the Constitution. Let it also be remembered that in the Convention which framed the Constitution the proposition to grant to the General Government the power to coerce a State or States of the Union was overwhelmingly voted down, thus receiving no favor in that convention, which knew far more about the Constitution than did Lincoln, Lincoln to the contrary notwithstanding. These and other equally important facts will forever stand out above the plane of the Constitution like the peaks of the great Rocky Mountain system, as eternal witnesses to the truth of history. Before their testimony all such pleas as "playing my last card" will be assigned to ignominy as hypocritical, unjust, illegal and tyrannical.

We might suppose from his complacency and self-assurance that this proclamation was well received throughout the North. But was it? Mr. Morse says, "The measure took the country by surprise;" that "some remained just as distrustful and dissatisfied toward him (Lincoln) as ever." "Some said he had been forced into this policy, some that he drifted with the tide," thus evidently without the all important compass, the Constitution. Others said "he was false to the responsibility of a ruler." "Its immediate practical effect was to unite the South and divide the North. Upon the whole, it created general alarm throughout the North." These extracts from Morse's Abraham Lincoln (American Statesman) speak for themselves. Are they condemnatory? They show that the spirit of Northern injustice was not yet general. So great was the sentiment of dissatisfaction that Congress felt compelled to come to the assistance of Lincoln and by resolution ratify the President's policy "as well adapted to hasten the restoration of peace" and "well chosen as a war measure." It is thus always with wrong and injustice. Truth and right never need props. Wrong and injustice always do.

Consider another fact. "The President himself afterward declared 'his conviction' that had the proclamation been issued six months earlier it would not have been sustained"—thus declaring it absolutely necessary to first create a public opinion before it would be sustained. As it was, when issued, Mr. Wilson says, "The larger numbers received it with deadly and outspoken op

position." Professing great respect, even reverence, for public opinion, he created a public opinion to suit his purposes.

What now becomes of that "Necessity," declared to have made the proclamation constitutional? If this necessity was the result of his own creations was it not artificial, and hence false? But according to Wilson, public opinion did not sustain it at the time the proclamation was issued. For "the larger numbers received it with deadly and outspoken opposition." Had he changed as to public opinion? Did he not assert in his inaugural address that his election upon the Chicago Platform committed his policy to the principles of that platform because of the will of the people? And this, too, when elected by less than 39 per cent of the votes cast? But he was elected, and on the Chicago Platform? Yes. Did that platform express the sentiments of the American people? No; not by sixty-one and fourfifths per cent. But did not Mr. Lincoln assume that the people had elected him President? Yes; and correctly so. Did not this election, therefore, place the Chicago Platform above all Supreme Court decisions? By no means. That platform had not been submitted to the States as an amendment to the Constitution, and was not so regarded. The Constitution makes special provision for submitting to the States Constitutional amendments for their approval or rejection. The submission of that platform to the people was made by a political party, and not as an amendment to the Constitution.

But did not Mr. Lincoln assume that his election demanded the policy of the Chicago Platform? Yes, but wrongfully so. Did he not say, "If I had issued that proclamation six months earlier it would not have been sustained?" Does not Mr. Wilson say, "It met with deadly and outspoken opposition by the large numbers" when issued? Do not Lincoln and Wilson establish the fact that public sentiment was against it six months earlier and at the time it was issued? But even if sustained by public opinion would that justify his assumption as to making the Chicago Platform his policy? Not even if he had been elected by a majority vote, for that platform was unconstitutional according to a Supreme Court decision.

If public sentiment was decidedly against the proclamation six months before it was issued what about it on the 4th of March, 1861, the time of the inauguration nearly two years earlier? Will not all admit that if Lincoln in his inaugural address had declared his purpose to issue a general emancipation proclamation the entire North would have stood as a solid wall of adamant against him? How then was this great change of policy brought about? Who can say every step of approach was not of cunning and deception?

We ask further: If the Chicago Platform had declared in advance in favor of issuing a general emancipation proclamation under any circumstances, would Lincoln have been elected? Do not all know that both Lincoln and his platform would have met with a Waterloo? Whence then this boast that it was in accordance with the sentiment of the American people? Do not all know, therefore, that the war was the result of a disguised policy? That every step in its conduct was a step of cunning and intrigue? Has it not been admitted that the Northern masses were under "a splendid popular delusion?" Do not all know that foreign powers were deceived both as to the character of the Government and the cause of the war? Do not all know that Federal defeats were often claimed as victories by the Government, and that small victories were often magnified into great ones? Was not even the drawn battle of Antietam claimed as a victory, and made the occasion of issuing the emancipation proclamation? These things being true, was not the war from the standpoint of the South a contest for truth and principle, and from the standpoint of the North a contest for emancipation and revolution?

Mr. Morse says, "It soon became evident that a formidable reaction of this (hostile) kind had taken place; that dissatisfaction with the anti-slave measures and discouragements together were even imperiling Republican ascendency, meant, in fact, the speedy settlement of the war by compromise. . .Therefore in those elections of the autumn months in 1861 the whole question of Union or Disunion had to be fought out at the polls in the loyal States, and there was an appalling chance of its going against the Union party. . .

"The Democracy made its fight on the ground that the antislavery legislation of the Republican majority in the 37th Congress had substantially made abolition the ultimate purpose of the war. Here, then, they said was a change of base.

"The administration had committed itself, the party and the nation decisively to the 'bold, far-reaching, radical and aggressive policy,' from which it would be impossible afterward to turn back without deliberately resolving to sacrifice our nationality. In his proclamation Lincoln proclaimed to the people "that their only chance now lay between slavery on the one hand and nationality on the other, so that of the two things they might take that one of the two they deemed the more worthy. The two together they never could again have."

Unless the people could divest themselves of all delusions, and look backward to the origin of the troubles of these "dark days" it would seem utterly impossible to present to them a stronger appeal than these simple words of Lincoln. Yet who does not see the fallacy in such phrases as these, "without deliberately sacrificing our nationality" and "between slavery on the one hand and nationality on the other." Would the nationality of the United States have been destroyed by the secession of a few States? Just as well ask would a tree be destroyed by removing a few of its limbs? Lincoln had a peculiar genius of making error appear to be truth, and fiction appear to be fact. Morse says, "He was a shrewd politician in matter of detail." The very atmosphere of a frontier life seems to implant in the human mind a cunning, a shrewdness, to which civilization is a stranger; and when to this is added a moral insanity the cunning and shrewdness become such indeed.

Under strong appeals like these the men of the loyal States went to the polls in the autumn of 1862. "In September, in Maine. upon a vote for Governor, a Republican majority, which usually ranged from 10,000 to 19,000, was reduced to 4,000, and for the first time in ten years a Democrat secured a seat in the House of Representatives."

"In October, Ohio elected 14 Democrats to 5 Republicans. In Indiana 8 Democrats and 3 Republicans were sent to Congress. In Pennsylvania the Congressional delegation was divided, but

the Democrats polled the larger vote by about 4,000; 'whereas Mr. Lincoln had had a majority of 60,000'! In New York the famous Democratic leader, Horatio Seymour, was elected Governor by about 10,000 majority. Illinois, the President's own State, showed a Democratic majority of 17,000, and her Congressional delegation stood 11 Democrats to 3 Republicans. New Jersey turned from Republican to Democracy. Michigan reduced a Republican majority from 20,000 to 6,000. When the returns were all in, the Democrats who had only 44 votes in the House in the 37th Congress, had 75 in its successor. Even if the non-voting absentees in the army had been all Republicans, which they certainly were not, such a reaction would have been appalling.

"Fortunately some other Northern States-New England's six and Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, California and Oregon-held better to their Republican faith. But it was actually the border slave States which in these dark nad desperate days, came gallantly to the rescue of the President's party.

"Thus was the much maligned border State policy at last vindicated; and thanks to it the frightened Republicans saw, with relief, that they could command a majority of about twenty votes in the House. Mr. Lincoln (not the border States) had saved the party whose leaders had turned against him.

"Beneath the dismal shadow of these autumnal elections the thirty-seventh Congress came together for its final session December 1, 1862. The political situation was peculiar and unfortunate. There was the greatest possible need for sympathetic co-operation in the Republican party; but sympathy was absent, and co-operation was imperfect and reluctant. The majority of the Republican members of Congress obstinately maintained their alienation from the Republican President! an enormous popular defection from Republicanism had taken place in its natural strongholds; and Republican domination had only been saved by the aid of States in which Republican majorities had been attainable because a large proportion of the population was so disaffected as either to have enlisted in the Confederate service, or to have refrained from voting at elections held under Union