CHAPTER XXVI.

Grant's original plan at the West to move to the sea-Plan turned over to Sherman when Grant became general-in-chief-Co-operation of Banks and Canby prevented by Red river disaster-Sherman first proposes destruction of railroad to the rear-Unity of instinct between Grant and ShermanSherman reverts to original plan-Grant first suggests movement to Savannah, instead of Mobile-Sherman promptly accepts suggestionDevelopment of views of the two commanders-Hood moves to rear and threatens Sherman's communications-Sherman obliged to follow-Grant makes a movement before Richmond to prevent Lee reinforcing Hood -Sherman still anxious for his onward march-Sherman first suggests leaving Hood in bis rear-Hood attacks Chattanooga railroad and Sherman again compelled to follow-Grant meanwhile arranges for Sherman's march to the sea-Attack and defence of Allatoona-Repulse of rebelsSherman again suggests moving to Savannah, leaving Thomas to contend with Hood-Grant at first prefers Sherman to destroy Hood before moving to sea-Sherman repeats suggestion-Grant sanctions movement, if line of Tennessee can be held-Mutual confidence of Sherman and Grant -Superior responsibility of Grant-Daring of Sherman's conceptionComparison of Sherman's plan with that of Grant behind VicksburgDifference between Grant's original plan and modifications of ShermanOriginality of Sherman-Movement of Grant on the James in support of Sherman and Sheridan-Orders to Butler and Meade-Grant has small expectation of capturing Richmond at this time-Hopes to gain advantage before Petersburg-Complicated responsibilities of general-in-chief-Movement of Butler from Deep Bottom-Capture of Fort Harrison - Ord wounded-National advance interrupted-Grant enters captured workAssault by Birney repelled-No further advantage gained north of James --Correspondence of Grant with President in regard to Sheridan-Sheridan's operations facilitated by movement on James-Meade moves out to left-Warren captures work on Peeble's farm-Ninth corps at first forced back, but afterwards rallies-Warren holds his position-Three rebel assaults on Fort Harrison-Butler retains his prize-Rebels with

draw within their lines-Advantage gained by Grant on both flanksBalancing character of operations-Consternation in Richmond-Anxiety of Lee.

IN the midst of Sheridan's brilliant successes in the Valley, the general-in-chief was obliged to turn his attention to the new situation in Georgia; for as soon as Atlanta was won, it became necessary to determine what use should be made of Sherman's victorious army. Grant's original plan, while he still commanded in person at the West, had been to acquire Atlanta, and then, retaining possession of that important place, to fight his way to the sea, thus dividing the Confederacy again, as had already been done when the Mississippi was opened the year before. Mobile was the point he desired to strike, and a co-operative movement, under Sherman or McPherson, was designed, to secure that place as a new base for his army, when it arrived. On the 15th of January, two months before Grant became general-in-chief, he said to Halleck: "I look upon the next line for me to secure to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile, Montgomery and Atlanta being the important intermediate points . . . Mobile would be a second base." A copy of this letter was sent to Sherman, and on the 19th of January, the scheme was also unfolded to Thomas.*

When the command at the West was transferred to Sherman, that general was instructed to carry out this programme, and Banks was directed to concentrate his entire strength against Mobile, so as to open up a base for Sherman as he emerged from his southern campaign. The Red river dis

* See Vol. I., pp. 554 and 555.

aster, however, prevented the co-operation of Banks, and after Canby took command at the South-West, he also was for a long time unable to act offensively. Still, the original idea was kept steadily in mind by both Grant and Sherman. On the 29th of May, Sherman telegraphed from Dallas: "Johnston has in my front every man he can scrape, and Mobile must now be at our mercy, if General Canby and General Banks could send to Pascagoula ten thousand men ;" and on the 30th, he proposed that A. J. Smith's division should be reinforced and sent "to act against Mobile, in concert with Admiral Farragut, according to the original plan." To this Grant replied, on the 3rd of June: "If there are any surplus troops West, they could be advantageously used against Mobile, as suggested in Sherman's despatch;" and on the 5th, he added, from Cold Harbor: "The object of sending troops to Mobile now would be, not so much to assist Sherman against Johnston, as to secure for him a base of supplies, after his work is done."

But it was found necessary to transfer A. J. Smith to West Tennessee and the Nineteenth corps to Virginia. Canby was therefore unable to send any force whatever to act against Mobile until late in July, and then only two thousand men under Gordon Granger, to co-operate with the fleet. Farragut, however, with splendid daring, steamed his vessels past the forts at the entrance to Mobile bay, and during the month of August all the defences of the harbor were either evacuated or surrendered. By the 23rd, the fleet had complete possession of the bay, but the city itself remained in the hands of the rebels. On the 13th of August, rumors of these

events reached Sherman, at that time contemplating his final circuit around Atlanta, and he telegraphed at once: "If there be any possibility of Admiral Farragut and the land forces under Gordon Granger taking Mobile, and further, of pushing up to Montgomery, my best plan would be to wait awhile, as now, and operate into the heart of Georgia from there."

This was just at the time when Hood's cavalry under Wheeler had been sent to cut the railroad between Atlanta and Chattanooga, and on the 13th of August, Sherman learned that Wheeler was threatening Dalton. "Before cutting loose, as proposed," he continued, "I would like to know the chance of my getting the use of the Alabama river. I could easily break up the railroad back to Chattanooga, and shift my army down to West Point and Columbus, a country rich in corn, and make my fall campaign from there." Large ideas were evidently floating in his brain, but as yet without form and void. The same day he said: "If ever I should be cut off from my base, look out for me about St. Mark's, Florida, or Savannah, Georgia." This was the first mention in the correspondence of either Grant or Sherman, of the destruction of the railroad to the rear, or of the possibility of a campaign in Georgia, like that behind Vicksburg, entirely without a base. Doubtless, the idea was presented to Sherman by the menace to his communications offered by Wheeler's cavalry, as well as by his memory of the strategy which had been so successful in Mississippi, the year before.

On the 18th, Grant replied: "I never would advise going backward, even if your roads are cut so

as to prevent receiving supplies from the North. If it comes to the worst, move South, as you suggest." The unity of instinct between the two soldiers was as remarkable as ever. There can be no doubt that if Grant had never directed Sherman to open a line to the sea, that general would himself have conceived the idea; and if Grant had been on the spot instead of Sherman, events would beyond all question have suggested to him most of the modifications of the plan which occurred to his subordinate. As it was, the thought had passed between them, and was for weeks developing before it took actual and definite form; affected, in the first place, by the idiosyncrasies of each, and afterwards, as the thoughts and plans of all great soldiers are, by the varying circumstances of war; and in this instance, especially liable to change, when so many campaigns were combined and involved, and so many and distant armies were cooperating.

On the 17th of August, Sherman reverted to the primitive idea: "We must have the Alabama river

but of course I must trust to Admiral Farragut and General Canby." To Canby he said on the same day: "If possible, the Alabama river should be possessed by us in connection with my moveinents. I could easily open communication with Montgomery." On the 4th of September, after Atlanta had fallen, he proposed that he and Canby should each be reinforced by fifty thousand men ; that Canby should move to Montgomery, and he himself towards the same point, and, then forming a junction, they should open the line to the Gulf of Mexico. On the 10th, he said to Canby: "We must