ment, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war. The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.' This stipulation clearly embraces the claim of the plaintiff-its claim against the United States for indemnity having arisen prior to the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace with Spain." THINGS DONE AFTER CONCLUSION OF TREATY OF PEACE. According to the doctrine of the best jurists, the effect of Peace, once contracted, being to render unlawful every act of force or violence between States, if a capture be made after the stipulation is completed, though by persons ignorant of its completion, it must, vi pacis, be restored, "sublatum enim jam erat belli jus.” 66 For Peace (says the author just cited) is considered to be broken non modo si toti corpori civitatis, sed et si subditis vis armata inferatur nimirum sine novä causâ:" and for this grave and excellent reason," nam ut omnes subditi tuti sint pax initur; est enim pax actus civitatis pro toto et pro partibus." Phillimore, vol. III, pp. 777, 778; Grotius, 1, iii, c. xx, ss. 20. 32. Abreu, however, is strongly in favour of the lawfulness of the prize, and maintains stoutly the rights of the captor. He was acting under a lawful commission; till that commission was directly or by clear implication revoked, it was his right and duty to act under it. At the time of the capture that commission was not so revoked; the capture was therefore legal. To the argument that the conclusion of the Peace can retrospectively affect the prize, he answers that a jus superveniens can never by retroaction affect the jus tertii, which is the right of the captor in this supposed case. The answer to the argument of Abreu appears to be that of the indemnification of the captor should proceed from the State to which he belongs; and that though individuals are not deemed criminals for continuing hostilities after their cessation has been agreed upon, through ignorance of that cessation, yet they are civilly responsible before the tribunals of International Law. When a place is exempted from hostilties by articles of Peace it is the duty of Governments to apprise with due diligence their subjects of the fact; and to indemnify them for acts done in ignorance of that Peace. But it is the actual wrongdoer who is to answer in judgment: the person from whom the injury has been received cannot be passed over in order that it may be fixed upon another person on the ground of a consequential responsibility. So, if a captain, acting under the orders of an admiral, be the seizor, he, and not the admiral, must be called, as the immediate wrongdoer, to adjudication. Phillimore, vol. III, pp. 778, 779; The Mentor, 1 Rob. Adm. Rep. p. 171. It may happen that a period has been fixed by Treaty for the cessation of hostilities within or at a specified place, and before this period has arrived, but with a knowledge of the Peace, a capture has been made. In such a case, is the capture lawful? Jurists have entertained different opinions upon this subject. Mr. Chancellor Kent adopts the opinion of Emerigon, that it would be unlawful; and his reasoning, viz. that if a constructive knowledge of the Peace, after the time limited in different parts of the world, renders the capture void, much more ought actual knowledge of the Peace to produce that effect. It appears to the writer of these pages that this reasoning is sound and ought to govern the practice of States. Phillimore, vol. III, p. 779. The effect of constructive knowledge has undergone considerable discussion in the French Prize Courts. It arose on the capture of the British ship Swineherd by the French privateer Bellone in 1801. The Swineherd was carried into the Isle of France and condemned as prize. An appeal was instituted in the Conseil des Prises at Paris; that tribunal confirmed the judgment of the Court in the Isle of France. We are indebted to M. Merlin for the report of the case. Unfortunately we are not indebted to him for the expression of his own opinion, which that learned and laborious jurist expresses his determination to withhold, when he introduces the case to our notice. He reports, however, at length the argument of the Advocate-General, M. Collet Descotils, in favour of the legality of the capture. The case depended in some measure upon the 11th article of the Preliminary Articles of the Peace of Amiens; it was decided, rightly or wrongly, that the French privateer was entitled to its prize, the Swineherd, upon a variety of grounds, the principal of which appear to have been, that the capture was made at a period anterior to the time fixed for restitution; that it was sheltered by the Preliminary Article which has been mentioned; that there was, on the part of the privateer, "le défaut de connaissance suffisante de la cessation de toute hostilité." Phillimore, vol. III, p. 779; Merlin, Rep. tome xxv, tit. Prise Maritime, s. 5, p. 115. Another case different from the foregoing has happened, and been subjected to judicial decision, both in England and the North American United States,-the case of a capture made before the period fixed for the cessation of hostilities, and in ignorance of the Peace; but not carried into port and condemned. The vessel was recaptured after the period fixed for the cessation of hostilities, but in ignorance of the Peace. In both countries the possession of the captor was holden lawful, and the divesting him of his possession unlawful. The title of the owner was completely barred by the intervention of Peace, which quiets all titles of possession to property of this kind arising from War. It is no longer competent to the original proprietor to look back to the enemy's title, either in his own possession or in the hands of neutral purchasers. And here it may also be remarked, that if a new war break out after the Treaty of Peace, on account of nonfulfilment of its provisions or for any other reason, though that may change the relation of those who are parties to it, it can, as Lord Stowell observes, have no effect on neutral purchasers, who stand in the same situation as before. Phillimore, vol. III, p. 782; The Legal Tender, Wheaton's Digest, p. 302; The Schooner Sophie, 6 C. Rob. 143. Civil responsibility for continuing hostilities. But though individuals are not deemed criminal for continuing hostilities after the date of the peace, so long as they are ignorant of it, a more difficult question to determine is, whether they are responsible civiliter in such cases. Grotius says, they are not liable. to answer in damages, but it is the duty of the government to restore what has been captured and not destroyed. In the case of the American ship Mentor, which was taken and destroyed, off Delaware Bay, by British ships of war, in 1783, after the cessation of hostilities, but before that fact had come to the knowledge of either of the parties, the point was much discussed; and it was held that the injured party could not pass over the person from whom the alleged injury had been received, and fix it on the commander of the English squadron on that station, who was totally ignorant of the whole transaction, and at the distance of thirty leagues from the place where it passed. There was no instance in the annals of the prize courts of such a remote and consequential responsibility in such a case. The actual wrongdoer is the person to answer in judgment, and to him the responsibility, if any, is attached. He may have other persons responsible over him, but the injured party could look only to him. The better opinion was, that though such an act be done through ignorance of the cessation of hostilities, yet mere ignorance of that fact would not protect the officer from civil responsibility in a prize court; and that if he acted through ignorance, his own government must protect him and save him harmless. When a place or country is exempted from hostility by articles of peace, it is the duty of the government to use due diligence to give its subjects notice of the fact; and the government ought, in justice, to indemnify its subjects who act in ignorance of the peace. And yet it would seem from that case that the American owner was denied redress in the British admiralty, not only against the admiral of the fleet on that station, but against the immediate author of the injury. Sir William Scott denied the relief against the admiral; and ten years before that time relief had equally been denied by his predecessor against the person who did the injury. If that decision was erroneous, an appeal ought to have been prosecuted. We have, then, the decision of the English High Court of Admiralty, denying any relief in such a case, and an opinion of Sir William Scott many years afterwards, that the original wrong-doer was liable. The opinions cannot otherwise be reconciled than upon the ground that the prize courts have a large and equitable discretion in allowing or withholding relief, according to the special circumstances of the individual case, and that there is no fixed or inflexible general rule on the subject. Kent, vol. I, pp. 185, 186; The Mentor, 1 C. Rob. 179; The Ostsee, 9 Restoration of captured property. If a time be fixed by the treaty for hostilities to cease in a given place, and a capture be previously made, but with knowledge of the peace, it has been a question among the writers on public law whether the captured property should be restored. The better and the more. reasonable opinion is, that the capture would be null, though made before the day limited, provided the captor was previously informed of the peace; for, as Emerigon observes, since constructive knowledge of the peace, after the time limited in different parts of the world, renders the capture void, much more ought actual knowledge of the peace to produce that effect. Kent, vol. I, p. 186. What constitutes knowledge of peace. This point was extensively discussed in the French prize courts, in the case of the capture of the British ship Swineherd, by the French privateer Bellona, in 1801, and what was sufficient knowledge of the fact of the peace to annul the capture was the great question. The English ship was taken possession of, and carried into the Isle of France, and libelled, and condemned as lawful prize of war. The sentence of condemnation was affirmed in 1803, on appeal to the Council of Prizes at Paris, and M. Merlin has reported at large the elaborate argument and opinion of M. Collet-Descotils, the imperial advocate-general in the Council of Prizes, in favor of the captors. The ground he took, and upon which the Council of Prizes proceeded, was, that the king's proclamation of the signature of the preliminary articles of peace, though made known repeatedly to the French cruiser before the capture, but unaccompanied by any French at |