that independence. All admit that each of the thirteen original States were once independent States. The Constitution is evidence that in express terms not one of these States delegated awaits independence. Therefore each of the States were independent in the Sixties; and as such had the same right to secede it had to accede.

It was November 1860 when the presidential election occurred. Most of the State Legislatures were yet to convene in regular session. In some cases special sessions were convoked to consider the momentous questions of the hour. In most instances conventions were called. Conventions more truly represent the sovereign will of the people than do Legislatures. These conventions did not question the right of secession any more than did New England in the early days of the Republic. It was in this way these States had entered the Union. In this way they should withdraw from the Union, if they must. They deliberated: and deliberation precluded the idea of haste. They debated-earnestly debated. This precluded the idea of unanimity, and hence that of conspiracy. It meant they were there to weigh all questions pertaining to their welfare and to determine what, in their judgment, was the best policy in the midst of the perilous conditions thrust upon them. All the facts pertaining to these conventions clearly preclude the idea of organized conspiracy. as falsely charged by the dominant unconstitutional party.

Between the election and the inauguration about four months had intervened. Hence there was no necessity for haste. The time was ample for calm deliberation, both North and South. Buchanan, the out-going President, held that the Federal Government had no right to coerce a State. In this decision he was sustained by the whole line of Presidents who preceded him. On the 3rd day of December, 1860, in his message to Congress he said: "Our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never be If it cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war. cannot live in the affections of the people it must one day perish. Congress may possess many means of preserving it by conciliation, but the sword was not placed in their hands to preserve it

by force." But conciliation meant the Constitution with the Supreme Court, and the dominant party, as we have seen, would have none of that.

In the convention of 1787 a proposition was actually made to authorize the employment of force against a delinquent State. To this proposition Mr. Madison replied: "The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might have been bound." The convention promptly voted down the proposition and settled the judgment of that convention as to the right to use force against a State, to the right of a State to secede. It will be remembered that when Mr. Lincoln, in his Cooper Institute speech, was pretending to show by irrelevant votes "the intention of the fathers," he overlooked this clear-cut fact which admits of no doubt as to their intention. Such evidence was too conclusive for him. The stealth of the Indian characterized all his arguments. Would he have seen this well established fact of history if the presidency had not been in sight? Was not Lincoln human as well as we?

At this time there were men in all the Northern States, moved by the lust of of self-aggrandizement. They appealed to passion. They incited the North against the South. They declared the right to coerce a State. They encouraged the policy of war against the South in case of secession. But there were also in the Northern States men unmoved by sordid consideration. They asserted the right of a State to secede. Many of these were found in the ranks of the dominant party. Among these was the distinguished editor of the New York Tribune, the organ of the Abolitionists. He said, "If the Southern States wish to withdraw from the Union they should be allowed to do so; that any attempt to compel them to remain by force would be contrary to the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and to the fundamental ideas upon which human liberty is based; if the Declaration of Independence justified the secession from the British Empire of three millions of subjects in 1776, it is not seen why it would not justify the secession of five millions of Southerners from the

Union in 1861." He also said, "Sooner than compromise with the South and abandon the Chicago Platform let the Union slide."

Confessing the Constitutional right of secession this great editor placed the party platform above the Constitution-above the Union. Was it unnatural for the South to think it might ease the conscience of the party in power, if the Southern States should withdraw from the Union? Moreover, this same editor said, "If the Southern people wish to leave the Union, we will do our best to forward their views." Why should not that party have wished this? Had they not declared the Constitution "a covenant league with hell and a compact with death?" A leading Boston paper had for its caption: "ACovenant with Hell." Why was the American Constitution termed a covenant with hell? Simply because it was distinctly proslavery. It is universally admitted that all who held these views belonged to the anti-Constitutional or Republican party It was their insidious attacks upon the Constitution which created the alarming conditions that resulted in the disruption of the Union in 1861. Who then caused the war?

A few leaders of the anti-Constitutional party were honest enough to confess that they preferred their party platform to the Constitution of the Union. Among these, as we have just seen was the distinguished editor of the New York Tribune. Why did not Lincoln adopt the views of this editor? He knew, that without the conciliation of the South on the basis of the Constitution, it would mean a disrupted Union; and that a disruption of the Union would be justly charged to his, the antiConstitutional party, for their aggressions on the South, the Supreme Court and the Constitution. This would bring upon him and his party the odium of having severed the Union. In short it would mean retreat, confession of wrong, and disaster to all his cherished hopes. On the other hand, to reject the editor's views would mean to advance, to maintain their anti-Constitutional platform, and, if successful, would mean to reap an imperishable rame, even though illegally won.

The only question now was that of success or failure. The penalties of failure were great. Their dreadful warnings urged him on with the madness of desperation. The rewards of success were most alluring, under whatever conditions, or by whatever means that success might be won. To him it justified the use of all means, whether legal or illegal, right or wrong, within his power, necessary to accomplish his purpose. His position, at the head of the Government, was the one of the greatest possible advantages. All its power and all its resources were at his command. Then, too, all its moral influence was at his back. Only thirty-eight and three-tenths per cent of the votes in that election were cast for him, yet he was elected. Even though all these votes were purely sectional, he construed his election to mean the repeal of the decision of the nation's Supreme Court, as to the equal rights of the Southern States in the Territories; and to mean that his anti-Constitutional platform superceded the court and the Constitution.

Cautious, at first, he began by declaring his purpose to enforce the law in the seceded States. In vain was he admonished by leading statesmen of the North and of all parties, that there were no laws to be enforced in these States; and that the enforcement of the law meant war and only war. But to him the war was only a 30 days' job, and he turned a deaf ear to all their admonitions.

These are the new species of patriots that laid claim to "the principles of the fathers.". Yet hostility to the Constitution was as conspicuous in all their principles as the love and reverence for the Constitution was with the fathers. To love and cling to what another hates is in turn to be hated and despised. The Southern States loved and clung to the Constitution. They were therefore hated and despised. In these perilous times, rendered perilous by the agitators of the North, every breeze brought renewed intelligence of hostility to the South. Jeers and taunts and bitterness and insults were the themes of the press and pulpit. And who were the Southerners that they should deserve these denunciations? Did not their future prowess on the field reveal them to have been princes among men? What had they done to deserve anathemas from the North? Their great sin, their only sin, was they had been true to the Constitution of the Union.

THE SOUTH, HER ACCUSERS, AND HER EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE UNION AND THE CONSTITUTION UNIMPAIRED.

On the 12th day of February, 1790, just eleven months and eight days after the inauguration of Washington, a petition headed by Dr. Franklin, and having for its ultimate object the abolition of slavery within the States, was presented to Congress. Congress answered this petition by declaring it had "no authority in the emancipation of slaves."

This was the first note of centralism under the Constitution. It had been heard in the convention that framed the Constitution, and silenced there, but not subdued. It was soon heard again, and again, only to be silenced. Its discordant notes were heard in the first judiciary act; in the financial measures under Hamilton; in the assumption of the State debts; in the first appropriation bill; and loudly in the Alien and Sedition Act.

Assuming the popular name of Federal, the Centralists were very bold from 1790 to 1798, when they met with an overwhelming defeat by Thomas Jefferson. There are not wanting a few who believe but for this defeat, their measures would have resulted in war.

They were silenced now for a longer time but still not subdued. They were still vigilant and hopeful. The time came when by "the law of climate" the Northern States had abolished slavery. The eagle eye of Centralism now caught the popular issue on which to win victory. That issue was "the wrong of slavery." On it the North could be united against the South. The North being vastly superior in numbers, in wealth, and in all the materials of war, if victorious at polls, could easily enforce her demands. Another popular title was now assumed, that of Republican. It was called the new party by its advocates. But its title and its claims denied its tenets. It was the same old Federal party under a new name, with the abolition feature added.

It is true, it did not, in express terms, lay claim to Centralism. That would have been unpopular. But to be anti-Constitutional in