1. WRECK OF THE ISLA DE CUBA. 2. WRECKS OF THE ISLA DE LUZON AND DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA. SUNK BY DEWEY 4. THE ARSENAL AND SHIP YARD AT CAVITE. 3. VIEW OF MANILA BAY SHOWING SPANISH WARSHIPS THE SPANISH FLEET DESTROYED. At Five times the American fleet had steamed back and forth in front of the Spanish line of battle, and as yet there was no evidence of great damage having been done to the opposing squadron. The Reina Christina had been destroyed, and others of the ships had been on fire several times, but so had one of the American ships, and the enemy's firing was still as vigorous as at the beginning of the action. 7:35 o'clock, the Olympia displayed the signal: Cease firing, and follow the flag-ship." In obedience to this command, the fleet silenced its guns and withdrew out of range. This movement so astonished the Spaniards that they immediately cabled to Madrid the defeat of the American fleet. The cause of the withdrawal was a matter no less serious than a report from the ships that the ammunition was running low. When the ships When the ships were beyond the danger zone, orders were given to pipe the men to breakfast, much to the disgust of the guncrews who grumbled and expressed the sentiment, "To hell with breakfast!" The order, however, brought a blessed relief to the engineers, stokers, and magazine attendants, who had been working for two hours in a temperature ranging from 110° to 160°. A conference of the captains was called by Commodore Dewey, and when their reports were brought in, to the delight of all it was learned that the ships were practically uninjured. In addition there had been no loss of life, and the rumor that the ammunition was growing short was proved to be 109 erroneous. The moment of gloom was dispelled in a twinkling, and at once all were eager to complete the work. That it could be done no one had the slightest doubt. During this interim, Commodore Dewey sent a flag of truce to the batteries at Manila announcing that if they did not cease firing he would shell the city. This had the desired effect and the batteries were silent during the remainder of the action. After a rest of three hours, the fleet again steamed down in battle order, the Baltimore this time in the lead. It was then perceived that the work of destruction was almost complete. the Spanish ships showing clearly the fearful effect of the American guns. Only one of them, the Don Antonio de Ulloa, was able to make effective resistance, and its guns were soon silenced. The shore batteries, however, were still active, and two shots from them did considerable damage to the Baltimore, wounding two officers and six men. Steaming up to a distance of less than two thousand yards, the American fleet in obedience to its order to capture or destroy, completed its work, and soon the Spanish fleet was but a tragic array of battered hulks, whose exploding magazines continued the devastation begun by the American shells. The ships directed to destroy the arsenal and the batteries at Cavité were no less thorough; the battle virtually ceasing when a wellaimed shot blew up the powder magazine of the arsenal. At 12:40 the guns of the enemy no longer made reply, white flags of surrender were flying at Cavité and other points, so the signal to cease firing and anchor at will was displayed, and the battle of Manila Bay was at an end. In his report of the battle, Commodore Dewey, referring to Commander Wood, of the Petrel, who was detailed to destroy the small gunboats behind the point of Cavité, says: "This duty was performed in the most thorough and complete manner possible." These words might be taken from their context and applied to work of the American fleet as a whole. The battle of Manila in its far-reaching results, in the perfection of the method adopted by Commodore Dewey, in the insignificant loss of life experienced by the victors, and in the absolute thoroughness with which the task was performed, was one of the decisive naval battles of the world's history. CHAPTER III. 1898. CREATING AN ARMY. -Size of Difficulties in the mobilization of a large army-The navy better prepared than army. army on a peace basis - Reply to call for volunteers - Need for care in subjecting men to tropical conditions Organization and training camps. Owing to the fact that Commodore Dewey was not permitted to make use of the cables running from Manila to Hong Kong, authoritative information regarding the battle did not reach the United States until May 7. In the meanwhile public attention was occupied by the events taking place in the Gulf of Mexico. At the outbreak of the war rash statements had been made to the effect that 50,000 soldiers could be poured into Cuba within a fortnight, and the Spanish army put to flight within thirty days. It was soon discovered, however, that mobilizing an army was no less a problem in 1898 than it was in the days pre ceding the disaster at Bull Run. It was found that the entire organization of the war department was incapable of bearing up under the strain arising from the conditions of war, and the readjustments found imperative and experiments that were made during the first days of the war resulted in delays and perhaps disasters. In comparison with the navy, the army presented to the public a very shabby and discreditable spectacle. And yet the people, in a way, were responsible for the condition as it existed. Soon or late, Congress always gives the people what they want, and as yet there had been no insistent de THE VOLUNTEER ARMY. mand for an increased or more efficient army. Pressure of circumstances and popular opinion had been responsible for the building of the new American navy, but there had been no call for an army capable of doing more than protect the country during the internal dissensions that might arise during times of peace. It was evident from the beginning that the regular army of 28,143 men would serve merely as the nucleus for an army such as would be required in the conflict now imminent, and the States were accordingly called upon for their quota of volunteers. On April 23, two days after the opening of hostilities, the President issued the proclamation calling for 125,000 two year volunteers. The reply was a revelation to those who conceived that the martial spirit of America was passing, for instead of thousands, hundred of thousands offered to go to the front, and it was only by the most rigid examination in order to eliminate every one in the least physically or otherwise unfit that the number was reduced to the required point. The weak, the underweighted, the hollow-chested, and the puny were left out. The examinations were as severe as those conducted in time of peace, and the result was the selection of none but those fittest for the task. It was the fittest, alone, who would survive, for these volunteers were to contend with foes quite as merciless and far more insidious than the Spaniards: with heat, malaria, yellow fever, and all the other evils of the tropics. Of these volun 111 teers many were raw boys, scarcely out of school, some were negroes, not a few were battle-scarred veterans who had worn the blue and the gray during the '60's, whose eagerness to fight side by side in this conflict with a foreign foe revealed how truly was the nation a unity at last. A month later (May 25) the President issued another call for volunteers, and again the reply was as enthusiastic as before. Several hundred thousand responded when only 75,000 were desired. The same caution, however, was exercised in this case as in the first, and the final result was an army of 200,000 recruits, raw, and mainly untrained in the elements of military science, but material out of which an invincible army could be shaped in a comparatively short space of time. The following table shows the volunteer army as organized, with the number of men supplied by each State: |