the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men." A less doctrinaire statement was that of New Hampshire, to the effect that there should be such a separation of powers "as the nature of free government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in an indissoluble bond of union and security."

Though the separation and balance of governmental powers, was accepted in theory there was in practice no such equilibrium established as the theory called for.1 On the contrary, there was an exaltation of the function and position of the legislature and a corresponding depression of the others, particularly the executive. Everywhere there was manifested great jealousy of the state executive, and numerous restrictions were thrown around his tenure, term, and prerogatives. In many cases the governor was elected by the legislature,2 his term of office was limited to one year,3 restrictions were placed upon his appointing power, and in only a few cases was the veto allowed. The judiciary was declared independent by some states, but was generally dependent in respect to appoint

1 On the Revolutionary State Constitutions see "The First State Constitutions," by W. C. Morey, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. IV; also, in Vol. IX, "Revolutionary State Constitutions," by W. C. Webster.

8

2 N.J., Del., Md., Va., N.C., S.C., Penn., Ga.

3 N.H., N.C., Va., Mass., N.J., Penn., Ga., Conn., R.I., Md.

4 Mass., S.C. (1776), N.Y. (with Council of Revision).

ment and salary upon the governor and council, or even directly upon the legislature.1 When it is further considered that in many states almost all of the important officers were appointed by the legislature; that in two states there was a unicameral legislature; 2 and that the constitutionamending power was often vested in the ordinary legislature,3-it becomes evident that the predominant position was held by that body. The strong dislike of the English crown and of the royal governors had led to a reaction against executive authority in general that resulted in the practical supremacy of another of the three coördinate branches of government, namely, the legislature. There was naturally greater readiness to intrust the necessary governmental powers to this body, inasmuch as the legislators were regarded as the immediate representatives of the sovereign people. In the long and bitter struggles of colonial days, the Americans had learned to trust and rely upon the legislature, and to suspect and antagonize the executive. They, therefore, reduced to a minimum the powers of the executive and intrusted such authority as seemed necessary for the establishment of government to the legislature. They

1 Va., N.H. ('76), N.C., S.C., N.J., Del., R.I., Conn.

2 Penn., Ga., Vt.

8 In Ga., Mass., and Penn. provision was made for amendment by a convention; in the other states where mention was made of amendment, the power was vested in the legislature.

G

W

did what the English Parliament had done and
was yet to do still more emphatically, asserted the
superiority of the legislature over the executive.
In addition to the separation of powers, another
method used for the purpose of holding in check
the government was the grant of power for a
short term only. To guarantee security, it was
thought that power must be kept close to its true
basis, the people. In this way the rise of arbi-
trary rulers could be prevented and the officers
intrusted with power be made responsible to the
people. As John Adams once said, "where annual
elections end, there tyranny begins." 1 This idea
was conspicuous in the constitutions of the states,
where frequency of election received both theo-
retical and practical support. Maryland declared
a long continuance in the first executive depart-
ments of power or trust is dangerous to liberty;
a rotation, therefore, in those departments is one
of the best securities of permanent freedom." Of
like import was the statement of Massachusetts:
"In order to prevent those who are vested with
authority from becoming oppressors, the people
have a right . . . to cause their public officers to
return to private life." In general, officers were
allowed short terms only. Governors were in
many cases annually' elected, legislatures for the
same period, and other officers, with the exception of
judges, followed the same rule. This requirement
1 Cf. the Pennsylvania Constitution, Sec. 19.

was made still more rigid by the provision in many instances that the office-holder should be ineligible to the same office for a certain period of years, as one in three, two in four, or some like ratio. Thus the officer was not only limited to a short term, but was forbidden continued reëlection, and constitutionally forced to retire, even though his administration had been of the ablest kind. The evils arising from the existence of a permanent or hereditary office-holding class, it was determined to prevent even at the cost of administrative efficiency.

In these different ways, then, the attempt was made to keep alive the principle of popular sovereignty, and to prevent the development of a tyrannical government. What was feared at that day was not the incapacity or inefficiency of those conducting the administration, but the tendency of the ruling class to oppress in some way or other the class to be ruled. To the theorist of that time, every officer appeared to be a possible foe to the security of the individual and his property. The great guaranty of liberty was, therefore, to give the rulers as little power as possible and then to surround them with numerous restrictions, to balance power against power, to compel a frequent return to the people for renewal of the tenure of authority. This was the mechanism devised to carry out the democratic theory, and to prevent the recurrence of governmental tyranny.

It is essential to notice, however, that while the

revolutionary theory was democratic on its destruc tive side, and to a certain extent on the constructive side, there were also present aristocratic tendencies of a pronounced character. Democracy had by no means reached the degree of development that was attained in the following century.

The most marked of these aristocratic features in the government of the "Fathers" was the limitation upon the suffrage. In actual practice the basis of their democracy was not very broad, or, at least, was relatively narrow when compared with that of the present day. The principle was laid down in some of the state constitutions that those were entitled to the suffrage who showed "sufficient evidence of attachment to the community." This evidence, however, generally consisted in the possession of a certain amount of property, preferably real estate. In discussing the subject of representation, Franklin said that "as to those who have no landed property, . . . the allowing them to vote for legislators is an impropriety." 1 Hamilton considered that those who possessed no property could not properly be regarded as having a will of their own.2

In drawing up the state constitutions the property qualification was adopted, as a guide for determining who should be entitled to participate in the choice of officers. The accepted idea was that 1 Works, IV, 221, 1766.

2 Ibid, II, 62 ff., The Farmer Refuted.