an explanation and justification of the new con ditions.

The Federalist's argument in defence of the Constitution was directed along the following lines. It was urged that the modern system of representation enables government to extend over farv wider limits than would otherwise be practicable. While in ancient times it was true that the limit of a democracy was that size which would allow all the citizens to assemble in order to exercise the necessary public functions, by the modern plan the limit is that extent which will allow the representatives of the citizens to assemble.1 Again, as between large and small republics, the larger state has the advantage in this respect, that its officers are chosen from larger numbers, and hence the opportunities are greater for the selection of able men. The broader the field or range of choice, the greater the chance for a good selection, is the argument.2 A third reason in favor of a large state is that increased size will afford a wider variety of interests. Now, the larger the number of these, the greater the difficulty of forming such a combination as will lead to the tyrannical rule of any one faction. Hence the greatest possible security for the rights of the individual is found where there is a large number of different interests in the given community; and the larger the number, the greater the difficulty of forming a dangerous combination. In 1 Nos. 14, 62. 8 No. 50.

2 No. 10.

Rhode Island, for example, there is only a small extent of territory to be ruled and only a few groups to be considered. Under these conditions it seems that any particular interest is in the highest degree insecure. But in the United States, with its vast area and great variety of occupations, there must of necessity be such a balancing of claims as will render the domination of any one, or even of a few interests, impossible.1

The Federalist's discussion of forms of government is interesting and suggestive, particularly in respect to the "Republic."2 This is defined as "a government which derives all its powers, directly or indirectly, from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behaviour." 3 The essential fact is that the government derives its authority from the great body of the society and not from any particular class. The method of election may be indirect, the tenure of office may be almost permanent, but these facts do not detract from the republican character of the government, provided the ultimate responsibility rests with the great body of the people. The distinction between a pure democracy and a "republic" consists, according to the Federalist, mainly in two points: first,

1 This was a favorite idea of Madison.

2 The discussion of the federal-national character of the new Union is given in Chap. VII, infra. 8 No. 38.

in the more complete development, in the republic, of the representative idea; and, secondly, in the greater territorial extent of the republic.

The common division of governmental powers into legislative, executive, and judicial was adopted by the Federalist as one of the axioms of political science.1 The advocates of the pending constitution were forced to meet, nevertheless, the objection made by certain jealous admirers of liberty, that the proposed plan of government did not respect this fundamental principle-that, on the contrary, the three classes of power were dangerously confused. It was pointed out that the legislature might impeach and convict the executive, that the executive would appoint the judiciary, and that the senate would confirm appointments and ratify treaties. To these plausible arguments the Federalist replied by a closer examination of the theory of the tripartite division of powers. This doctrine, it was held, does not imply or require that each of the several departments is to be absolutely and entirely isolated from the others; or that one department is to have no influence whatever on the determinations of another. The only danger to be averted is that the whole power of any two or more departments might pass into the same hands, as would be the case if one governmental organ should obtain both the law-making and the law-executing power, or the executive and the

1 No. 46.

judicial power.

This, it was claimed, was the proper interpretation of the doctrine, and the view actually taken by the states in framing the Revolutionary constitutions. Not only was the radical theory deemed incorrect, but it was regarded as wholly impracticable and even dangerous. It is not possible, so argued the Federalist, to separate governmental organs in any measure whatever unless they are so connected and related as to give each one a certain control over the others. It is entirely insufficient to delineate "parchment barriers" against the encroachments of one department upon another. There must be provided some constitutional means by which each department may exercise a certain restraint on the encroaching tendencies of the others. It is well enough to write down in the Constitution the declaration that the three sets of powers must be distinct and independent, but unless the departments are interrelated there will be no separation whatever. 1 In other words, the greatest and strongest barrier against consolidation and concentration of power is the mutual interrelation and interdependence of the various departments. The Federalist abandoned the doctrinaire theory of the absolute separation of the functions of government, as it was stated, for example, in the Massachusetts constitution. In fact, it was definitely admitted that it was wholly impossible accurately to

1 Nos. 46-50. Cf. James Wilson, Works, I, 368.

define the boundary lines between the various departments, and consequently the true policy was to devise such a balance of interests and motives as would insure, not an absolute separation, but a substantial and enduring interdependence of the three classes of powers.

In addition to the threefold division of powers, the Federalist called attention to another method of securing a constitutional equilibrium. The new theory now advanced was that the states and the Federal government would be balanced against each other, while within both state and Federal governments there would be a balance of legislative, executive, and judicial organs. The different governments would control each other, and at the same time each would be controlled by a division of powers within itself. This unique arrangement, it was urged, afforded additional guaranty that the government would not easily become an instrument of tyranny.1

The discussion in detail of each of the three classes of power-the legislative, the executive, and the judicial—is a masterly treatment from the side of constitutional law, and also reveals many deviations from the radical political theory of the preceding decade. In the Revolutionary constitutions, as already seen, the executive power was in disrepute, and the legislative the object of popular confidence. The executive authority suggested

1 No. 50.