on the deck, breaking the steam and water pipes, and decreasing the speed of the vessel perceptibly. Says her commander, Capt. Concas y Palau:

"The steam permeated the poop, cutting it off completely, and invaded the turret, rendering it untenable. The fires increased, as we could not reach them. The crew of one of the small-caliber ammunition hoists were suffocated; a number of brave men who attempted to pass through the after gangways, led by a valiant officer, perished in the fire.

*

"At this moment, while, from the bridge, I was addressing the men who were fighting furiously amidst the frightful chaos which the deck of the cruiser presented, and was trying to ascertain what had occurred on the poop, * I fell severely wounded, and with me the two officers of the squadron staff, we three being the only ones left standing of the many who had been stationed defenseless on the bridge.

"During that furious struggle there was no time nor opportunity to call the executive officer, and therefore the admiral himself took command of the ship, while I was carried to the sick bay. The fire on the after deck of the Maria Teresa

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the admiral consulted me and agreed that it was impossible to continue."- Concas y Palau.

"As far as I could see, during the entire action, no Spanish ship gave the slightest indication of using either ram or torpedo."- Admiral Evans, in the Century Magazine.

*The hearings before the Schley Investigation Commission (U. S. Government Printing Office) reviews in the full the whole controversy between Admirals Sampson and Schley, including testimony regarding the Brooklyn's "loop."

grew more and more formidable, her speed dimin ishing every moment, and the havoc was constantly increasing, as we were within range of the rapid firers.* The Admiral therefore called the second and third officers and lieutenants, who were in his immediate vicinity, and it was agreed that there was no other recourse than to beach the ship, in order to prevent her from falling into the hands of the enemy and to save the crew, for which reason, putting her to starboard, the ship was run ashore about 5 miles from the mouth of the harbor " (Nima Nima).†

Following the Teresa, came the graceful armored cruiser, the Vizcaya. The Texas, Brooklyn and the Oregon immediately engaged her. Captain Eulate of the Vizcaya, in describing her experience, says:

"When the Maria Teresa headed for the shore

I passed her, and I had the Brooklyn, Texas, Iowa, and the Oregon all firing at me. The firing from these ships was terrific; shells were bursting all around us. My ship was set on fire by a shell exploding in my cabin. My engines and pumps were disabled, and I could not fight the fire. My men were being killed and wounded in large numbers. A shell finally exploded in one of my forward magazines and I was forced to head for the shore. When I went into the action I had flying at the masthead a large embroidered silk flag, which had been presented to the ship by the ladies of the province of Vizcaya. When I saw that my ship would be lost, I had this flag hauled down and burned, and hoisted another ensign in its place. My flag was shot away twice during the engagement, the last time just as the ship grounded. The boats of the Iowa picked up those of the many officers and men still left alive, and carried them to that ship. When I went on board the Iowa, I took off my sword and tendered it to Captain Evans, but he refused it, saying that I had fought four ships and that I should keep my sword. That was the proudest moment of my life."

"The Maria Teresa was struck 18 times by heavy projectiles. She was beached at 10:15."

In a number of accounts of the battle, Captain Concas is cited as having been killed; his dying words being quoted extensively. He lived, however, to write a most interesting and generally fair account of the contest.

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Nos. 1, 4 and 5 by courtesy of Collier's Weekly; Nos. 2 and 6 by James Burton; No. 3 from Stereograph copyright by Underwood & Underwood.

1. MARIA TERESA AND OQUENDO BURNING ON BEACH NEAR SANTIAGO. 2. WRECK OF THE VIZCAYA. 3. WRECK OF THE OQUENDO IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BATTLE. 4. THE VIZCAYA BURNING. 5. WRECK OF THE REINA MERCEDES (MORRO CASTLE IN THE BACKGROUND). 6. WRECK OF THE

OQUENDO TAKEN SOME TIME AFTER THE BATTLE.

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