before Petersburg, when he sought to overwhelm Grant's left in the extending movements, he invariably failed. All that he ever accomplished in these operations was to annoy, and disturb, and injure his antagonist. He never defeated Grant's aim; he never drove him from a position; he never compelled him to withdraw. Full, however, of the devices of a wily strategy, the rebel chief was often able to elude a force which he could not withstand; he fled with eminent success; and as a purely defensive fighter was probably never surpassed. The national soldiers had a saying that Lee knew how to feed a fight; he discovered the point where troops were most needed, and there he threw them constantly and continuously. No one would probably have held off the national armies longer than he, and it is doubtful whether an offensive defence would have succeeded better against Grant. Elaborate, specious, elusive, not free from the besetting sin of the South-a tendency to duplicity —but stubborn, valiant, and arrogant, Lee was on the whole a fitting representative of a cause which, originating in treason, based on the enslavement of a race, and deriving its only chance of success from men who had been false to their military oaths, was, in reality, a rebellion against the rights of man, and a defiance of the instinct and judgment of the civilized world. He fought with the splendid energy of that arch rebel who was expelled from heaven, and his downfall was as absolute. To overthrow him and his desperate supporters, Grant needed more help than he could get even from the government and his generals. He needed soldiers with many of his own traits. And as any man of surpassing success probably represents and typi fies his time, it is not surprising that some of the same qualities which distinguished him as a commander can be detected in the men whom he commanded. The national soldiers were not, as a rule, so brilliant as the rebels in a charge, and no better behind works, but they were more persistent in attack, and better able to perform evolutions under fire. They were not so apt to lose head in battle, and recovered sooner from the effects of disaster. The enemy oftener succeeded by surprise, but seldom reaped the full result of a victory; and rarely won except by a first, impulsive, and unexpected onset. In this the Southerners were like the negroes. But, when it came to sustained, renewed, deliberate assault, it was the national soldiers who bore away the prize. Excellent But, after all, it is only by transcendent effort that transcendent success is ever attained. people, good soldiers, brave men, careful generals, are not enough in offensive war with determined foes. The troops who do what can neither be expected nor required are the ones who are victorious. The men who, tired, and worn, and hungry, and exhausted, yet push into battle, are those who win. They who persist against odds, against obstacles, against hope, who proceed or hold out unreasonably, are the conquerors. And for chiefs-there are only two or three in a generation. It is no disparagement of a man that he has not genius. We cannot expect every one to be the exception. There were many admirable tacticians, and strategists, and engineers, as well as loyal subordinates and faithful, heroic patriots in the national army; there could be in the nature of things only two or three supereminent commanders. Only one could be at the top. In such an one there should be found, above all things, a comprehensive grasp of the situation, of the relations of the various points and events of the field to each other, and to the general purpose; a faculty of retaining the head under unexpected circumstances; not only of planning in advance, but of originating new combinations when the old ones are interrupted; and, as much as anything, a judgment and impulse combined, both audacious yet neither incautious; a decision in acting on this judgment and impulse instantaneously, without waiting to balance chances; and, thereafter, neither doubt nor delay, but only belief and persistence to the end. Such an one, if simple, honest, unambitious, and magnanimous, might aptly represent the best results of a republic, and worthily command its armies even in those crises when nations are never saved without a leader. Early in June, 1865, steps were taken with the sanction of the government to procure the indictment of Lee and others for the crime of treason. The former rebel chief at once appealed to Grant, who went in person to the President, and protested verbally and in writing against the measure. Johnson, however, was obstinate, and Grant finally declared that he would resign his commission in the army if the paroles which he had granted should be violated. This determination was conclusive. The proceedings were abandoned, and the communication of this decision was the last official act in the intercourse of Lee and Grant. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXV. SHERIDAN'S STRENGTH IN THE CAMPAIGN IN THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA, 1864. GENERAL SHERIDAN TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY. SION, HEAD-QUARTERS, MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION, GENERAL: I have the honor to forward as complete a field return as is possible at the present time. The most strenuous exertions are being made by me to obtain a full return, but the difficulty in obtaining such from the commanding officer, Department of West Virginia, because of his command covering so great an extent of country, has so far prevented. The enclosed return does not include the cavalry under Averill, about 2,500, or the troops of the Department of Washington, Susquehanna, or Middle. I simply forward it you as a statement showing the number of men for duty south of the Potomac. Hoping soon to furnish complete all reports required, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Brigadier-General L. THOMAS, P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General. Adjutant-General, United States Army. FIELD RETURN OF TROOPS IN THE FIELD BELONGING TO THE MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION, SEPTEMBER 10, 1864. This return is the only one made by Sheridan to the AdjutantGeneral prior to the battle of Winchester; and, as it was accompanied by a statement of its incompleteness, I applied to his head-quarters for a return of his effective strength, but, owing to the loss of all his papers in the Chicago fire, I was unable to obtain either the numbers or organizations detached from his army south of the Potomac. It was stated, however, that the garrisons of Harper's Ferry, Charleston, Martinsburg, and other points, together with escorts to trains, were of sufficient size to reduce the force in the field to the numbers given in Sheridan's report to Grant, which were taken at the time from the official returns of effective or fighting strength present for duty. But as these returns were never sent to Washington, and were destroyed as above stated, it was impossible to furnish copies of them. At Grant's head-quarters it was always understood that Sheridan's effective force in the Valley campaign was about thirty thousand men. -AUTHOR. |