of Anderson's intention, he would doubtless have facilitated, rather than interrupted, his march. As it was, he waited now to be certain that troops had started for Richmond. Indeed, for a fortnight this was the whole policy of Grant; but of course the country could not be apprised of the plan, and failing to understand the delay, became impatient again. On the 8th, the general-in-chief said to Sheridan: "If you want to attack Early, you might reinforce largely from Washington. Whilst you are close in front of the enemy, there is no necessity for a large force there. This is not intended to urge an attack, because I believe you will allow no chance to escape which promises success." But Anderson still remained in the Valley, and Sheridan telegraphed : "Early's infantry force and mine number about the same. I have not deemed it best to attack him, but have watched closely to press him hard, so soon as he commences to detach troops for Richmond. This was the tenor of your despatch to me after I took up the defensive." To this Grant replied, on the 9th: "I would not have you make an attack with the advantage against you, but would prefer the course you seem to be pursuing; that is, press closely upon the enemy, and when he moves, follow him up, being ready at all times to pounce upon him, if he detaches any considerable force." Meanwhile, the enemies at home were making the most of the delay and proclaiming Sheridan to be another failure. Not only the loyal people, but the government, were anxious; the continuous threat of invasion was intolerable, and the use of the rail Still, road and canal had become indispensable. Grant hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. The condition of affairs throughout the country required great prudence, and defeat in the Valley could be ill afforded. He was unwilling to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing the personal feeling of Sheridan as to the result. He indeed always took into consideration the temper and mood of his generals, and often in actual battle went to the front, not only to observe for himself the condition of the field, but to discover the spirit and inclination of commanders. In the same way he left City Point on the 15th of September, to visit the Valley, and decide, after conference with his lieutenant, what order should be made. He travelled direct to Charlestown, not stopping at Washington on the way. That night, Sheridan learned that Anderson was moving through Winchester, on his way to Front Royal. He felt then that the time for battle had come, and had almost made up his mind to fight at Newtown, in the rear of Winchester, giving up his own line, and throwing himself on that of the enemy. He was, however, a little timid about this movement, until the arrival of Grant ;* but then he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay, what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that the general-in-chief declared the only instructions She "I was a little timid about this movement until the arrival of General Grant."-Sheridan's Official Report. Sheridan was never timid afterwards. He learned to confide in himself, and to know his own genius. Grant knew it too, and was never anxious about Sheridan again. ridan needed were to advance. This was on Friday, and the supply trains were waiting at Harper's Ferry for forage. Grant asked if the teams could be brought up in time for an attack on the following Tuesday; and Sheridan replied that he could be ready before daylight on Monday. Grant gave him the orders, and felt so confident of the result, that he left the front, and went to New Jersey, to put his children at school.* On the 17th of September, Early, with inexcusable folly, still further divided his command. Though weakened already by the loss of Anderson, he marched with two divisions of infantry and a large force of cavalry, to Martinsburg, twenty-two miles away, to do what damage he could to the railroad, leaving the remainder of his force in front of Winchester. Sheridan at once detected the blunder of his antagonist, and instead of moving to Newtown, as he had intended, determined to attack the enemy in detail, fighting first the two divisions left near Winchester, and then the two that had been moved to Martinsburg. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 18th, his whole army marched from Berryville towards the Opequan. But at Martinsburg Early learned that Grant had been with Sheridan, and anticipating some movement of importance, he at once * "You may recollect that, when I visited Sheridan at Charlestown, I had a plan of battle with me to give him. But I found him so thoroughly ready to move, so confident of success when he did move, and his plan so thoroughly matured, that I did not let him know this, and gave him no order whatever except the authority to move. I was so pleased that I left, and got as far as possible from the field before the attack, lest the papers might attribute to me what was due to him."-General Grant to Author, June, 1878. .. set out to return.* At daylight on the 19th, there was one rebel division immediately in front of Sheridan, and another only five miles to the north, while two, still nearer, were marching rapidly up on the road from Martinsburg. Sheridan was promptly informed of these dispositions of the enemy, and understood that he now must fight the entire command of Early. His plan was to attack the rebels with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, holding Crook's division in reserve, to be used as a turning column when the crisis of the battle occurred. His cavalry he placed on the right and left of the infantry. The approach to Winchester by the Berryville road is through a difficult gorge, and it was nine o'clock before an advance in line could be effected. The attack was then made in handsome style, without cover; but by this time Early's two divisions from Martinsburg had come upon the ground, and the rebels were not only able to hold their own, but made a countercharge, and the national centre was forced back for a while. Sheridan, however, threw forward Upton's brigade and struck the attacking column in flank, when the rebels in turn were driven back, and the national line was re-established. The enemy's principal strength was opposite Sheridan's right, where where the Martinsburg road comes in, and Crook was now directed to find the left of the rebel line, strike it in flank or rear, and break it up, while Sheridan made a left half wheel of the main line of battle to support him. Crook * "At Martinsburg I learned that Grant was with Sheridan that day, and I expected an early move."-Early's Memoir, page 84. ridan needed were to advance. This was on Friday, and the supply trains were waiting at Harper's Ferry for forage. Grant asked if the teams could be brought up in time for an attack on the following Tuesday; and Sheridan replied that he could be ready before daylight on Monday. Grant gave him the orders, and felt so confident of the result, that he left the front, and went to New Jersey, to put his children at school.* On the 17th of September, Early, with inexcusable folly, still further divided his command. Though weakened already by the loss of Anderson, he marched with two divisions of infantry and a large force of cavalry, to Martinsburg, twenty-two miles away, to do what damage he could to the railroad, leaving the remainder of his force in front of Winchester. Sheridan at once detected the blunder of his antagonist, and instead of moving to Newtown, as he had intended, determined to attack the enemy in detail, fighting first the two divisions left near Winchester, and then the two that had been moved to Martinsburg. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 18th, his whole army marched from Berryville towards the Opequan. But at Martinsburg Early learned that Grant had been with Sheridan, and anticipating some movement of importance, he at once * "You may recollect that, when I visited Sheridan at Charlestown, I had a plan of battle with me to give him. But I found him so thoroughly ready to move, so confident of success when he did move, and his plan so thoroughly matured, that I did not let him know this, and gave him no order whatever except the authority to move. I was so pleased that I left, and got as ... far as possible from the field before the attack, lest the papers might attribute to me what was due to him."-General Grant to Author, June, 1878. |