activity, and the contention is made that "each function must rest on its own utilitarian basis.' This specific determination belongs to the domain of government rather than of political theory. Willoughby predicts, however, that with the development of civilization and the increasing complexity of industrial interests, the activity of the state must continue to expand.

Among the authorities on political economy, the early idea of laissez faire, at least in its extreme form, has been subjected to severe criticism, and in general has been abandoned. The new position is a mean between socialism and extreme individualism. Francis A. Walker characterized the situation when he spoke of "those of us who discerned the coming of a storm and removed ourselves and our effects from the lower ground of an uncompromising individualism to positions somewhat more elevated and seemingly secure."1 He declared, and this statement is typical of the general attitude of the economists, that he believed “a large practical gain to the order of society and the happiness of its constituent members would in the long result accrue from the interposition of the state."2 Every proposal, however, for the ex

1 Discussions in Economics and Statistics (1899), I, 344.

2 Ibid. II, 271. In the American Economic Association (1885) there was an interesting discussion on this point. Among other statements, that of Edmund J. James was significant: "We do not regard [the state] as a merely negative factor, the influence of which is most happy when it is smallest, but we recognize that some of

tension of the powers and duties of the state should be subjected to careful scrutiny, and the burden of proof should be thrown upon those who advocate the innovation. Furthermore, no changes should be made in the direction of state regulation for transient causes or doubtful objects. The principle of action would seem to be to consider each case on its own merits, without reference to the question of individualism or socialism. In cases where the economic principle of competition appears to be threatened, the interference of the state seems to be most cheerfully welcomed.1

From a consideration of these various opinions, it is evident that the modern idea as to what is the purpose of the state has radically changed since the most necessary functions of a civilized society can be performed only by the state, and some others most efficiently by the state; that the state, in a word, is a permanent category of economic life, and not merely a temporary crutch which may be cast away when society becomes more perfect." Publications of the American Economic Association, Vol. I, 26.

An interesting attempt to lay down definite principles respecting the function of government has been made by H. C. Adams, in The Relation of the State to Industrial Activity (1887). His fundamental proposition is that neither the English idea of the individual as supreme, nor the German idea of the state as supreme, is the correct one. Both state activity and individual activity are in reality functions of society - the "living and growing organism— the ultimate thing disclosed by analysis of human relations." The point of view in the discussions of the sphere and duty of government should be therefore that of the society, rather than that of the individual or the state.

1 See in this connection Richard T. Ely, Socialism and Social Reform (1894).

Y

the days of the "Fathers." They thought of the function of the state in a purely individualistic way; this idea modern thinkers have abandoned, and while they have not reached the paternalistic or socialistic extreme, have taken the broader social point of view. The "protection " theory of the state is on the decline; that of the general welfare is in the ascendant. The exigencies of modern industrial and urban life have forced the state to intervene at so many points where an immediate individual interest is difficult to show, that the old doctrine has been given up for the theory that the state acts for the general welfare. It is not admitted that there are no limits to the action of the state, but on the other hand it is fully conceded that there are no "natural rights" which bar the way. The question is now one of expediency rather than of principle. In general it is believed that the state should not do for the individual what he can do as well for himself, but each specific question must be decided on its own merits, and each action of the state justified, if at all, by the relative advantages of the proposed line of conduct.

At yet another point the drift away from the Revolutionary theory is evident; namely, in relation to the division of governmental powers. The generally accepted theory since the eighteenth century has been that all governmental powers may be divided into the legislative, the executive, and

the judicial; that in every free government these powers should be carefully separated and a distinct set of officers should administer each class of them. This has long been regarded as a “fundamental" of political theory and of constitutional law as well.1 Viewing the situation from the standpoint of administrative law, however, a new line of division has been recently drawn by Goodnow.2 In Politics and Administration Goodnow criticises the theory of the tripartite division of governmental powers as an "unworkable and unapplicable rule of law," and proposes to substitute another classification in its place. The primary functions of the state may be divided, he maintains, into politics, "the expression of the will of the state," and administration, "the execution of that will." "Politics" includes constitution-making, legislation, selection of governmental officers, and the control of the function of executing the will of the state. This function of politics is discharged by constitutional conventions, legislatures, the judiciary, and the political parties. "Administration," on the other hand, may be divided into two classes: the administration of justice, commonly called the judicial authority, and the administration of govern

1 See William Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers," in Columbia Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. V.

2 Frank J. Goodnow, Politics and Administration (1900), Comparative Administrative Law (1893).

ment, which includes what is ordinarily termed the executive authority, together with other functions of a quasi-judicial or semi-scientific or statistical character.1

The method of control over the administration is discussed, and the highly decentralized system adopted in Revolutionary times is subjected to severe criticism. The conclusion drawn is that the present administrative system of the various states should be much more centralized and consolidated than at present; and in the second place that the political party should receive legal recognition as a governmental organ. The fear of centralization which our fathers entertained is, he holds, under modern conditions no longer reasonable. It is a "battle-cry suitable only to an age that has already passed away," "a bogie which has been conjured up by designing persons conscious that a proper organization of our administrative system will work to their disadvantage."3 The party, furthermore, must no longer be regarded as a purely voluntary association but as a political body subject to public regulation and control, constituting,

2

1 Politics and Administration, Chaps. II, IV.

2 Ibid. 261.

Ibid. 130. Cf. Ernst Freund, "The Law of Administration in America," in the Political Science Quarterly, Vol. IX. See also "Public Administration in Massachusetts," by Robert H. Whitten, in Columbia University Studies, Vol. VIII, No. 4; "The Centralization of Administration in New York State," by John A. Fairlie, Ibid. Vol. IX, No. 3.