Captain Cotton of the Harvard that the information came that Cervera had touched at St. Pierre, the principal port of the French island of Martinique, and two days later (May 14) came the news from Willemstad, Curaçao, that the Spanish fleet had obtained a small supply of coal for its torpedo boats at that point. Therefore, when Admiral Sampson anchored his vessels in the harbor of Cape Haytien (May 15), he received the information not vouchsafed by the guns of his fleet at San Juan. The same cable line that flashed this to Sampson was also the medium by which the Spanish admiral learned of the assault on San Juan, and he accordingly changed his plans. To go to that port under the circumstances, as he cabled to Minister Bermejo, "would be madness." That the Spanish ministry was aware of his desperate straits is furthermore evidenced by the message received by him from Bermejo while at Martinique to the effect that he could return to Spain if he found it necessary. Nevertheless, in spite of misgivings, he continued toward the coast of Cuba, finally reaching Santiago on May 19. To the Spaniards in Cuba the only

*

“Have received your cipher telegram advising

me of pitiful condition of your naval forces. Believe no more can come from Spain, as none were available except Carlos V, Alfonso XIII, and a few destroyers and torpedo boats. Pelayo has not, I believe, her secondary battery installed. Possibly some of the trans-Atlantics purchased may come with stores. I believe there are four; speed good. My coming here has been somewhat accidental; according to instructions I was to go to Porto Rico."- Admiral Cervera to the commandant-general of navy yard at Havana (Manterola), Santiago, May 22, 1898.

hope of saving the island lay in succor from the Mother Country. They well knew that the naval and military forces already available could hold out but a short time against the wellnigh unlimited resources of the United States. Any illusions they may have had were wholly dispelled by the coming of Cervera's fleet. Instead of a dozen battleships and a flotilla of lesser craft, here were only six vessels in all, some of them clearly crippled by the voyage across the Atlantic. The fleet, instead of proving a savior, soon proved to be an incubus, only adding heavier burdens to the beleaguered city. The additional 2,000 mouths to feed hastened the famine already imminent, and, furthermore the coming of Admiral Cervera, himself, soon resulted in a collision of authority between him and General Blanco that in the end proved disastrous to the plans of both.

For one week Cervera was unmolested in the harbor of Santiago, and if he had hunted throughout the harbors of the world he could not have found a more secure hiding-place. It was so secure, indeed, that once within, the problem would be to get out. Under favorable conditions the city could hold out against almost any force, military or naval, for na ture has done everything to render it impregnable. The entire line of the coast of the southern extension of Cuba is marked by mountains of heights varying from less than a thousand to 8,000 feet. These in many places rise sheer from the waters of

the sea, which, not far from the coast, assumes a depth of 6,000 feet. Here Here and there along this natural barricade are bays and inlets, which run back into the mountains. The largest of these are Guantanamo and Santiago. It is almost impossible for a person unwarned of its presence to discover the entrance to the latter, so narrow is it and so beset with mountains. The channel, though less than 200 yards in width, is of sufficient depth, and is feasible to the largest battleships. Guarding this entrance is the ancient Morro Castle, the largest and most interesting of the three in Cuba and

Porto Rico. It has all the character

istics of a medieval castle, and though it appears impregnable on its frowning height, 200 feet above the sea, it would be but poor protection against modern gun-fire. Santiago is at the head of the bay, four miles from Morro. Founded by Velasquez, the conqueror of Cuba (1514), it is perhaps the oldest city established by Europeans, and still retains many vestiges of its ancient origin.

The week following the departure of Cervera from Curaçao was a busy one for the American navy. It was assumed that he was bound for a Cuban port, for it was announced at Willemstad that San Juan was the objective point, and familiarity with Spanish diplomatic methods was not calculated to inspire faith in a statement made under such circumstances. As consequence San Juan was largely ignored for the time being. It was decided to envelop the island of Cuba

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with the entire naval force, and in furtherance of this plan Commodore Schley was ordered to proceed with the Atlantic flying squadron to Cienfuegos by the way of Yucatan Channel, thus sweeping the western end of the island in order to intercept Cervera should he attempt to reach Havana by that route. As Sampson's fleet was guarding the eastern end, the latter conceived that the escape of the Spanish fleet would be an impossibility.

Schley proceeded to Cienfuegos without discovering any traces of the foe, and finally stationed himself at that port, acting with such deliberation that he drew upon his head the ire of Secretary Long and Admiral Sampson, which resulted in the issuance of orders placing his squadron under command of Sampson. He was ordered to leave Cienfuegos on May 25 and proceed to Santiago de Cuba, but delayed his departure, acting on the assumption that Cervera was in the former port. His reports also contain a number of references to lack of fuel, and the difficulty of coaling off the Cuban coast. He arrived, however, at Santiago May 28, and immediately threw the navy department into a panic by threatening to return to Key West for supplies. Impera

* We have no desire to enter into the unfortu nate controversy that arose as a result of Admiral Schley's actions in the Santiago affair. The facts given are taken substantially from the documents themselves, and, although the Court of Inquiry requested by Schley himself decided (Admiral Dewey dissenting) that he had failed in his duty from the strictest point of view, yet

tive orders to remain at his post came from Secretary Long, which, however, were unnecessary, for in the meanwhile messages came from Schley to the effect that the Spanish fleet had been seen in the Santiago harbor.

During the course of all of the events at Manila and about Cuba, an American battleship was undergoing a test of a wholly different nature, but equally severe. It was decided before the outbreak of the war to transfer the battleship Oregon, called by the sailors "the bull-dog of the navy," from her station on the Pacific coast, where, indeed, she had been built, to Cuban waters. In a sense this tremendous voyage of more than 14,000 miles was a crowning test of the modern armored battleship. Indeed, save inadequately in the few unequal battles of the Chino-Japanese war, the ships of the new navies of the world had as yet not been thoroughly tried out.

The terrible disaster that had deprived the British navy of the Victoria, one of its most magnificent armor-clads, had caused grave doubts as to their efficiency when the real stress came. As the problems of the present struggle were primarily naval, it was anticipated that the modern ship of war would be subjected to the ordeal that would establish or set aside the principles upon

there is every reason for believing that he thought he was taking the course of wisdom. He made the mistake of assuming that the Spaniards would do the logical and advisable thing and enter the harbor of Cienfuegos. His misconception can be justified. His ability and bravery certainly are not open to attack.

which it was constructed. The naval expert of the time of Nelson, or of Ericsson even, could not have conceived, even in his wildest dreams, the battleship in its final state of evolution. Indeed it can hardly be called a ship at all, but a floating fortress, an aggregate of machinery, the most massive and the most delicate, to control which requires unusual skill and special knowledge. The lore of shrouds and knots has given place to that of range-finders, torpedo-tubes, dynamos, and all of the complicated electrical and other appliances that enter in the make-up of a modern ship of war.

When the orders came to make ready for its voyage, the Oregon was stationed at Bremerton, Washington. Its commander, Captain B. J. McCormick, was informed on March 7 that relations between the United States and Spain were fast assuming a critical aspect, in view of which fact he should go to San Francisco, and there lay in supplies and ammunition. When that point was reached, Captain McCormick, for reason of physical disabilities, was superseded by Captain C. E. Clark, who was ordered to proceed to Callao, Peru, the first stage of the Oregon's long voyage around the continent of South America. Here the gunboat Marietta, which had been stationed at Panama, having laid in a supply of fuel for the Oregon, left for Valparaiso, Chile, March 31, from which point she departed for Punta Arenas (Sandy Point), Patagonia, where more supplies were to be pro

cured by her commander. The Oregon reached Callao April 4, remaining there until April 7 coaling and completing work on boilers and engines. She then set forth for the Straits of Magellan, where the Marietta was to join her, the two vessels to journey together from that point. After coaling here, on April 21, the prows of the Oregon and the Marietta were turned northward on the voyage home. The miles to come were doubly arduous to officers and men, for at Rio de Janeiro they learned that war had been declared. The Spanish torpedo-boat, Temerario, was also known to be in the neighborhood of Rio, so precautions were taken to guard against a secret attack on the part of the same. At that place, also, the vessels were joined by the cruiser Nictheroy (later the Buffalo), which had been purchased from the Brazilian government. They were warned, in the messages from Washington, of the danger to be anticipated from the Cape Verde fleet, the Oregon being ordered to continue its journey without the Marietta and Nictheroy if delayed by the same.

A short test of his men at targetshooting with the big guns convinced Captain Clark that even should it be necessary to pit them against the entire Spanish fleet, he could give almost as good as received. His faith in the

"Oregon, Bahia, Brazil: Proceed at once to West Indies without further stop (in) Brazil. No authentic news from Spanish fleet. Avoid (same) if possible. We believe that you will defeat it if met. Long." (May 9, 1898.)

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Oregon is expressed in the message forwarded from Bahia: "Could steam fourteen knots for hours, and in a running fight beat off and cripple the Spanish fleet." Under rather than over-estimated was the report of the Oregon's possibilities as given by her commander, for, according to the ship's log of the run, she averaged 15 knots per hour for 155 knots - 1.5 knots per hour more than he calculated.

Off Cape Frio, the Marietta and the Nictheroy, the latter partially disabled, were left behind, and now the flying battleship set forth to make no stop until the enemy was passed or met. During the period that followed the last reports from the Oregon at Bahia until the news came of the anchoring at Bridgetown, Barbados, the nation held its breath, expecting every day to receive a message of disaster from the lone vessel. On May 24 she joined the fleet at Jupiter Inlet, Florida, and at last, on July 3, she met Cervera's fleet, playing a leading part in its doom.

"The total distance traveled by the Oregon during this record-breaking trip was 13,792 miles, at an average speed of 11.2 knots per hour. During the entire journey, the' engines were never once slowed or stopped for repairs. The voyage occupied sixty-eight days, of which fifty-eight days, or parts of days, were spent at sea. Such repairs as were necessary were made by the ship's force. No body of men could have worked more earnestly under adverse circumstances than did the Oregon's crew. Comfort was out of the question during the trip, but not a murmur was heard. Such patriotism speaks for itself. Later on, the crew showed its capacity for fighting as well as for work."- Lieut. W. H. Allen in The American-Spanish War, p. 175.

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As soon as Secretary Long was assured that Cervera had found refuge within Santiago harbor, Admiral Sampson received permission to proceed to that place, reaching there June 1, with the New York, the Oregon, the converted yacht Mayflower, and the torpedo-boat Porter under his command. During the course of the voyage he held a consultation with Commodore Watson and Captains Folger and Converse with respect to a plan for blocking the narrow channel of Santiago Bay, should Cervera prove to be within. The colliers Sterling and the Merrimack were suggested as possible sacrifices to the scheme, the Merrimack being selected on account of its unseaworthy behavior during Schley's activities around Cienfuegos. The day before arrival at Santiago, Lieutenant Richmond P. Hobson, assistant naval constructor, was called to the flag-ship to offer suggestions as to the best method for sinking the Merrimack. As a result of these consultations, the details of the plan were carefully

worked out, and so much was Admiral Sampson impressed by the qualifications of Lieutenant Hobson that he gladly placed him in command of the hazardous undertaking. The method determined upon was to hang ten improvised torpedoes along the bottom of the vessel, exploding them simultaneously by the means of electric batteries. Two methods of obtaining entrance into the channel were proposed: one to feign a chase by the American warships; the other to endeavor to slip in under cover of darkness. The former was rejected on account of the difficulty of navigating the narrow and crooked passage.

The whole scheme was thoroughly worked out by the time the New York arrived off Santiago, and immediately afterwards the Merrimack was examined and a careful reconnoissance made of the shores and defences by Lieutenant Hobson. Preparations were then made for stripping the collier and for making the torpedoes destined to sink the craft. Volunteers were also called for, and the