MAJOR-GENERAL THE HON. J. LINDSAY, M.P. in the Chair.

ENGLAND, HER WARS, AND EXPEDITIONS, SINCE 1815. By COLONEL ADAIR, A.D.C. to the Queen.

PART I.

THE CHAIRMAN said it was hardly necessary to introduce Colonel Adair to the audience, as he had often addressed them before. He never took up any subject which he did not thoroughly understand; and when he did introduce one, he always did so with very great ability.

COLONEL ADAIR: With regard to the subject which I shall have the honour to treat to-day, it has not escaped my notice that I am obnoxious in a very considerable degree to a charge of presumption, in attempting to set forth the military achievements since 1815, by land and sea, of an empire which has carried its warfare wider and deeper than has any known to civilisation, with the exception perhaps of the Spanish monarchy. Vast as was the space which the Roman eagles overshadowed, it was narrow compared to that over which the English standards wave. Therefore it is that, deprecating no criticism, yet requesting rather a liberal judgment of the purpose with which I approach this noble task, than as conceiving that I deal with it exhaustively, I shall now proceed.

In the first place, it will be recollected that England stands amongst military and colonizing nations almost without a parallel or an example in her need to conduct warfare of varying types. On her, rests the obligation of enforcing by warlike means the due execution of treaties; on her, also, falls the obligation of protecting her colonies proper; and on her devolves the duty of defending, no less than of administering, the "territories that have been gathered beneath her sway. Hence she is destined to assimilate and practise specialities of warfare differing in degree and in character from those proper to nations which, possessing no colonies, or but few, wage a warfare limited to a single class of operations in 20

VOL. V.

field or siege. For instance, it is incumbent on those who wield the military strength of England to be prepared to confront an enemy campaigning by rule of European science, as in the wars of the Peninsula and of the Crimea, and those who, being in part trained to the Asiatic and desultory mode of fight, have nevertheless adopted, in a certain sense, the European system of tactics and of organization-such as the Persian, the Chinese, the Mahratta, and the Sikh. Again, there are the warlike races who, relying on their national and appropriate system of warfare-as the Affghans and the Burmese-must be treated with a strategy varying in relation to the habits of undisciplined, yet not despicable, foes. England has also to encounter with those races, unbroken in their savage strength, resolute, and partially barbarous, which do not shrink from the British troops in the field, trusting, and not without warrant at the outset, to the natural strength of the country, which has suggested their not incomplete organization such as the Kaffir and the New Zealander. For all the exigencies of such dissimilar campaigns, an English war administration must be prepared. Now, it would seem that the generic distinction between the system of European strategy and the system of the Asiaticthat is, of what may be called local tactics-consists mainly in the preponderance given to the scientific employment of infantry and of siege artillery by generals manoeuvring and campaigning on principles of military science. The Asiatics of the Indian Peninsula, for instance, have shewn great skill in casting heavy guns, and in delivering masses of artillery fire in position; while they are not successful in the employment of siege artillery. The cavalry of Africa and of Asia is capable of wonderful efforts, even in their partly trained squadrons; but in the European system of warfare alone, due and scientific preponderance is given to the combined movements of infantry, to which, from the days of the Spanish Bands down to those in which the solidity of the British regiments attracted the admiration of their allies, the victory in all great battles in Europe, with but a single exception, has been ascribed. For the employment of siege artillery the Asiatic genius is notoriously unfitted.

Such being the duties of England, to what extent has she been compelled to develop her military resources? Since 1815, in the four quarters of the globe twenty-two wars have been waged by her arms, concluded by the sharp struggle of the Indian mutiny, equivalent in proportion and manoeuvres to four wars-certainly to four sternest campaigns. Twenty expeditions within that time have been carried to the extremity of the earth. In that period every form and manner of war has been experienced and tested, and therefore it may be thought that some general rules are deducible from such wide and severe experience for the future guidance and organization of her troops, for the policy in conducting wars, and for the application of strategy. And it is worthy of especial remark that, while the military virtues have never ceased-overlaid, as they were supposed to be, by the security that a long peace had induced-yet the general organization of her armies, in consequence of the long peace, had not corresponded to the latent powers of the magnificent machine to which substance and permanence were to be supplied. Nor has adequate preparation always preceded war; just as it has been proved too fatally that sufficient means of maintaining warlike effort with vigour has not always been supplied.

Now, of the peculiarities of the British service. The chief duty, is the colonial, which causes the largest demand upon the national forces; for the colonial service, comprehending all our dependencies in their wide bounds, troops must be raised partly in the colonies and dependencies, but to be led by regiments sont from England. Therefore, the first principle to be deduced would be, that the unit of organization of the British army should be the single battalion; a distinction being drawn between the regimental, as understood in England, and the brigade system of continental armies, in which the single or the two-battalion regiment is the exception, and the four-battalion or the brigade corps is the rule. Where large masses can be kept permanently in the same quarters or province, it is well to organize regiments in several battalions; where it is desirable, as in the detachment service of the colonial empire of England, that every fraction of the unit should be complete in itself, the regimental is the appropriate organization. If, then, dependence is mainly to be placed on the efficiency of troops in small bodies, trained to act independently, which yet in no degree diminishes the aptitude for consolidation, but rather prepares, by effective instruction, for large consolidation-if it be not practicable to raise suddenly large masses of troops, as in military states, then it is imperative to give a high training to the individual soldier. Much progress in that respect has been lately made. The regimental system was well understood, as between officer and men, even before the Crimean war; it scarcely admitted of improvement. But the weapons were inferior to the soldier's military merits; tactics admitted of simplification, and have been simplified, whence a larger usefulness has been given to the physical power and mental energy that unite to mark the British soldier.

Moreover, if the soldier's training should be complete, the machinery which is to keep the army effective must not be restricted in its composition or scope. Hence arises the need for a staff corps effective for all military purposes, and numerically adequate to the demands of multiform and disseminated warfare; for many are the opportunities of applying the labours of the scientific corps in giving weight by skill to the scanty numbers which are available, ordinarily, for British warfare. Then, while the soldier looks for few luxuries in the field, he should receive, without stint or delay, constant and steady supplies to maintain his strength, to recruit his strength, and to restore his health, if for a time he be unfitted, by disease or wounds, for the line of battle.

Such being the principles, as regards the soldier, of a British system rightly applied, what are the rules most suitable for the external military policy of the empire? The natural fortresses of England are such as Gibraltar, or Aden, placed at the extremity of a territory, no matter how hostile, so that the sea be open; or of islands within whose harbours may be concentrated fleets designed to maintain communications between the fortresses, maritime, peninsular, or insular, and the mother country. In this portion of our military policy, we rightly follow the example of two of the most successful of the colonising nations-the Genoese, who strengthened points on the mainland with forts, and the Venetians, who occupied islands, whence neither were driven forth, while true to the policy which dictated such occupation.

Hence arises another principle of British strategy, namely, to treat the

sea always as the British base of operations. England is often practically nearer the base which governs operations, by sea, than other countries are by land, seeing that distance is of little moment, in comparison with facility of access, and regularity of passage. The base of operations being by sea, a base of operations by land is dispensed with; and on cognate reasons those campaigns have been carried out with the happiest effect, of which the line of operations has been drawn through fluvial districts. Again, in the progress of wars in isolated or remote regions there is one rule which, in the most complicated campaigns of our wars of manoeuvre -Kafir or Indian-should always be respected, confirmed as it is by the opinion of the Duke of Wellington. It is this-never to retreat before an Asiatic or a barbarous enemy; and further, to break up combinations of hostile tribes by moveable columns, employed with much effect in the Kafir war, and against the Indian mutineers. And thus the essential predominance of highly trained infantry will be maintained.

There is yet another law important to the military policy of England. whether a general leads contingents, or acts in combination with independent allies. Let the general who leads contingents be absolute in his authority. If British troops be required to co-operate with an ally, let the lines of operation be distinct and well-defined, and suitable to the genius of each army, in order to the largest results. For, inasmuch as each class of war is special to each particular army, each has its particular gift and appropriate military style; in order to common objects, the efforts of allies should be, to use a mathematical expression, rather convergent than combined, since communications may be maintained, though contiguity be avoided.

The warfare of England may be divided into three classes: the warfare of obligation by treaty, the colonial, and the warfare of territorial defence. It is now proposed to notice briefly the wars of obligation by treaty, and the less important maritime expeditions. On a second occasion, two colonial wars, the Kaffir, and New Zealand, and the larger maritime wars, of China, and of Burmah, and some few of those land expeditions in India, which, on account of the genius, the active courage, and the endurance manifested, deserve a chapter in the military history of England, though in the blaze of our bolder successes they may have escaped the observation of our countrymen. The third and last division will comprise the Indian wars of tactics, and of the higher class of strategy. Nor will those who have studied the history of the two Affghan campaigns, the campaign of Scinde, and of the Cutchi hills; the Sikh campaigns, the second and third Mahratta wars, the Nepâl war, and lastly, the magnificent combinations by which the Indian mutiny was trodden out, hesitate to maintain the credit of British strategy against any parallels drawn from the campaigns of Europe.

And first, of the wars that succeeded to the great cycle of strife closed in 1815. It would, at the first glance, seem that since the twenty-five years of devastation which blazed round the world, from the storm of the Bastile to the last Cossack rush on the barriers of Montmartre, that England had been lightly visited with the plague of war; but year after year, in tracing our military records, brings its history of strife.

It is difficult to include in the previous definitions the wars in which England conceived herself imperiously urged to action in behalf of huma

nity. From such strife her sword has never been withheld; and the first occasion after the occupation of Paris was at the bombardment of Algiers. Supinely had the European powers endured the ascendancy of the corsair in the Mediterranean. Since the days of Blake, Cromwell's admiral, a practical impunity was granted to the predatory power of the pirates of Algiers; for the Spanish enterprise failed in its completion, and the French under Louis XIV. gained no solid advantage; whence it was not till the combined fleet of England and of the Netherlands bombarded Algiers in 1816 that the plague was effectively stayed for a season, to be finally and utterly annihilated by the arms of the French people. This naval action was distinguished, as usual, by the characteristic skill and the still more characteristic coolness of the British navy and of its gallant ally. To the naval genius of the two kingdoms exclusively this triumph is due. From the hour on that August afternoon when Lord Exmouth laid the flag-ship within fifty yards of the Algerine batteries, till the last shot was fired at ten p.m., was one continued exhibition of masterly skill and science by the allied squadrons, and of resolute vigour by the Algerines. If one result of seamanship be specially selected, it would be placing the Granicus in the line, under fire, through the dense smoke; for it is principally with the view of drawing attention to the progressive results of artillery fire, that I remark on the armaments. So many of 866 guns as could be trained from the decks of the allied squadron kept down the fire and disabled 700 guns on the sea-faces of Algiers, against the combined advantages of position and concentration and an effective preponderance of available ordnance. The expenditure of 118 tons of powder and 500 tons of shot attest the severity of the cannonade. The characteristic of the action is a vigorous and direct fire from the fleets and batteries, with the partial employment of rockets and shells.

But not alone on the African seaboard were the naval expeditions of the country covered, as usual, with distinction. The expedition of the Persian Gulf to Ras-el-Khyma, a fortified town on a peninsula, in 1819, proves in its successful issue of how powerful an organisation the combined efforts of our military and our naval strength are susceptible. The troops sailed from Bombay in December, 1819, were landed on the 2nd, the trenches were opened on the 4th, and the town was stormed on the 8th. The 47th and 65th King's, the flank companies of some Sepoy regiments, and the Honourable East India Company's artillery and engineers, formed the land force of five thousand men. Three English men of war, the " Liverpool," 50, Eden," 26, "Curlew," 18, and the Honourable East India Company's cruisers and mortar boats co-operated. Within these four days, piracy on that coast was extirpated. The expeditions against Borneo in the Eastern seas and the pirates of the Mediterranean attest the pervasive power and the unselfish policy of England. Successive expeditions also penetrated, in 1835 and 1847, from Cape Coast Castle to the town of Apollonia. It lies in the interior, at a considerable distance from Cape Coast Castle, and thither an expedition was directed in order to check the land piracy in that district, with but partial success.

66

Amongst the minor operations by land on the African continents, arose an unexpected war, not unchequered with disaster, in that inroad which resulted, in 1824, in the defeat of the troops, at Cape Coast Castle, by the Ashantees. But repulse and disaster, developed the strength of the