in fact, a part of the government. In this way the party may be made responsible, and the danger, that under a more centralized system party bosses would wield still greater power, may be averted.1

Another interesting phase of American political theory is the effort made by numerous thinkers to distinguish between "state" and "government." From the earliest days of the Republic, the difference between "people" and "government" has been emphasized, and the assertion made that sovereignty rests with the "people" as distinguished from the "government." This idea was more systematically stated by Lieber, who made a distinction between state and government. The state in his opinion is the jural or political society which the whole community constitutes. The government is the instrument through which the political society acts, when it does not act directly.2

In the theory of Burgess, this distinction has been made a cardinal principle of political science and of public law. The state is "a particular portion of mankind viewed as an organized unit." The government is a particular form of organization through which the state acts. In early times, he points out, there was no clear distinction made between the state and the government; they were,

1 On the function of political parties, see H. J. Ford, The Rise and Growth of American Politics, Chaps. XXIII-XXV.

2 Political Ethics, I, 238; Brownson, op. cit. 174-175.

in fact, blended in the person of the king; but in modern times the distinction has become clearly evident, and the government need not now be confused with the political society. In the United States, in particular, this has been recognized and embodied in our system of public law. Here we have a separate and distinct organization for state and government in their several capacities.

Burgess makes several important applications of this doctrine to political problems. In the classification of political systems, for example, the recognition of this distinction between state and government is of great advantage. The difficulty involved in democratic Cæsarism is on this basis easily explained, for such a system is really a combination of democratic state with monarchic government. In the same way we may have a democratic state with an aristocratic government, or an aristocratic state with a monarchic government. Since the state and the government are distinct, any combination of monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements is possible.

Application of this idea is also made by Burgess to the vexed question of sovereignty. The strongest objection to the recognition of the absoluteness of sovereignty arises, it is pointed out, from the general failure of publicists to distinguish clearly between "state" and "government." One fears to place unlimited power in the hands of the ordinary government, and failing to distinguish between

this and the state, declares against supreme power in general. In strict analysis, however, the "government is not the sovereign organization of the state. Back of the government lies the constitution and back of the constitution the original sovereign state which ordains the constitution both of government and liberty." Recognizing the fact that the sovereignty belongs not with the ordinary government or administration, but with the state in supreme organization, the admission of the character of the ultimate power presents fewer and less formidable difficulties. This double organization is á feature in which American public law has advanced beyond that of the states of Europe, since here is to be found an organization of the government in its local and central branches, and then, above these governments, the organization of the state in its supreme and all-controlling capacity. Thus, in our political system, government and state are distinctly organized, and have distinct methods of action.1

The reflection of American political theorists on the problems of modern democracy has not up to the present time taken on scientific form. In fact,

1 A similar distinction is made by Woodrow Wilson, although in his theory the line is drawn between "society" and "government," while the terms "state" and " "" government are used interchangeably. Society, in his phrase, is termed an "organism," and government is characterized as an "organ." The State, Secs. 1160, 1269-1273. Cf. Willoughby, The Nature

of the State, 8. Wil

the two great studies of American democracy have been made respectively by a Frenchman and an Englishman: Democracy in America by De Tocqueville and The American Commonwealth by James Bryce. There has been no profound and comprehensive study of the facts and the philosophy of modern democracy by an American thinker. In recent years, however, considerable attention has been given to the nature and meaning of democratic institutions, and there have been numerous discussions centering around the problems of democracy. The weakness of popular government in our large cities has been considered by a number of thinkers; among the most conspicuous is Godkin, in his Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy and Problems of Modern Democracy. The relation of democratic government to modern industrial combinations has been considered by Moses in his sug gestive sketch on Democracy and Social Growth? The compatibility between democracy and colonial government has been discussed, among others, by Giddings in Democracy and Empire. Eliot has pointed out certain contributions made by Ameriloughby distinguishes between state and government on the ground that, strictly speaking, state is "an abstract term," whereas govern ment is "emphatically concrete" - a distinction corresponding, he says, to that between a person and his bodily frame. For his criticism of Burgess's theory, see op. cit. 206, note.

1 E. L. Godkin, Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy (1898), Problems of Modern Democracy (1896).

2 Bernard J. Moses, Democracy and Social Growth (1898).

1

can democracy to civilization, and Lowell has shown the relation between democracy and the constitution.2 Numerous other interesting and useful contributions have been made, but in none or all of them is there found that complete study of modern or American democracy which it is desirable to have.

Within the last few decades, no little attention has been given in America to the study of social forces in the general sense of the term. These investigations have been directed primarily to the observation and classification of social facts, but incidentally contributions have been made to the solution of certain problems of political theory. Attention has already been called to the restatement of the doctrine of natural rights at the hands of Giddings. In his Dynamic Sociology (1883), Lester F. Ward lays great emphasis on a more scientific direction of social forces. The science of society, he urges, should lead up to the art of society, which in his terminology is known as "collective telesis." There ought to be a transformation of

3

1 Charles William Eliot, American Contributions to Civilization (1897).

2 A. L. Lowell, Essays on Government (1892). See also Gamaliel Bradford, The Lesson of Popular Government (1899); Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (1902); J. H. Hyslop, Democracy, A Study of Government (1899); David Starr Jordan, Imperial Democracy (1899). 8 See ante, p. 310.

4 See also "Collective Telesis," in the American Journal of Sociology, Vol. II.